In polling released by BC Hydro last week, the public power utility touts “broad” support for its controversial Site C dam — a mega hydro dam on the Peace River that would flood 107 kilometres of river valley, forcing farmers and First Nations off their land.

Hydro must have been counting on nobody taking a close look at the questions they asked respondents, because not only are they misleading, but they also tell another story entirely.

Let’s first address a glaring problem with the questions themselves: polling company Abacus Data began by asking British Columbians a multiple choice question about how to meet “increasing electricity demand.” 

There’s just one problem: B.C. does not have increasing electricity demand. In fact, electricity demand in B.C. has remained basically flat since 2005. But no, the pollster told all 1,000 telephone respondents that electricity demand is rising and we must meet it somehow.

Then comes the key question: “Is the idea of building Site C, a new hydroelectric dam, to help meet the rising demand for electricity in B.C., an idea you strongly support, support, can accept under certain circumstances, oppose, or strongly oppose?”

Well whaddya know, that old porky about “rising demand for electricity” has appeared right in the benchmark polling question, presented plainly as fact.

(Anyone with any experience with polling knows the demand language is so prominent because BC Hydro has likely message tested the bejeebus out of it and knows exactly how to prime the pump to elicit the answer it wants.)

Continuing the obsession with power demand, later on in the poll, respondents are asked to gauge their agreement with the statement: “I have no doubt that the demand for electricity in B.C. will continue to grow significantly in the years ahead.”

After being misinformed about electricity demand in B.C. repeatedly in the poll, 89 per cent of respondents then say they expect demand to increase. In other words: 89 per cent of respondents listened diligently to the misleading information and responded accordingly.

Enter this quote from Bruce Anderson, chairman of Abacus Data, who designed and analyzed the poll: “What stands out for me is the fact that people broadly believe that more power will be needed and that a new dam is probably one of the best ways to meet growing demand.”

Well, doesn’t that just take the biscuit. Really, Mr. Anderson, were you surprised that after you told respondents multiple times that electricity demand is increasing that they then parroted your line back to you? Seems like a pretty simple case of cause and effect to me.

Opposition to Site C Dam Has Doubled Since 2013

Now, for the results themselves. While BC Hydro would like you to focus on awareness reaching a new high (77 per cent) and 73 per cent of British Columbians saying that they either support or can support Site C under certain circumstances, the trends tell a different story.

Between 2013 and 2016, awareness of the project grew from 41 per cent to 77 per cent. During that same period of time, opposition to the dam nearly doubled, growing from 13 per cent to 24 per cent. In other words, the more people who learn about the dam, the more opposition increases — that’s not a super positive trend-line for a project that is only six months into eight years of construction.

.@BCHydro (really) doesn’t want you to know #SiteC opposition has doubled https://t.co/O76cyRjVZp #bcpoli pic.twitter.com/SeshQDDHSX

— DeSmog Canada (@DeSmogCanada) June 14, 2016

Support also grew from 42 per cent in 2013 to 49 per cent in 2016, during which time the B.C. government churned out relentless spin about the so-called “need” for the project. Despite the spin, growth in opposition significantly outpaced support. 

“It's not that people don't have any anxieties about the impacts of this project, but that a better alternative is not obvious, and a certain degree of comfort has developed that this project is being handled with appropriate diligence,” Anderson said in BC Hydro’s release.

Actually, a better alternative is obvious — but BC Hydro never chose to poll about that. First and foremost, demand for power has been flat in B.C. for the past 10 years. Were it to begin to increase, we could easily meet our needs with the Columbia River entitlement or various smaller scale renewable options — chiefly geothermal. Both of those options would be far cheaper than the Site C dam.

And when it comes to the project being handled with “appropriate diligence,” there are numerous high-profile individuals and groups who have come forward to argue the contrary. Perhaps most surprising is Harry Swain, chair of the provincial-federal panel tasked with reviewing Site C, who said BC Hydro’s failure to adequately investigate alternatives to the dam represents a “dereliction of duty" and that the province shouldn't be moving ahead while the demand case remains unclear.

