The US government agency responsible for interstate pipelines recorded a catalog of problems with the construction of TransCanada’s Keystone Pipeline and the Cushing Extension, a DeSmog investigation has found.   Inspectors at the US Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) observed TransCanada’s contractors violating construction design codes established to ensure a pipeline’s safety, according to inspection reports released to DeSmog under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).   Evan Vokes, former TransCanada materials engineer-turned-whistleblower, told DeSmog the problems uncovered in the reports show issues that could lead to future pipeline failures and might also explain some of the failures the pipeline had already suffered.   Vokes claimed PHMSA was negligent in failing to use its powers to shut down construction of the pipeline when inspectors found contractors doing work incorrectly. “You cannot have a safe pipeline without code compliance,” Vokes said.

The Keystone and the Cushing Extension are part of TransCanada’s Keystone Pipeline network, giving the company a path to move diluted Canadian tar sands, also known as dilbit, to the U.S. Gulf Coast.    The Keystone pipeline network is made up of the Keystone Pipeline (Phase I), that runs from Hardistry, Alberta, to Steele City, Nebraska, and the Keystone-Cushing extension (Phase ll), from Steele City to Cushing, Oklahoma. There, it connects to the southern route of the Keystone XL, renamed the Gulf Coast Extension (Phase III), that runs from Cushing, Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast in Texas.    The final phase of TransCanada’s network, the Keystone XL, (Phase lV), originating in Alberta, is meant to connect to the Gulf Coast pipeline. But KXL is blocked for now since President Obama rejected a permit TransCanada needs to finish its network.   According to the inspection reports PHMSA provided, its inspectors observed TransCanada violating construction design codes established to assure a pipeline’s safety. Inspectors wrote that some contractors working on the Keystone were not familiar with the construction specifications.   The reports show that when PHMSA inspectors found improper work, they explained the correct procedures — such as telling welders the correct temperature and speed they needed to weld at according to specifications.   In one instance, a PHMSA inspector found a coating inspector using an improperly calibrated tool, so the PHMSA representative instructed him on the proper setting.   The inspection reports also describe regulators identifying visible problems with pipe sections as they were placed in ditches, and of ditches not properly prepared to receive the pipe.

Caption: PHMSA Inspection report of the Keystone Pipeline 6/15/2009 to 6/19/2009   “Regulators did nothing to stop TransCanada from building a pipeline that was bound to fail,” Vokes told DeSmog after reviewing the construction inspection reports for the Keystone 1 pipeline and the Cushing Extension.   According to Vokes, those welders and inspectors should have been fired because problems with welds and coatings can lead to slow and hard to detect leaks.   “It is impossible to believe the welders and inspectors cited in the PHMSA reports were operator qualified, which is a mandated requirement by PHMSA,” Vokes said.   TransCanada insists it used qualified contractors.   Matthew John, a communications specialist for TransCanada, told DeSmog: “In fact, the Special Permit conditions for Keystone Phase 1 and the Cushing Extension included a requirement for TransCanada to implement a Construction ‘Operator Qualification’ program. We only use highly trained and specially certified contractors in the construction of the Keystone System.”   But the PHMSA inspection reports cast doubt on the effectiveness of the ‘Operator Qualification’ program.   Vokes said: “How is it possible that PHMSA could find multiple violations at multiple sites on multiple days in multiple years?”    “It isn’t a regulator’s job to instruct contractors how to comply to code,” Vokes said.   “If the construction crew was not familiar with the correct procedures, they shouldn’t have been allowed to continue constructing the pipeline.”   Part of Vokes’s job as a pipeline materials engineer was to ensure TransCanada adhered to the accepted codes of pipeline construction set by institutions such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.   “Straying from the adopted code is not only illegal, but it compromises the integrity of a pipeline,” he said.   Vokes says that during his five years with the company he did his best to get TransCanada to identify and solve its problems. But he said the company continued to emphasize cost and speed rather than compliance.   This compelled Vokes to send damning evidence of code violations to the Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta, the Canadian National Energy Board, and PHMSA.   He was fired after airing TransCanada’s failures, which did not surprise him. He is, however, surprised regulators in the U.S. and Canada continue to let TransCanada and other companies build pipelines that are not built to safety standards.   Vokes told DeSmog he had sent senior PHMSA investigator Gery Bauman a “binder full of information” showing issues with TransCanada's construction methods. “Bauman seemed concerned and told me that he would look into my allegations, but blew me off.” According to Vokes, Bauman stopped responding to his emails.   PHMSA confirmed it received documents Vokes sent to Bauman and reviewed them. Bauman and other communication specialists at PHMSA were asked by DeSmog to comment on the communications with Vokes, but have not responded.   According to Vokes, the documents he gave Bauman contained proof that TransCanada didn’t follow minimum safety standards when building the Luddem pumping station — the same pump station that spilled about 400 gallons of oil in North Dakota in 2011.   Bauman witnessed some of the construction problems firsthand. An inspection report on the construction of the Keystone Pipeline bearing his name, dated 06/15/2009 to 06/19/2009, states:

“G. Bauman and M. Kieba conducted an inspection of Spread 3B out of Aberdeen, SD. The issues and concerns noted by Gery ranged from coating anomalies not being repaired to bolts causing coating damage. Additionally, a joint of pipe was found with a three-inch section where the wall of the pipe was measured to be 0.356”. Gery also inquired about the CP [cathodic protection] of the line that had been in the ground for almost a year, and line markers to help prevent any possible third party damage.” 

  Vokes believes the problems Bauman described could lead to a spill. He explained regulators should have required an integrity test to determine if a sleeve (protective layer) was required, but the report makes no mention whether such a test was ordered.   DeSmog asked Bauman and the PHMSA if the issues Bauman reported on Spread 3B could lead to a spill and an integrity test or any other kind of follow-up work was ordered, but did not receive a reply.   Bauman warned Kinder Morgan, another pipeline industry giant, on similar “inappropriate” construction practices when he inspected REX, a natural gas pipeline that runs from Colorado to Pennsylvania completed in 2009. PHMSA accepted assurances form Kinder Morgan that remedial actions would be taken. But whatever actions Kinder Morgan took, they did not prevent a gas leak causing evacuation of nearby homes in southeastern Ohio or a slew of other incidents.   After reviewing the construction inspection reports obtained by DeSmog on the Keystone and the Cushing Extension, Vokes said that regulators cite numerous problems grave enough that, in his opinion, PHMSA should have shut the project down. He said PHMSA’s apparent acceptance that operators would change their ways showed the agency learned nothing from REX. 

Another PHMSA inspection report, dated June 2009, indicates TransCanada ignored basic protocols by working on the Keystone pipeline without written specifications. “That gave PHMSA grounds to shut the work down on the spot,” Vokes said.

Caption: PHMSA Inspection Report 7/06/2009 to 7/10/2009 Indicating Multiple Regulation Violations by a third party auditor   “The PHMSA inspection report dated 10/05/2009 to 10/09/2009 foretells the kind of leak that led to the spill from a section of Keystone Pipeline in South Dakota,” Vokes said. The spill, discovered on 2 April, leaked an estimated 16,800 gallons of dilbit because of a faulty transition weld.    The report states: “There has been a problem with cracked welds on this spread, which is well known to the personnel involved. The problem got worse with twenty cracks the last seven working days. The mainline welded out on Wednesday, October 7, 2009.”   The PHMSA inspection report dated 08/24/2009 to 08/28/2009 calls out a coating inspector for using an unauthorized tool, stating: “The procedures call for a utility knife of a specific size to be used for performing the coating V notch adhesion test. The coating inspector used a lock blade knife for the inspection.”   “Why not just use a pocket knife or prison shank while the coating inspector is at it?” Vokes joked.   Though PHMSA chose not to fine TransCanada for any code violations during construction of the Keystone and Cushing Extension phases after the Keystone Pipeline became operational, PHMSA fined the company twice for construction violations following incidents that required the Keystone pipeline to be shut down for repair.   This included the spill at the Luddem pump station in 2011 and an extreme corrosion event that was detected in multiple spots in 2012 as well as other probable violations.     Most recently, following the South Dakota spill, PHMSA issued a Corrective Order Notice to TransCanada.   “These actions don’t change the fact that any pipeline not built to code is an accident waiting to happen,” Vokes said.

