The US government agency responsible for interstate pipelines recorded a catalog of problems with the construction of TransCanada’s Keystone Pipeline and the Cushing Extension, a DeSmog investigation has found.   Inspectors at the US Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) observed TransCanada’s contractors violating construction design codes established to ensure a pipeline’s safety, according to inspection reports released to DeSmog under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).   Evan Vokes, former TransCanada materials engineer-turned-whistleblower, told DeSmog the problems uncovered in the reports show issues that could lead to future pipeline failures and might also explain some of the failures the pipeline had already suffered.   Vokes claimed PHMSA was negligent in failing to use its powers to shut down construction of the pipeline when inspectors found contractors doing work incorrectly. “You cannot have a safe pipeline without code compliance,” Vokes said.

The Keystone and the Cushing Extension are part of TransCanada’s Keystone Pipeline network, giving the company a path to move diluted Canadian tar sands, also known as dilbit, to the U.S. Gulf Coast.    The Keystone pipeline network is made up of the Keystone Pipeline (Phase I), that runs from Hardistry, Alberta, to Steele City, Nebraska, and the Keystone-Cushing extension (Phase ll), from Steele City to Cushing, Oklahoma. There, it connects to the southern route of the Keystone XL, renamed the Gulf Coast Extension (Phase III), that runs from Cushing, Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast in Texas.    The final phase of TransCanada’s network, the Keystone XL, (Phase lV), originating in Alberta, is meant to connect to the Gulf Coast pipeline. But KXL is blocked for now since President Obama rejected a permit TransCanada needs to finish its network.   According to the inspection reports PHMSA provided, its inspectors observed TransCanada violating construction design codes established to assure a pipeline’s safety. Inspectors wrote that some contractors working on the Keystone were not familiar with the construction specifications.   The reports show that when PHMSA inspectors found improper work, they explained the correct procedures — such as telling welders the correct temperature and speed they needed to weld at according to specifications.   In one instance, a PHMSA inspector found a coating inspector using an improperly calibrated tool, so the PHMSA representative instructed him on the proper setting.   The inspection reports also describe regulators identifying visible problems with pipe sections as they were placed in ditches, and of ditches not properly prepared to receive the pipe.

Caption: PHMSA Inspection report of the Keystone Pipeline 6/15/2009 to 6/19/2009   “Regulators did nothing to stop TransCanada from building a pipeline that was bound to fail,” Vokes told DeSmog after reviewing the construction inspection reports for the Keystone 1 pipeline and the Cushing Extension.   According to Vokes, those welders and inspectors should have been fired because problems with welds and coatings can lead to slow and hard to detect leaks.   “It is impossible to believe the welders and inspectors cited in the PHMSA reports were operator qualified, which is a mandated requirement by PHMSA,” Vokes said.   TransCanada insists it used qualified contractors.   Matthew John, a communications specialist for TransCanada, told DeSmog: “In fact, the Special Permit conditions for Keystone Phase 1 and the Cushing Extension included a requirement for TransCanada to implement a Construction ‘Operator Qualification’ program. We only use highly trained and specially certified contractors in the construction of the Keystone System.”   But the PHMSA inspection reports cast doubt on the effectiveness of the ‘Operator Qualification’ program.   Vokes said: “How is it possible that PHMSA could find multiple violations at multiple sites on multiple days in multiple years?”    “It isn’t a regulator’s job to instruct contractors how to comply to code,” Vokes said.   “If the construction crew was not familiar with the correct procedures, they shouldn’t have been allowed to continue constructing the pipeline.”   Part of Vokes’s job as a pipeline materials engineer was to ensure TransCanada adhered to the accepted codes of pipeline construction set by institutions such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.   “Straying from the adopted code is not only illegal, but it compromises the integrity of a pipeline,” he said.   Vokes says that during his five years with the company he did his best to get TransCanada to identify and solve its problems. But he said the company continued to emphasize cost and speed rather than compliance.   This compelled Vokes to send damning evidence of code violations to the Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta, the Canadian National Energy Board, and PHMSA.   He was fired after airing TransCanada’s failures, which did not surprise him. He is, however, surprised regulators in the U.S. and Canada continue to let TransCanada and other companies build pipelines that are not built to safety standards.   Vokes told DeSmog he had sent senior PHMSA investigator Gery Bauman a “binder full of information” showing issues with TransCanada's construction methods. “Bauman seemed concerned and told me that he would look into my allegations, but blew me off.” According to Vokes, Bauman stopped responding to his emails.   PHMSA confirmed it received documents Vokes sent to Bauman and reviewed them. Bauman and other communication specialists at PHMSA were asked by DeSmog to comment on the communications with Vokes, but have not responded.   According to Vokes, the documents he gave Bauman contained proof that TransCanada didn’t follow minimum safety standards when building the Luddem pumping station — the same pump station that spilled about 400 gallons of oil in North Dakota in 2011.   Bauman witnessed some of the construction problems firsthand. An inspection report on the construction of the Keystone Pipeline bearing his name, dated 06/15/2009 to 06/19/2009, states:

“G. Bauman and M. Kieba conducted an inspection of Spread 3B out of Aberdeen, SD. The issues and concerns noted by Gery ranged from coating anomalies not being repaired to bolts causing coating damage. Additionally, a joint of pipe was found with a three-inch section where the wall of the pipe was measured to be 0.356”. Gery also inquired about the CP [cathodic protection] of the line that had been in the ground for almost a year, and line markers to help prevent any possible third party damage.” 

  Vokes believes the problems Bauman described could lead to a spill. He explained regulators should have required an integrity test to determine if a sleeve (protective layer) was required, but the report makes no mention whether such a test was ordered.   DeSmog asked Bauman and the PHMSA if the issues Bauman reported on Spread 3B could lead to a spill and an integrity test or any other kind of follow-up work was ordered, but did not receive a reply.   Bauman warned Kinder Morgan, another pipeline industry giant, on similar “inappropriate” construction practices when he inspected REX, a natural gas pipeline that runs from Colorado to Pennsylvania completed in 2009. PHMSA accepted assurances form Kinder Morgan that remedial actions would be taken. But whatever actions Kinder Morgan took, they did not prevent a gas leak causing evacuation of nearby homes in southeastern Ohio or a slew of other incidents.   After reviewing the construction inspection reports obtained by DeSmog on the Keystone and the Cushing Extension, Vokes said that regulators cite numerous problems grave enough that, in his opinion, PHMSA should have shut the project down. He said PHMSA’s apparent acceptance that operators would change their ways showed the agency learned nothing from REX. 

Another PHMSA inspection report, dated June 2009, indicates TransCanada ignored basic protocols by working on the Keystone pipeline without written specifications. “That gave PHMSA grounds to shut the work down on the spot,” Vokes said.

Caption: PHMSA Inspection Report 7/06/2009 to 7/10/2009 Indicating Multiple Regulation Violations by a third party auditor   “The PHMSA inspection report dated 10/05/2009 to 10/09/2009 foretells the kind of leak that led to the spill from a section of Keystone Pipeline in South Dakota,” Vokes said. The spill, discovered on 2 April, leaked an estimated 16,800 gallons of dilbit because of a faulty transition weld.    The report states: “There has been a problem with cracked welds on this spread, which is well known to the personnel involved. The problem got worse with twenty cracks the last seven working days. The mainline welded out on Wednesday, October 7, 2009.”   The PHMSA inspection report dated 08/24/2009 to 08/28/2009 calls out a coating inspector for using an unauthorized tool, stating: “The procedures call for a utility knife of a specific size to be used for performing the coating V notch adhesion test. The coating inspector used a lock blade knife for the inspection.”   “Why not just use a pocket knife or prison shank while the coating inspector is at it?” Vokes joked.   Though PHMSA chose not to fine TransCanada for any code violations during construction of the Keystone and Cushing Extension phases after the Keystone Pipeline became operational, PHMSA fined the company twice for construction violations following incidents that required the Keystone pipeline to be shut down for repair.   This included the spill at the Luddem pump station in 2011 and an extreme corrosion event that was detected in multiple spots in 2012 as well as other probable violations.     Most recently, following the South Dakota spill, PHMSA issued a Corrective Order Notice to TransCanada.   “These actions don’t change the fact that any pipeline not built to code is an accident waiting to happen,” Vokes said.

