Now 79, David Anderson has been fighting to prevent oil tankers on the coast of British Columbia since he was first elected 48 years ago. In the early 1970s, he was the architect of an inside passage tanker moratorium and a number of other restrictions on B.C. offshore drilling and tanker exports imposed by then-Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau — which may or may not still exist. Anderson would go on to serve as federal Minister of Environment under Jean Chretien, after a stint in provincial politics, including as leader of the provincial Liberal party. Anderson left politics in 2006, but has remained a steadfast advocate for the coast he loves.

The following interview was conducted on November 15, 2016, weeks before the federal Liberals announced a north coast crude tanker ban and approved the expansion of Kinder Morgan's Trans Mountain pipeline. It has been lightly condensed and edited for clarity.

Christopher Pollon: There has been a lot of confusion about the restrictions on oil and gas drilling and tankers that were created back in the early 1970s, and the current status of those. What is the history of this?

David Anderson: [Those restrictions] were put in place in 1971. I guess you could say I was the instigator.

I went to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and he agreed in 1970, when the Alaska pipeline battle was going full bore, that we should put a moratorium on offshore drilling. At this time [British Columbia] had 28 wells drilled at sea off the west coast of Vancouver Island and in Hecate Strait. The safety record for drilling and tankers was abysmal then — it has improved, so it has gone from dismal to bad.

Trudeau was concerned about that and the Alaska traffic [from tankers carrying Alaska oil to the lower 48]. The most likely route was the inside passage down to somewhere in Puget Sound. And that clearly was a major risk, to have tankers plying the inside passage, so Canada was determined to get them on the outside coast in the open ocean, where in fact if there were an incident, it wouldn't be like the Exxon Valdez or the Queen of the North. It would at least be a ship in trouble, with the opportunity perhaps of getting a tug out there to help it out. Also, if you have an open ocean spill, you are less likely to foul the coast.

The idea was that we were trying to prevent tanker traffic in the inside passage, and Trudeau was persuaded. He was quite an environmentalist — and I mean Pierre Elliott Trudeau — and he was persuaded. He put a moratorium on the drilling because drilling licenses require you to do so much work in a certain time period to hold the license. He said no, we'll waive that and put a moratorium on any work. So, [oil companies like Chevron] didn't lose their licenses, they are still valid out on the west coast. But 1971 was the year that they ceased to be operational.

CP: What about on the south coast?

DA: At that point we already had tanker traffic going out of Vancouver from Trans Mountain…I think most of it went to California, which is sort of ironic because we used to get entirely supplied by California a few decades before Alberta oil started to flow.

So what Prime Minister Trudeau did at that time, he said, 'we'll cap the exports at their present level.' The issue, of course, was if you take away somebody's business, they're entitled to compensation.

And also there was the issue of inconsistency with respect to refined products. We had refined products going to a lot of coastal communities, to Vancouver Island, obviously by sea. But the basic concern was that we would be in protracted negotiations and/or litigation with Trans Mountain, if we took away their export market. So what we did, we froze the level, and said, you can carry on doing what you're doing now, but we're not letting you expand.

CP: Were these restrictions made into law?

DA: It was informal. It was never formalized by an order in council. Neither of these things were formalized by order in council. And what Justin Trudeau is now planning on doing is at least formalizing the northern ban on tanker traffic, crude oil movements in northern British Columbia waters.

CP: So for the south coast, there was a restriction created for how much Trans Mountain can move?

DA: Absolutely.

CP: So, does any of this apply now? Or did these non-formalized directives die when that Prime Minister left office?

DA: Well, I can't answer that definitively; it would take a constitutional lawyer. But I guess you'd have to say that anybody can put in a proposal to be analyzed for moving oil. The National Energy Board has its methods of evaluating, and the government has its methods of evaluating proposals.

But there was in place the knowledge that it was government policy to prevent exports exceeding the level that they were at in 1971. So if you could persuade the government that its policy was wrong, then you could perhaps get a permit to increase the level.

CP: So has Kinder Morgan specifically addressed or challenged this export cap on the south coast?

DA: No, what they've said is, it doesn't exist because it was not formalized in an order in council or law.