For regulators to allow companies like TransCanada to break the rules seems criminal to him. “It goes against the code of ethics licensed engineers take that require them to put the safety of people and the environment first,” he said.   Inside Climate News reported that Jeffrey Wiese, a top PHMSA administrator, informed a group of industry insiders that PHMSA has "very few tools to work with" in enforcing safety rules.   But PHMSA does have the power to shut a job site down, to fine operators and require additional integrity tests if regulators have reason to doubt a pipeline’s safety.   A PHMSA public affairs specialist told DeSmog: “PHMSA can refer any discovery of possible criminal activity to either the Department’s Office of the Inspector General or the Department of Justice for further investigation and action. Those agencies may initiate criminal investigations and prosecution as a result of, or separate from a PHMSA referral.”   DeSmog asked PHMSA why inspectors did not shut down construction work or fine TransCanada for breaking rules on the Keystone Pipeline and Cushing Extension projects. PHMSA has not responded.   Despite problems with the Keystone Pipeline prior to the 2 April spill, TransCanada’s CEO Russ Girling boasted about the Keystone Pipeline network’s safety last year on the occasion of the company transporting its billionth barrel of Canadian and U.S. crude oil from Canada to the Gulf Coast.   TransCanada spokesperson John said: “Any deficiencies in code compliance identified during the construction of the pipeline were addressed prior to it being put into service. The Keystone System is safe and TransCanada has one of the best operating records in the entire industry.”   But Vokes asked about the violations that inspectors didn’t catch. “If a pipeline is not built to code,” Vokes insists, “it’s not if the pipeline will spill, it is when.”   DeSmog asked PHMSA for final evaluation reports on the Keystone Pipeline and the Cushing Extension after reviewing a Final Evaluation Report for the Gulf Coast Pipeline obtained through a FOIA request.   But PHMSA claims no such reports were conducted for the other two pipelines. Background information provided to DeSmog by the agency indicates that different regions do different kinds of paperwork, which might explain why no final evaluation reports exist for these pipelines.   PHMSA did not quantify what percentage of the inspection reports conducted on the two pipelines it provided to DeSmog.   “It is hard to believe some kind of final inspection report was not done for those pipelines. The Keystone Pipeline was the largest pipeline project in the United States at that time,” Vokes said.   The agency’s website states: “PHMSA inspects pipeline construction to assure compliance with these requirements. Inspectors review operator-prepared construction procedures to verify that they conform to regulatory requirements. Inspectors then observe construction activities in the field to assure that they are conducted in accordance with the procedures.”    The newly released PHMSA inspection reports, minus a final evaluation report, raise further questions about the integrity of the Keystone Pipeline and the Cushing Extension.   Main Photo Credit: TransCanada's pipe yard near Gascoyne, North Dakota. © 2013 Cindy Meyers  

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TransCanada received permission from federal regulators to re-start the Keystone Pipeline a week after a 16,800-gallon spill in South Dakota. The pipeline started back up on Sunday morning at a reduced operating pressure.   The incident has given ammunition to a group appealing the decision by the South Dakota Public Utility Commission (PUC) to re-certify TransCanada’s permit to build the Keystone XL Pipeline, despite President Obama’s denial of a permit needed to cross international borders.    The PUC reasoned that the next president could decide to issue the permit — a reminder that TransCanada has not given up on building the northern route of the Keystone XL. However, this most recent spill renews questions about the company’s ability to build safe pipelines.   When Evan Vokes, a former TransCanada materials engineer-turned-whistleblower, heard about a small spill along the Keystone Pipeline, he guessed that the leak would be found at a transition weld near where the pipeline crossed under a road. Transition welds connect thinner-walled pipe to thicker-walled pipe.

Places where the pipeline goes under road crossings require thicker pipe than the rest of the line, so wherever the Keystone goes under a road you will find transition welds, Vokes explained.    It turns out that Vokes’s prediction was right. In a corrective action order notice issued to TransCanada on Saturday, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the agency that regulates interstate pipelines, indicated the probable cause of the leak was from a girth weld anomaly at a transition site. 