For regulators to allow companies like TransCanada to break the rules seems criminal to him. “It goes against the code of ethics licensed engineers take that require them to put the safety of people and the environment first,” he said.   Inside Climate News reported that Jeffrey Wiese, a top PHMSA administrator, informed a group of industry insiders that PHMSA has "very few tools to work with" in enforcing safety rules.   But PHMSA does have the power to shut a job site down, to fine operators and require additional integrity tests if regulators have reason to doubt a pipeline’s safety.   A PHMSA public affairs specialist told DeSmog: “PHMSA can refer any discovery of possible criminal activity to either the Department’s Office of the Inspector General or the Department of Justice for further investigation and action. Those agencies may initiate criminal investigations and prosecution as a result of, or separate from a PHMSA referral.”   DeSmog asked PHMSA why inspectors did not shut down construction work or fine TransCanada for breaking rules on the Keystone Pipeline and Cushing Extension projects. PHMSA has not responded.   Despite problems with the Keystone Pipeline prior to the 2 April spill, TransCanada’s CEO Russ Girling boasted about the Keystone Pipeline network’s safety last year on the occasion of the company transporting its billionth barrel of Canadian and U.S. crude oil from Canada to the Gulf Coast.   TransCanada spokesperson John said: “Any deficiencies in code compliance identified during the construction of the pipeline were addressed prior to it being put into service. The Keystone System is safe and TransCanada has one of the best operating records in the entire industry.”   But Vokes asked about the violations that inspectors didn’t catch. “If a pipeline is not built to code,” Vokes insists, “it’s not if the pipeline will spill, it is when.”   DeSmog asked PHMSA for final evaluation reports on the Keystone Pipeline and the Cushing Extension after reviewing a Final Evaluation Report for the Gulf Coast Pipeline obtained through a FOIA request.   But PHMSA claims no such reports were conducted for the other two pipelines. Background information provided to DeSmog by the agency indicates that different regions do different kinds of paperwork, which might explain why no final evaluation reports exist for these pipelines.   PHMSA did not quantify what percentage of the inspection reports conducted on the two pipelines it provided to DeSmog.   “It is hard to believe some kind of final inspection report was not done for those pipelines. The Keystone Pipeline was the largest pipeline project in the United States at that time,” Vokes said.   The agency’s website states: “PHMSA inspects pipeline construction to assure compliance with these requirements. Inspectors review operator-prepared construction procedures to verify that they conform to regulatory requirements. Inspectors then observe construction activities in the field to assure that they are conducted in accordance with the procedures.”    The newly released PHMSA inspection reports, minus a final evaluation report, raise further questions about the integrity of the Keystone Pipeline and the Cushing Extension.   Main Photo Credit: TransCanada's pipe yard near Gascoyne, North Dakota. © 2013 Cindy Meyers  

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TransCanada received permission from federal regulators to re-start the Keystone Pipeline a week after a 16,800-gallon spill in South Dakota. The pipeline started back up on Sunday morning at a reduced operating pressure.   The incident has given ammunition to a group appealing the decision by the South Dakota Public Utility Commission (PUC) to re-certify TransCanada’s permit to build the Keystone XL Pipeline, despite President Obama’s denial of a permit needed to cross international borders.    The PUC reasoned that the next president could decide to issue the permit — a reminder that TransCanada has not given up on building the northern route of the Keystone XL. However, this most recent spill renews questions about the company’s ability to build safe pipelines.   When Evan Vokes, a former TransCanada materials engineer-turned-whistleblower, heard about a small spill along the Keystone Pipeline, he guessed that the leak would be found at a transition weld near where the pipeline crossed under a road. Transition welds connect thinner-walled pipe to thicker-walled pipe.

Places where the pipeline goes under road crossings require thicker pipe than the rest of the line, so wherever the Keystone goes under a road you will find transition welds, Vokes explained.    It turns out that Vokes’s prediction was right. In a corrective action order notice issued to TransCanada on Saturday, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the agency that regulates interstate pipelines, indicated the probable cause of the leak was from a girth weld anomaly at a transition site. 