The joint review panel’s report on Site C predicted the dam would lose at least $800 million in the first four years of production because there’s no need for the power in B.C. and exports would lose money.

That’s why B.C. Premier Christy Clark is now flapping her gums about selling the power to Alberta to power the oilsands  — an entirely new (and totally unrealistic) justification for the project that confirms there’s no need for the power in B.C.

Clark knows there’s no demand for new power in B.C.  No doubt BC Hydro knows it, too. Now if only British Columbians knew it — then how would they answer a polling question about spending nearly $9 billion to build a new dam?

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In an exclusive interview with DeSmog Canada, former BC Hydro CEO Marc Eliesen says ratepayers will face a “devastating” increase in their electricity bills if the Site C dam is built and emphasizes there is no rush to build new sources of power generation in B.C.

“With Site C, BC Hydro ratepayers will be facing a devastating increase of anywhere between 30 and 40 per cent over the next three years,” Eliesen told DeSmog Canada in his first interview on the subject.

“There’s no rush. There’s no immediate need for Site C or any other alternative energy,” he said.

Eliesen’s comment about the lack of immediate need for the power echoes statements made by Harry Swain, the chair of the panel that reviewed the Site C hydro dam for the provincial and federal governments. In March, Swain told DeSmog Canada the B.C. government should have held off on making a decision on the dam.

With a price tag of $8.8 billion, the 1,100-megawatt Site C dam is the most expensive public project in B.C. history. The hydro dam, which would impact 13,000 hectares of agricultural land, has been proposed for the Peace River for three decades.

In late 2014, the provincial and federal governments approved the project and this July construction permits were issued despite pending court challenges by First Nations.

Eliesen, an economist by training, has also served as chairman and CEO of Ontario Hydro, chairman of Manitoba Hydro and has held senior roles with the federal government and the governments of Ontario and Manitoba. In November, Eliesen called the National Energy Board’s review process for the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline “fraudulent” and a “public deception” as he dropped out of the process.

Failure to Consider Columbia River Power ‘Non-Sensical’

Eliesen said there is no rush to build new generating capacity in B.C., leaving “more than sufficient time to evaluate alternatives” that are more cost effective and minimize environmental impacts.

The alternatives include everything from geothermal to BC Hydro’s Burrard Thermal plant — due to be decommissioned in 2016 — to the 1,100 megawatts of electricity B.C. has access to through the Columbia River Treaty, Eliesen said.

Not considering using the Columbia River power to meet B.C.’s needs is “non-sensical,” Eliesen said.  (See: The Forgotten Electricity that Could Eliminate Need for Site C Dam)

“If there is a demand for the power, well you clearly have an available supply, which you can depend on,” he said.

“If there was some massive escalation in demand that you needed immediately, well my goodness, you’ve got two instant sources: there’s 1,100 megawatts from the Columbia River and almost another 1,000 from the Burrard Thermal Plant, which was converted from coal to natural gas some time ago.”

Mining, LNG Companies Not Paying ‘Fair Share’

Eliesen also critiqued BC Hydro for adopting a price structure that results in everyday British Columbians subsidizing heavy power users.

“Whether it’s mining or proposed LNG plants or anything of that nature …  They’re all subsidized by other hydro ratepayers. Those heavy power users do not pay the true cost,” Eliesen said. “They are not paying their fair share.”

The B.C. Utilities Commission used to review the cost of service, but that doesn’t take place any more, Eliesen said.

“The provincial government basically declared we don’t want the commission — we don’t want anyone — looking at BC Hydro plans. I think the result has been quite devastating.”

The B.C. government exempted the Site C dam from a review by the B.C. Utilities Commission, despite calls from its own expert panel to refer the project for an independent review of costs and need. The province’s failure to consider the panel’s recommendations has since become the basis for the Peace Valley Landowners Association court challenge against the Site C dam.