Vokes warned his former employer and PHMSA about the transition welds, which he described as “inherently risky.” Welding different thicknesses of pipe together is harder to do than welding the same thickness, and it is more difficult to get accurate X-rays of welds.   “Even a seasoned welding inspector could miss imperfect welds when reviewing X-rays used to check the welds during the pipeline’s construction,“ Vokes told DeSmog. “And any less than perfect weld is more prone to crack when the pipeline moves, which happens when weather conditions change.”   Vokes felt so strongly about the risk of leaky transition welds that he sent an email to TransCanada’s CEO Russ Girling, warning that the transition weldsused on the Keystone Pipeline were a bad idea.   He pointed out to Girling that TransCanada was ignoring an advisory PHMSA issued in 2003 that warned against the use of such welds because they are prone to crack under stress.   He also emailed Kenneth Lee, a top PHMSA engineer who ran a workshop on “Pipeline Construction Challenges” in 2010, to inform Lee of his concerns.    Diagram of an improper weld transition part of a PHMSA presentation.   Lee responded by email: “We are in full support of efforts and technologies to improve pipeline safety, including many of those you have mentioned. The increased incidents of girth weld cracks are of great concern to us and we treat this very seriously.”    But Vokes believes his warning to Lee was ignored because no corrective actions were taken against TransCanada during the pipeline installation to stop the transition welds.   ”Bad welds can result in a catastrophe, “Vokes explained to DeSmog. “A tiny crack in a weld can leak for years before it is found, because leak detection systems are only capable of detecting leaks when a pipeline’s volume drops by two percent in the course of a day.”   TransCanada’s detection system didn’t pick up the leak near Freemont, South Dakota, allowing the pipeline to spill at least 168,000 gallons of dilbit (refined Canadian tar sands oil) before a landowner noticed the spill.   It is impossible to say how long the pipeline was leaking, or how long it could have gone on leaking, had the spill taken place in a more remote area.    “There could be hundreds of cracks in welds along the Keystone Pipeline and TransCanada’s leak detection system wouldn’t locate them,” Vokes said. "The Enbridge Pipeline spill in Kalamazoo, Michigan, leaked twice as much dilbit before anyone noticed.”   The mounting failures of various TransCanada pipelines does not surprise Vokes because “the company often did not follow the code of construction.”    But he is surprised and dismayed that, when pipeline safety is at stake, regulators in Canada and the United States allow companies to continue to break the rules with few to no consequences.    Two other TransCanada projects that failed not long after they started operating are the Bison Pipeline in Wyoming, and the North Central Corridor Loop in Alberta, Canada, validating Vokes’s claims.   Vokes was fired by TransCanada before most of the changes he advocated took place. PHMSA did issue a corrective warning to the company related to the construction of the Keystone Pipeline, but it was for issues that did not include the transition welds.    Vokes believes that pipelines would be safe if the rules of construction were followed. But he is aware that the rules were broken repeatedly here.   While reviewing photos that Cindy Myers, a member of the Dakota Rural Action group, took near the spill site, Vokes noticed a person on the pipeline right-of-way carrying a firearm. “Firearms are not permitted on a pipeline’s right-of-way,“ Vokes said. “This shows that the company and the regulators are not taking pipeline safety seriously. To ignore safety rules even when the public is present shows a total disregard of public safety." 

Man with reflective safety vest carrying a gun at the site of the Keystone spill in South Dakota 4/4/2016. Photo courtesy of Cindy Myers   Gary Dorr, a member of the Nez Perce Tribe, told DeSmog that TransCanada also ignores laws that say Indigenous peoples must be consulted before pipelines cross a tribe’s land. He is one of the legal challengers that includes members of the Dakota Rural Action, the South Dakota Keystone Consolidated Interveners, and several individual landowners who are challenging the South Dakota PUC’s decision to re-certify TransCanada’s permit. “The Keystone XL, if built, will cross tribal land without permission given to TransCanada by the tribes,” Dorr said.   The challengers filed an appeal against the PUC’s decision that is pending. ABC-TV affiliate KSFY in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, reported that the “circuit court judge in Pierre is expected to issue an order on consolidating the lawsuits against the PUC into one appeal next week.”   Dorr hopes this spill will make a difference in the court’s decision. “We were promised TransCanada’s pipeline won’t spill,” he told DeSmog, “and that is a promise that the company cannot keep.”   The PHMSA corrective order calls for more oversight on the Keystone Pipeline.   But Vokes told DeSmog, “The only way to find out if there are other slow leaks would be to dig up the pipeline everywhere a transition weld was made. There easily could be hundreds of undetected leaks in that pipeline.”

  Photo credit: Keystone Pipeline spill site in South Dakota, courtesy of Bold Nebraska.

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On May 12th, a heavily armed SWAT unit stormed the home of Thomas Harding and threw Harding, his son and a visitor to the ground. Harding was then handcuffed, arrested and taken for interrogation.

Harding was the engineer for the oil train that caused the explosion in Lac-Megantic, Quebec. He had cooperated with authorities and was expecting to be charged. The excessive force used to arrest Harding was criticized for being a “politically motivated stunt” in The National Post.