Vokes warned his former employer and PHMSA about the transition welds, which he described as “inherently risky.” Welding different thicknesses of pipe together is harder to do than welding the same thickness, and it is more difficult to get accurate X-rays of welds.   “Even a seasoned welding inspector could miss imperfect welds when reviewing X-rays used to check the welds during the pipeline’s construction,“ Vokes told DeSmog. “And any less than perfect weld is more prone to crack when the pipeline moves, which happens when weather conditions change.”   Vokes felt so strongly about the risk of leaky transition welds that he sent an email to TransCanada’s CEO Russ Girling, warning that the transition weldsused on the Keystone Pipeline were a bad idea.   He pointed out to Girling that TransCanada was ignoring an advisory PHMSA issued in 2003 that warned against the use of such welds because they are prone to crack under stress.   He also emailed Kenneth Lee, a top PHMSA engineer who ran a workshop on “Pipeline Construction Challenges” in 2010, to inform Lee of his concerns.    Diagram of an improper weld transition part of a PHMSA presentation.   Lee responded by email: “We are in full support of efforts and technologies to improve pipeline safety, including many of those you have mentioned. The increased incidents of girth weld cracks are of great concern to us and we treat this very seriously.”    But Vokes believes his warning to Lee was ignored because no corrective actions were taken against TransCanada during the pipeline installation to stop the transition welds.   ”Bad welds can result in a catastrophe, “Vokes explained to DeSmog. “A tiny crack in a weld can leak for years before it is found, because leak detection systems are only capable of detecting leaks when a pipeline’s volume drops by two percent in the course of a day.”   TransCanada’s detection system didn’t pick up the leak near Freemont, South Dakota, allowing the pipeline to spill at least 168,000 gallons of dilbit (refined Canadian tar sands oil) before a landowner noticed the spill.   It is impossible to say how long the pipeline was leaking, or how long it could have gone on leaking, had the spill taken place in a more remote area.    “There could be hundreds of cracks in welds along the Keystone Pipeline and TransCanada’s leak detection system wouldn’t locate them,” Vokes said. "The Enbridge Pipeline spill in Kalamazoo, Michigan, leaked twice as much dilbit before anyone noticed.”   The mounting failures of various TransCanada pipelines does not surprise Vokes because “the company often did not follow the code of construction.”    But he is surprised and dismayed that, when pipeline safety is at stake, regulators in Canada and the United States allow companies to continue to break the rules with few to no consequences.    Two other TransCanada projects that failed not long after they started operating are the Bison Pipeline in Wyoming, and the North Central Corridor Loop in Alberta, Canada, validating Vokes’s claims.   Vokes was fired by TransCanada before most of the changes he advocated took place. PHMSA did issue a corrective warning to the company related to the construction of the Keystone Pipeline, but it was for issues that did not include the transition welds.    Vokes believes that pipelines would be safe if the rules of construction were followed. But he is aware that the rules were broken repeatedly here.   While reviewing photos that Cindy Myers, a member of the Dakota Rural Action group, took near the spill site, Vokes noticed a person on the pipeline right-of-way carrying a firearm. “Firearms are not permitted on a pipeline’s right-of-way,“ Vokes said. “This shows that the company and the regulators are not taking pipeline safety seriously. To ignore safety rules even when the public is present shows a total disregard of public safety." 

Man with reflective safety vest carrying a gun at the site of the Keystone spill in South Dakota 4/4/2016. Photo courtesy of Cindy Myers   Gary Dorr, a member of the Nez Perce Tribe, told DeSmog that TransCanada also ignores laws that say Indigenous peoples must be consulted before pipelines cross a tribe’s land. He is one of the legal challengers that includes members of the Dakota Rural Action, the South Dakota Keystone Consolidated Interveners, and several individual landowners who are challenging the South Dakota PUC’s decision to re-certify TransCanada’s permit. “The Keystone XL, if built, will cross tribal land without permission given to TransCanada by the tribes,” Dorr said.   The challengers filed an appeal against the PUC’s decision that is pending. ABC-TV affiliate KSFY in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, reported that the “circuit court judge in Pierre is expected to issue an order on consolidating the lawsuits against the PUC into one appeal next week.”   Dorr hopes this spill will make a difference in the court’s decision. “We were promised TransCanada’s pipeline won’t spill,” he told DeSmog, “and that is a promise that the company cannot keep.”   The PHMSA corrective order calls for more oversight on the Keystone Pipeline.   But Vokes told DeSmog, “The only way to find out if there are other slow leaks would be to dig up the pipeline everywhere a transition weld was made. There easily could be hundreds of undetected leaks in that pipeline.”