Eliesen noted other jurisdictions are conducting much more thorough analyses of hydro projects, noting two projects in Manitoba he recently advised on. 

“They went through the most detailed evaluation by the Manitoba Public Utilities Board that ever could have taken place,” Eliesen said. “The kind of analysis and investigation and due diligence that was taken has never taken place recently in British Columbia.”

Site C Dam Price Tag Likely to Escalate

In 1993, when Eliesen was the president and CEO of BC Hydro, he issued a public statement on behalf of the board stating that Site C would never be built because of its significant negative environmental, economic and social impacts.

That position quietly went by the wayside when the Gordon Campbell government was elected, Eliesen said, noting that electricity costs have increased at a far quicker rates than other jurisdictions since then.

Over the years, Eliesen has seen the cost of the Site C dam nearly double. 

“I’ve seen the costs of Site C escalate enormously,” he says. “It used to be $5, $6 billion, then it was $7.9, now it’s $8.8 billion. It’ll easily reach, if it’s ever built, in the $11 to $12 billion dollar range.”

Eliesen says the costs of Site C haven’t been adequately reviewed and there are “too many conflicting interests in BC Hydro for it to undertake its own due diligence on this matter.”

Calls for a moratorium on construction on Site C have gained strength recently with the Greater Vancouver Regional District and Peace River Regional District both calling on Premier Christy Clark to pause the project while active court cases are completed

On July 23, the B.C. Government and Service Employees’ Union announced its opposition to the Site C dam due to its violation of indigenous rights and the massive loss of habitat and agricultural lands.

Site C Dam ‘Doesn’t Make Any Sense’

Despite the growing calls for a moratorium, the B.C. government appears hell-bent on pushing ahead with building the dam.

Asked why the government continues to push ahead, Eliesen said it doesn’t make any sense.

“Well I can’t talk for the government, so I don’t know, other than they want some major project undertaken during their current election term,” he said.

“It doesn’t make sense in the context of environment, it doesn’t make sense in the context of wanting to work with First Nations and it doesn’t make sense, more specifically, on the economic impact because the B.C. ratepayer will pay enormously over the next three years.”

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On January 17, 1961, Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and United States President Dwight Eisenhower signed the Columbia River Treaty.

It was a landmark agreement that required Canada to build three dams to aid in U.S. flood protection and power generation. In exchange for taking on the impacts of these water storage projects, Canada was paid $64 million for 60 years of flood control benefits.

Canada also received an entitlement to one-half of the estimated additional hydroelectric generation capability at power plants on the Columbia River in the United States made possible by the operation of the dams in Canada.

This power is referred to as the “Canadian Entitlement” and since 2003 it has amounted to at least 1,176 megawatts of capacity and 4,073 gigawatt hours of energy a year.

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That just so happens to be nearly identical to the amount of electricity B.C. could create via the controversial $8.8 billion Site C dam — the most expensive public project in B.C. history.

The B.C. government gave Site C the go-ahead in December 2014, but the third dam on the Peace River is facing several court challenges from landowners and First Nations who oppose flooding 83 kilometres of the Peace Valley.

This week, a U.S. energy economist said the power from the dam is dramatically more costly than previously thought. The B.C. government has argued the dam is the most cost-effective way to meet the province’s electricity needs and has rejected repeated calls for an independent review of costs by the B.C. Utilities Commission.

Failure to Consider Columbia River Power ‘Inexplicable’: Panel Chair

Harry Swain, the chair of the joint federal-provincial panel that reviewed the Site C dam, panned the B.C. government’s actions on the dam in March, in comments called “unprecedented” by environmental law experts.

 “To say we will not consider our entitlement under the Columbia River Treaty is inexplicable,” Swain told DeSmog Canada.

In recent years, B.C. has been selling off the Canadian Entitlement to the tune of $100 to $300 million annually. From 2010 to 2012, the province received about $30 per megawatt-hour for that power. Meantime, the cost of power from the Site C dam is estimated at $83 per megawatt-hour.