CP: I wanted to ask you what the federal government’s perception of this moratorium has been, and the provincial government, for that matter, as well. My understanding is that the original moratorium restricted oil and gas exploration and development on the inside coastal seabed, and it barred Alaska-bound oil tankers from the Dickson Entrance, Hecate Strait, and Queen Charlotte Sound. 

DA: Well, there's another wrinkle to this thing. The Americans have the right to use the inside passage to connect two states: Washington and Alaska. We do not have full jurisdiction when you have a sea route between two states, even though it passes through Canadian internal waters.

We had to persuade the Americans to go offshore, and that's why we got Trudeau so interested. He didn't want to have the inside passage used for this major expansion in Alaska oil traffic. Two million barrels a day, that's a lot of oil moved south. 

CP: So the two million a day was from what source?

DA: Alaska, from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez, and then onward from Valdez by tanker. 

It's now down to about a fifth of that I think. It's way down. Production has dropped off in Alaska, as the field was exhausted.  

CP: What was the dynamic at the time with the Americans, were they resistant to moving the tankers to the outside waters? 

DA: We had to persuade the Americans, because technically, as far as I could see, they had the right to take a route between the two American states which we had agreed to in the various border agreements that took place about the turn of the century.

They also had the right that comes with having the world's largest navy, the right of superior power. So we had to persuade them. Now, to persuade them to get offshore, we had to be consistent. And you couldn't be consistent if you were allowing drilling [in B.C. waters]. And you couldn't be consistent if you were allowing Canadian exports.

CP: What is the best course for the current Prime Minister if he is sincere about wanting to protect the coast?

DA: The first thing is to do a proper analysis of coastal risks. We have never had anything, except for the Thompson inquiry in the 80s, where you looked at the whole coast and said, which areas are the lowest risk?

We've always just responded to company proposals such as the Enbridge [Northern Gateway] one, or the Kinder Morgan one.

We've never done a systematic evaluation of the safest place to put a port. And actually, in my view, the safest place is probably on the north coast, a place like Port Edwards. But, I'm sure you haven't heard very much about Port Edwards. It's got the least obstruction from port to open ocean, the shortest distance from port to open ocean, and so it may be the safest. I use that just as an example.

Or take Kinder Morgan. If their proposal moved to Roberts Bank, the risk of a shipping accident declines dramatically. Why? Because their current proposal means taking a tanker a day out through Second Narrows, under the bridges and out with all the traffic coming into Vancouver harbour.

Tugboat people say 'no problem, we'll just handle it with tugs,' but a tug can't stop a loaded tanker. The inertia of such a vessel is so extraordinarily high, the energy represented by its weight times the speed, it's not possible for tugs to turn it on a dime.

So even shifting the terminal of the pipe from Burnaby to Tsawwassen will reduce your tanker risk of an accident at the terminal dramatically. Nobody has done this comparative analysis of these various sites. Nobody has said well, 'to really be safer we might want to go down to Cherry Point,' which is [nearby in] Washington state, where we may get greater safety of shipping, because that's the terminal that's been used for Alaskan oil for the last 30 or 40 years.

Or maybe we should build a terminal out at Port Angeles, out in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, as far out to the ocean as we can, on the grounds that the closer to the ocean, the fewer obstacles in the way.

So if I have one piece of advice to Trudeau, this being Justin Trudeau, for God's sake, start doing some systematic risk analysis of where we can have the safest system!

The second advice to him is to basically acknowledge, 'my father knew something that I think I should pay attention to. He was a smart man. He put in a ban on the north coast, and he put in a moratorium, or at least, a grandfathering [export] cap on the south coast. I should look very carefully before I change my father's policies.'

It's his dad that did it, and his dad did it for good reasons.

CP: What do you make of the whole Trump factor, and the prospects of the Keystone XL pipeline being back on the table?

DA: That has turned everything on its head. You don't need Kinder Morgan now to expand the tar sands in Alberta.

By the way, Kinder Morgan, Keystone XL, Energy East and Enbridge, all four of them were designed to expand what they're doing on the tar sands today. It's not to maintain market, to keep things going at the current level. It's to expand it.

That's a very questionable proposition. We know this source of oil is heavy in emissions, and we know that in future we're going to have to cut down on emissions, so if we're going to take the Prime Minister seriously on emission reduction, you're going to have to find even larger cutbacks elsewhere.