  Photo credit: Keystone Pipeline spill site in South Dakota, courtesy of Bold Nebraska.

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TransCanada’s claim that the southern route of the Keystone XL Pipeline is the safest pipeline ever built in the United States is challenged by the release of new documentation confirming multiple code violations.   Daily inspection reports on the construction of the pipeline obtained by the Tar Sands Blockade, an activist group, renew questions about the pipeline’s integrity. Mounting evidence that the pipeline was not built to mandated minimum requirements established by the American Petroleum Institute increases the chances the pipeline will leak or experience a catastrophic spill.    The reports — prepared by federal regulators with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) — reveal some code violations not previously disclosed. The number of reports also account for less than half the number of days the agency claims it spent inspecting the pipeline while it was being constructed.   Last year President Obama denied TransCanada a permit to build the northern route of the Keystone XL pipeline across the U.S.-Canada border.But his administration had fast-tracked the construction of the southern leg of the project in 2012.   The Keystone XL's southern route, renamed the Keystone Gulf Coast Pipeline when the project was split into sections, goes from Cushing, Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast. In Cushing, the pipeline connects to TransCanada’s pipeline network that originates in Alberta, Canada.   After mandatory safety tests revealed potential problems with the integrity of the southern pipeline, TransCanada dug up 130 sites and made repairs before the pipeline was permitted to start up.   PHMSA noted in its final inspection report that 37 sections of pipe had to be cut out and replaced and many areas of the pipeline’s coating had to be repaired.   The Tar Sands Blockade, Public Citizen, and landowners living along the pipelines path monitored the repair work. They were joined by Evan Vokes, former TransCanada materials engineer-turned-whistleblower, who shared his technical expertise.   They requested PHMSA require TransCanada do a new pressure test on the pipeline to test the integrity of the repairs. But PHMSA turned them down at a private meeting held shortly before TransCanada started up the pipeline.    PHSMA explained that it had faith the repairs were done correctly and assured the group that its inspectors spent over 150 days inspecting the pipeline during construction — overseeing welding, coating, installation, backfilling, testing and all other construction activities.   That claim prompted Kathy Redman, a member of the Tar Sands Blockade, to file a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for the daily inspection reports. In total 66 reports were released covering 70 days.   Of those reports, two recount a PHMSA inspector aborting his mission after being warned that protesters would be at the site he planned to inspect. Another recounts an inspector sitting in on a safety training session with contractors and interviewing personnel.   “Inspecting pipeline construction is a boots on the ground activity,” Vokes told DeSmog. “Any time not spent on the pipeline right of way cannot be considered time spent inspecting construction.”   Vokes believes it would have been prudent for regulators to spend as much time as possible monitoring the construction of the pipeline. TransCanada has been cited on more than one occasion by regulators in the U.S. and Canada for not complying with construction code.     A couple of the company’s latest projects blew up, not long after they started operating, including the Bison Pipeline in Wyoming and the North Central Corridor Loop in Alberta, Canada.   DeSmog asked PHMSA if it had documentation to prove more than 150 days were devoted to inspections.   “There would not necessarily be 150 reports for 150 days, and we’ve been trying to find another way to explain that,” an email sent to DeSmog by a PHMSA director stated.**   But PHMSA’s final inspection report for the Gulf Coast pipeline states, “Daily reports were submitted by each engineer/inspector to document the daily construction activities observed during the inspections.”  It also says that “A total of 165.9 AFO [away from the office] days and 53.35 non-AFO days were spent on the TransCanada construction project.”