“On the face of it, it doesn’t make a lot of sense to be building new sources at $83 (per megawatt hour) and continuing to export at $25 or $30 or $40 per megawatt hour,” said Philip Raphals, an energy analyst hired by the Treaty 8 Tribal Association to provide expert testimony during the Site C hearings. “Why not just use our own inexpensive resources instead of selling them off for so little?”

Using Columbia River Power Would Save B.C. $2 Billion: Treaty 8

In a 20-page letter to the B.C. government, the Treaty 8 Tribal Association made the case that taking into account just 50 per cent of the Canadian Entitlement would defer the need for new electricity capacity in the province to 2034.

“We have estimated the potential benefits to ratepayers of enacting such a regulation to repatriate the Canadian Entitlement to be at least $2 billion compared to the Site C portfolio preferred by BC Hydro,” said the letter sent in Dec. 2014 to Minister of Energy and Mines Bill Bennett and Minister of Finance Mike De Jong.

Days after the letter was sent, the B.C. government announced it intended to move ahead with the Site C project.

Canadian Entitlement ‘Fell Between Cracks’: Energy Expert

The panel that reviewed the Site C dam was not allowed to consider the possibility of repatriating the Canadian Entitlement, nor did BC Hydro bring it forward as an option.

Why not? B.C.’s Clean Energy Act.

The act includes a self-sufficiency requirement, which requires that BC Hydro be able to produce enough electricity to satisfy provincial electricity demand. It was designed so BC Hydro can’t rely on market purchases, particularly imports of high-polluting power, for planning purposes.

 “The Canadian Entitlement, however, consists of hydropower, the environmental costs of which are already borne by British Columbians,” reads the Treaty 8 letter. “Adopting a regulation allowing the import of the Canadian Entitlement (for planning purposes) could not be seen as compromising B.C.’s climate polices or its goal of energy self-sufficiency.”

Because of this requirement, BC Hydro never examined the possibilities of using the Canadian Entitlement to meet B.C.’s needs, Raphals says.

“How, then, would the provincial government ever become aware that it could avoid the environmental and treaty infringement consequences of the Site C project, avoid borrowing billions of dollars and avoid major rate impacts by repatriating BC Hydro power, if BC Hydro believes it is barred from even mentioning this possibility unless explicitly asked to do so by the government?” the Treaty 8 letter to government said.

The panel’s mandate was to work within existing laws, regulations and policy, which meant the Columbia River power only came up as an aside during the environmental review.

“The downstream benefits are off of everyone’s radar … It seemed to us that it’s a solution that has fallen between the cracks,” Raphals said.

The joint review panel did comment on the self-sufficiency requirement briefly, saying:

“Taken literally, this means a B.C. disconnected to the outside world, a vision of autarchy truly strange for a province that relies on trade, and a long way from its recent history …. Minor relaxations could mean being connected for reliability or for diversity exchange …”

The consequences of the self-sufficiency requirement were also evaluated in a 2011 BC Hydro review.  That panel wrote:

“The panel recognizes that the economic and energy situations have changed, and that the existing self sufficiency definition may be overly conservative and place an undue burden on ratepayers. The panel recommends that BC Hydro and the province evaluate alternative definitions and timelines for self-sufficiency that meet the needs of the province and ratepayers in a way that is sustainable for the long term.”

Re-Negotiation of Treaty Creates Too Much Uncertainty: B.C. Government

Given these well-documented concerns and the low market rate of electricity, why hasn’t the B.C. government considered using the Columbia River power to defer the need to build more expensive sources of power, such as the Site C dam?

In low water years, B.C. currently may import up to 10 per cent of annual demand, according to the Ministry of Energy and Mines.

“Meeting new B.C. demand by relying on the Canadian Entitlement instead of building new sources of power in B.C. would increase this exposure,” a ministry spokesperson said in a written response to DeSmog Canada. “While BC Hydro is comfortable with a 10 per cent level of exposure, a higher level of exposure would introduce risks regarding the ability of the market to reliably meet B.C.’s electricity needs under certain conditions.”