So, this expansion concept has to be analyzed. Most people think that, well, we're doing this to give a market for Albertan oil, because they think somehow or another we've lost markets. We haven't lost existing markets. And when the industry is pressed on this they say, oh we don't get a good price in the states, they're bad customers. Well, we get the price the industry negotiated. If they're incompetent in handling the business, you know, please will they bite the bullet and resign!

CP: How does it feel to see many of these issues unresolved today, given that they had been addressed so long ago?

DA: I've been fighting oil on the coast since I was first elected 48 years ago. And it's the same irritating business: you're not getting coherent, logical decision making, we're responding to companies without picking the best place, and we're making decisions on the fly based on politics in Alberta rather than on economic and environmental considerations.

Trudeau has admitted…the NEB evaluation system is flawed, and yet he's not repaired it.

He's said that we have climate change as the biggest issue we're facing, and yet he doesn't have climate change worked into this major increase in emissions that the Kinder Morgan proposal represents.

There's a whole pile of illogical aspects that irritate me enormously. 

Image: Tankers and cargo ships near Vancouver B.C. Photo: Ari Fester via Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

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The newly appointed head of the B.C. government’s communications branch is a former lobbyist for Enbridge Inc., the company that hopes to build the $7.9-billion Northern Gateway pipeline stretching 1,200 kilometres from the Alberta oilsands to Kitimat on the B.C. coast.

John Paul Fraser, who DeSmog Canada has learned became acting deputy minister in charge of Government Communications and Public Engagement (GCPE) earlier this month, worked as a lobbyist for National Public Relations from 2008 until shortly before moving to the B.C public service in 2011.

He previously worked for Burrard Communications Inc. — a company founded by Premier Christy Clark’s former husband Mark Marissen — where he was registered with the Federal Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada as a lobbyist on behalf of Enbridge Inc.

Fraser is a long-time friend of Clark who worked on her election campaign and, until this summer, was assistant deputy minister for strategic planning and public engagement. He is the son of B.C.’s conflict commissioner Paul Fraser.

It is not the first time Clark has included an Enbridge lobbyist in her inner political circle. Ken Boessenkool, her former chief of staff who resigned in 2012 after admitting to inappropriate conduct towards a female staff member, was also an Enbridge lobbyist.

The question for opponents of Northern Gateway is whether having former lobbyists in government corridors of power could make a difference to how Clark treats the project. Northern Gateway was conditionally given the green light by the federal government in June, subject to Enbridge meeting 209 conditions listed by the Joint Review Panel, but Clark has never been enthusiastic about the project.

Clark has set out five conditions that must be met before B.C. gives its support, including strict environmental protections, adequate consultations with First Nations and a greater share of economic benefits. B.C. also has its hand on the controls through numerous provincial permits that will be needed if Northern Gateway manages to overcome legal challenges launched by First Nations and environmental groups.

It is possible that having high-level bureaucrats who intimately understand the Enbridge file is an advantage as they will know the odds are stacked against the project, said Will Horter, executive director of Dogwood Initiative, a democracy group fighting against the oil pipeline and tanker project.

 “There’s a revolving door of people associated with Enbridge, either directly or as advocates, coming into the close circles of the premier . . . . But they must understand that this is a big mountain to climb or even that this is a zombie project,” Horter said.

Joe Foy, Wilderness Committee’s national campaign director, worries about a system that allows those with partisan or business interests to take up high-level positions in the civil service.

“I do have a concern when we have powerful players in our government that seem to slip seamlessly between the partisan world, corporate world and bureaucracy,” he said.

“I am not suggesting there is anything untoward, but I think it shows up a fairly major flaw in our system of government, because it is very important that citizens know who they are talking to.”

Fraser previously worked for David Anderson, former federal Liberal environment minister and a Northern Gateway opponent.

Anderson said he has no idea whether his opposition to bitumen-laden tankers in B.C.’s coastal waters could have rubbed off on Fraser, but he cannot see that someone as bright as Fraser could have had much to do with the Northern Gateway project.

“I have great admiration for John Paul Fraser. Enbridge has done such an appalling, hopeless, ridiculous job in managing its public relations, they couldn’t have taken advice,” he said.

Fraser could not be contacted for an interview.

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