“The discrepancy in the number of days the agency claims it spent inspecting to the number of daily inspection reports makes me doubt PHMSA’s credibility,” Redman told DeSmog. The reports she did get added to her concern that the pipeline is a disaster waiting to happen.   The reports include inspectors’ observations of TransCanada violating construction codes. A report dated 10/30/2012 describes a welder who had the wrong welding rods in his bucket.   “That is a fundamental fuck-up,” Vokes told DeSmog. “It could explain the high number of welding failures the pipeline suffered.”    A welding inspector is required at all construction sites during pipeline installation. Using the wrong welding rods leads to bad welds, and bad welds can lead to slow leaks.   “The welder and the welding inspector should have been fired on the spot,” Vokes said.    Vokes found it troubling that the inspection report makes no mention of PHMSA’s inspector taking immediate corrective action. He believes stopping construction after discovering the wrong rods in a welder’s bucket would have been an appropriate response.   In another PHMSA inspection report, dated 7/09/2013, TransCanada’s pipeline coating problems are noted.  At a dig site where the company was assessing issues detected by a safety test, the inspector found damage done to the coating caused by a shovel.   Previously released warning letters PHMSA sent to TransCanada reprimand the company for hiring unqualified welders and not protecting the pipeline’s coating during installation. And PHMSA’s final inspection report reveals TransCanada received unsatisfactory marks on welding procedures and installation practices related to the pipeline’s protective coating.   PHMSA did not fine TransCanada for any of the violations it cited in warning letters or require a second pressure test after TransCanada repaired the pipeline, although it has the regulatory power to do so.

A repaired pipeline segment on the Keystone Gulf Coast Pipeline. Source: PHMSA FOIA 2016-0041_000077   ”You can’t expect the pipeline to be safe if the basic rules of construction aren’t followed,” Vokes said.  “’Get the bitch in the ditch’ is the best way to describe pipeline construction these days. Speeding up the construction process makes no sense because it is a lot cheaper to do things right in the first place.”   Because pipeline regulators in the U.S. and Canada are not using the full force of their regulatory power, Vokes points out, operators have little reason to change their ways.    Redman is skeptical she was provided all of the documents she requested.  Regardless, the 66 reports she was able to obtain confirm her belief PHSMA didn’t spend an adequate amount of time acting as a watchdog of a company with a questionable safely record.    “Anyone who relies on a safe water supply along the pipelines route should be concerned,” she said.   PHMSA Daily inspection Reports Obtained by the Tar Sands Blockade in 2016   PHMSA Daily inspection Report Obtained by the Tar Sands Blockade in 2014

**Ed note: After publication of this article, a PHMSA public affairs specialist emailed DeSmog this statement: "The daily reports are essentially notes the inspector uses to document their observations over the course of the investigation. Our inspectors use them to complete the final construction report and don’t necessarily keep them once the final report is complete." 

Image credit: Julia Trigg Crawford at a TransCanada construction site across from her farm in Sumner, Texas, on Oct. 14, 2012. She tried to stop TransCanada from taking her land but was unable to prevent the company from using eminent domain. ©2012 Julie Dermansky

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Former TransCanada employee and engineer Evan Vokes, who released thousands of pages of records after he was dismissed by the corporation in 2012, believes that a newly acquired internal email shows his managers tried to discredit him for raising the alarm on their safety practices.

Vokes obtained the email in Feburary 2014 through access to information legislation, reports Mike De Souza for InsideClimate News. Most of the message was censored by TransCanada before release, but the first line clearly mentions "managing the EV [Evan Vokes] credibility issue."

"My understanding is that we have been reasonably successful at influencing authorities [redacted] and pointing out EV is disgruntled, and actually had the responsibility to correct these same matters and did not," reads the email, dated July 26, 2013.

TransCanada has not disclosed the identity of the employee who wrote the email or the "authorities" referred to in it. "We are not going to debate interpretations of the wording used by TransCanada staff members in old emails or private records," spokesman Davis Sheremata told InsideClimate News.

The previous records released by Vokes document internal safety issues raised within the energy company over its operations in Canada, as well as in the United States, where it hopes to build the proposed multibillion-dollar Keystone XL pipeline project. Vokes submitted the records as evidence when he appeared before a Canadian Senate committee hearing on energy policies in 2013.