In addition to that, the treaty is up for re-negotiation.

“It is also not a long-term resource as either country may unilaterally terminate the treaty with 10 years notice,” the spokesperson said.

Raphals argues that, given the importance of the treaty for U.S. system operations, it is “implausible” that the U.S. would simply abrogate it. 

“It is, however, entirely possible that the amount of the Canadian Entitlement will eventually be reduced,” he said.

And that’s why, when modeling the impact of the Canadian Entitlement, Raphals limited the downstream benefits to half of what is currently available.

Raphals argues that taking the Canadian Entitlement into account allows B.C. to delay the need to build new projects and ultimately make smarter planning decisions.

“There is no need for BC Hydro to make firm decisions in 2014 on how to serve its loads 20 years from now,” Raphals said. “The world today is very different than it was 20 years ago, and there is every reason to believe it will be very different as well, in very unpredictable ways, in 2034.”

Photo: Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower sign the Columbia River Treaty in 1961.

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Part 1 of DeSmog Canada’s exclusive sit-down interview with Harry Swain, the man who chaired the panel tasked with reviewing BC Hydro’s Site C dam, sparked a firestorm of activity on Tuesday.

Energy Minister Bill Bennett responded to Swain’s critique in the Globe and Mail, the B.C. NDP issued a statement on Swain’s comments and an environmental law expert called the statements “unprecedented.”

Martin Olszynski, an assistant professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Calgary, said Swain’s comments are extremely rare.

“To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that a panel member has spoken about a previous report in this manner,” Olszynski, an expert in environmental assessment, said. “To my knowledge, it’s unprecedented.”

The concerns Swain raises are not unusual though, Olszynski pointed out.

“The course of actions taken by the B.C. and federal governments in this case are not atypical,” he said. “They very often will ignore, or pay only lip service to, the recommendations of their expert panels. If you talked to other people who have served on similar panels — if they were willing to talk — they might express similar frustration.”

Geothermal Recommendations for B.C. Ignored …. For 32 Years

Certainly, the issue of recommendations being ignored is a live one in the case of the 1,100-megawatt Site C dam proposed for the Peace River. The dam is facing six legal challenges, including one that alleges that Cabinet erred in dismissing key portions of the joint review panel’s findings on the project.

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But beyond that, one of the key issues the panel raised in its report was the B.C. government’s failure to follow a recommendation to investigate alternatives to the dam, particularly geothermal — a recommendation made 32 years ago by the B.C. Utilities Commission when it first turned down the Site C proposal.

“The province or the province and its wholly owned subsidiary BC Hydro should have taken to heart the admonitions of the utilities commission 32 years ago and done some of the basic work that would allow an industry to develop,” Swain told DeSmog Canada. “But they didn’t do it, so there we are.”

In speaking notes obtained by DeSmog Canada, the province prepares to deflect questions about why it hasn’t pursued geothermal.

“While geothermal energy has a role to play in British Columbia, it has been slow to develop and has not developed the track record to reliably meet today’s growing demand,” read the notes prepared for the government’s Site C announcement in December.

Asked what he makes of that statement, Swain responded: “Dereliction of duty.”

The B.C. government has the principal responsibility for lands and resources under the constitution, Swain said.

“And in that sense, the province owes — in my view — an obligation to the citizens of B.C. to do a lot of basic mapping and exploration,” he said. “I don’t think there’s a major resource industry in this country that didn’t start without governments doing some of the basic work.”

Canada is the only country around the Pacific Ring of Fire that does not produce geothermal power at a commercial scale.

Vast Amount of Data Available From Gas Drillers on Geothermal Potential

In the past three decades, technological advances have led to the discovery of even more geothermal potential in B.C. — including in the Peace Country, where the Site C dam is proposed.