The U.S. State Department, which is reviewing the Keystone XL project, declined to comment on whether they'd discussed Vokes with TransCanada. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration also declined to comment on the email.

Vokes believes TransCanada's management tried to discredit him because they got "fed up" with his allegations that the company was saving money by skimping on safety inspections and repairs.

 Pipeline section marked 'junk' by TransCanada. Photo by Dave Whitley via Flickr.

A pattern of dismissal 

"There are literally thousands of cracks in the system but they sit there until somebody disturbs them," Vokes told InsideClimate News in an interview. "Whether it's the ground or frost, construction in the area, or a farmer doing work, suddenly all these substandard construction techniques can become a major problem because they were never dealt with during construction."

Vokes's records include discussions that took place within TransCanada about safety concerns that management dismissed. In a January 2011 email exchange, an engineering technologist, Russell Wong, was told by management to "stop these e-mails" when he warned them not to hire a welding company based on its poor performance history. Another engineering technologist asked whether the company would provide inspectors to examine the Keystone pipeline in a June 2011 email. Manager Tom Hamilton, in charge of quality and compliance for Keystone, wrote "Ha ha ha" in his email response.

Another series of internal emails from June 2011 between Vokes and other engineers and managers documents how TransCanada employees were unable to find records on the company's welding procedures for months, after they were reqested by provincial regulator Alberta Boilers Safety Association.

In another June 2011 email, Vokes himself was told by David Taylor, a manager of materials and engineering, to stop raising concerns and "accept where we are and become aligned with where we are going as a company."

TransCanada said that it could not comment on Vokes' eventual dismissal or whether the managers in the emails were disciplined, because of privacy and confidentiality issues.

Breaking pipeline safety regulations and whistleblower protections in Canada

Vokes collected most of the records over his five years working at TransCanada, where he specialized in "non-destructive" examination of pipeline infrastructure using tools and visual inspections. His complaints about pipeline safety led the National Energy Board (NEB) to conduct an audit of TransCanada's operations, released February 2014. The NEB found no immediate safety concerns, but concluded that TransCanada was breaking Canadian pipeline regulations in areas including "Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Control…Inspection, Measurement and Monitoring; and Management Review."

Another audit on TransCanada's management, released April 24, found that the company's management wasn't meeting requirements to protect concerned whistleblowers like Vokes.

When asked by InsideClimate News about the email concerning Vokes, the NEB said that TransCanada did not try to interfere with the audits.

"At no time during numerous interactions between board staff and TransCanada staff did the company attempt to influence the board on the character of Mr. Vokes," NEB spokeswoman Erin Dottor said in an email. "The source of any complaint or issue identification in no way impacts the NEB's commitment to take action to mitigate or prevent potential hazards to public safety or environmental protection."

Keystone XL future uncertain

The controversy surrounding the proposed Keystone XL project has brought TransCanada's safety record under close scrutiny. The company's existing Keystone pipeline, which runs from Alberta to Oklahoma, has suffered at least 35 leaks or other incidents since it opened in June 2010. If built, the Keystone XL pipeline would transport 830,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oilsands crude from Alberta to refineries on the U.S. Gulf Coast, crossing several sensitive U.S. water sources. Oilsands development is currently the fastest growing source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Canada.

The Obama administration's decision on Keystone XL has been continually delayed since the project was first proposed in 2008, and has met with opposition in both the United States and Canada. The final decision on the project isn't expected till November, owing to the latest hurdle–an ongoing court case over the pipeline's route through Nebraska.

Dave Domina, a lawyer representing Nebraska landowners challenging the Keystone XL pipeline's route, said that "TransCanada has a tug-of-war going on between environmental safety and profit." He said that the emails acquired by Vokes probably couldn't be used in the court case, however, though they come into play if the state is forced to restart the approval process.

Meanwhile, Vokes has been notified by the federal privacy commissioner's office that it is reviewing the censored portions of the documents released by TransCanada to him, after the company agreed to an audit. The privacy commissioner's investigator will be meeting with TransCanada management face to face after the materials are reviewed, though the company has asked that Vokes not be present.

Image Credit: TransCanada promotional video screen cap

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