“Up in the Peace, in the very strata that are being drilled for natural gas, there’s a lot of hot water,” Swain said. “Moreover, since the well logs of exploration and drilling companies are supposed to be deposited with the provincial government, there is a vast amount of information available. It was surprising to me that no attempt had been made to exploit that information.”

The challenge is that currently BC Hydro, the province’s crown energy corporation, is forbidden by law to involve itself in projects beyond big hydro and large transmission projects.

“All of the other production stuff is to come from the holy private sector,” Swain said.

To prevent future governments and panels from being “seriously uninformed” again, the panel recommended that, regardless of the decision taken on Site C, BC Hydro establish a research and development budget for the characterization of geographically diverse renewable resources.

“It’s probably fair to say that institutionally Hydro really, really wants to build this,” Swain said. “And that’s perfectly understandable. If you ask the Ford company, ‘what would you like to do?’ they’ll say ‘build cars.’ If you ask Boeing ‘what’s the solution to our transportation problems?’ they’ll say ‘airplanes.’ ”

The Canadian Geothermal Energy Association has argued geothermal can meet B.C.’s future energy needs at a lower cost than Site C with fewer environmental impacts. The association has called for a one-year moratorium on Site C to allow time for further due diligence on geothermal.

The LNG Wild Card: Inconsistency in Province’s Statements

One of the B.C. government’s go-to talking points on Site C has been that the dam is needed to power the liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry. In a Jan. 30th letter to the Peace River Regional District, Energy Minister Bill Bennett wrote that liquefied natural gas facilities would drive more electricity demand than the Joint Review Panel accounted for in its report (due to an addition error).

Swain says that, although there was an addition error in the report, it doesn’t change the conclusion: demand for the dam wasn’t proven.

“Given skepticism about LNG and about demand elasticity, I see no reason to modify the conclusion,” Swain said. “Frankly, I think their low-demand figure was probably overstated. So far there is no evidence that even their low usage scenario is likely to take place.”

Beyond that, if the province’s original LNG dreams had come to pass as quickly as they’d stated and if the plants had relied on grid electricity (two big ifs), that power would have been needed well ahead of Site C’s in-service date of 2024. A single LNG plant can require as much as 700 megawatts of electricity to run the giant compressors required to cool gas to 163 degrees below zero; at least 10 plants are proposed for B.C.’s coast, but it’s unclear whether any will come to fruition.

“If the initial scenario took place, the power demand would arise a long time before Site C could be built,” Swain said. “There really wasn’t a compatibility between the two statements of the province if you think of one statement about the development of the LNG industry and the second about the timeframe in which Site C was to be built. By their own story, they had an inconsistency.”

Site C Dam ‘No Ordinary Project’

About 20 B.C. local governments have asked the government to send Site C to the B.C. Utilities Commission to further investigate demand and costs — a recommendation made in the panel’s report and echoed by Swain in Part 1 of his interview with DeSmog Canada.

With a price tag of $8.8 billion, Site C would constitute the largest expenditure of public money in B.C. history.

“Site C is not an ordinary project,” the panel wrote in its report.

Swain said British Columbians should pay attention because “it’s going to effect them in the pocket book,” “destroy valuable bits of landscape” and “affect the constitutionally protected rights of First Nations.”

He suggested British Columbians consider the dam in light of the alternatives.

“Have we really pushed conservation and efficiency as far as they can go? And the answer is no,” he said. “What other kinds of generation or energy production are available and what are their costs and benefits?”

Swain called B.C.’s refusal to consider its entitlement under the Columbia River Treaty “inexplicable” and noted the verdict is still out on how British Columbians will react to electricity prices going up 30 per cent in the next three years (demand could decrease, for example).

Ultimately, the way forward needs to be one that considers all the options, not just large hydro dams.

“The province has defined the role of Hydro as being very limited,” Swain said. “If this were not the BC Hydro company, but simply … the ‘energy company’ whose job it was to make sure that demand was satisfied at reasonable prices regardless of source, regardless of who got to build and own, regardless of those kinds of extraneous considerations, we might have a more balanced view.”

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