No one is claiming that Harding intentionally caused the accident — however, he is the one facing charges that could result in life in prison.

Meanwhile, the oil industry has knowingly shipped explosive Bakken crude oil and, in the case of Lac-Megantic, misclassified the oil to make it appear less explosive than it actually was.

Irving Oil has been identified by Canada's Transportation Safety Board as the party ultimately responsible for insuring the proper classification of the oil it had purchased. No one from Irving Oil has been charged with any crime.

And in the case of the oil that ended up in Lac-Megantic, something very odd happened. The oil on that train was purchased from 11 different companies in the Bakken region. When the oil was initially transported by trucks from the point of production to a central facility it was required to be classified.

According to the Transportation Safety Board, there was a wide variety in the classification of the oil in the trucks when it was delivered from the suppliers to a facility in Newtown, ND:

Information contained in 10 different material safety data sheets (MSDS) provided by the suppliers varied widely and was contradictory in some areas. For example, while all MSDSs indicated that the product was a Class 3 dangerous good, the packing group information varied from PG I to PG III.

Not only was there a wide variety of classification, but two of the data sheets indicated it would be necessary to “determine flash point to accurately classify packing group” — something that wasn’t done.

When this oil was shipped in trucks to the rail facility it was then somehow all classified as Packing Group II.  And then when it was loaded on to the train, it was all reclassified as Packing Group III, the lowest level classification. So oil that had been Packing Group I at the point of production had now been reclassified as Packing Group III for rail shipment. The odds are high that this was intentional. The industry is well aware of the explosive nature of Bakken crude. 

And yet after Lac-Megantic, the problem of misclassification continued to be rampant. When the U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) conducted a testing program of Bakken crude in late 2013, called “Operation Classification,” it found 11 of 18 samples tested were misclassified. No SWAT teams were summoned to arrest the CEOs of the offending companies — but the companies were fined.

There is a good reason why these companies continue to intentionally misclassify Bakken crude. Fines are not a deterrent. Jeffrey Wiese of PHMSA stated as much last year during an industry conference, when he said:  

"Do I think I can hurt a major international corporation with a $2 million civil penalty? No.”

The fines proposed as a result of Operation Classification totaled $93,000.

This past week in New York state, Albany County Executive Dan McCoy made the same point when he announced his intention to introduce new legislation to make it a crime for rail companies not to report accidents in a timely manner. A recent derailment of a Bakken crude train in Albany that was not reported properly cost Canadian Pacific a fine of $5,000. 

"That fine doesn't mean anything to a big corporation. I want to introduce jail time,” McCoy said. “It is the only way that you will get their attention."

Fines certainly aren’t stopping the misclassification of Bakken crude. But the reality is that the Bakken crude wouldn’t have this issue if it was handled like the oil from the Eagle Ford formation in Texas. There, the oil producers strip the volatile natural gas liquids (NGLs), also known as “light ends,” from the crude using a piece of equipment known as a stabilizer. They can then capture and sell these natural gas liquids.

Eagle Ford producers aren’t doing this because they are more concerned about safety than their counterparts in the Bakken region. They are doing it because their crude is transported by pipeline, not rail, and it is a cost of doing business. Unlike the rail industry, the pipeline industry won’t accept crude oil with all of the volatile natural gas liquids still in it. 

Myron Goforth, president of a stabilizer leasing company in Houston, recently explained this to Reuters, saying that “pipeline specifications require certain pressure limits that pretty much force companies to strip out NGLs.”  Rail companies have no such requirements. 

"It's a little like the wild west up in the Bakken, where everybody gets to do what they want to do," Goforth said. "In the Eagle Ford, you've got to play by the rules, which forces the oil companies to treat it differently."

Much like the oil industry’s refusal to discontinue using the unsafe DOT-111 rail tank cars to transport Bakken crude in the U.S., the argument against using stabilizers in North Dakota, like they do in Texas, is the same. It would cost too much money, the companies say. In both cases, the costs have been estimated at several billion dollars — which also just so happens to be the current estimated cost to clean up and rebuild Lac-Megantic. This is a cost that all six companies involved in the accident, including the ones who misclassified the oil, are refusing to pay. 

When Harding and two other crew members were frog marched into court after their arrest, Ghislain Champagne, the father of a woman who died in the Lac-Megantic accident, yelled out, “It’s not them we want.” 

As reported by the National Post, this is a “common sentiment” in Lac-Megantic because no executives of the rail company have been charged with any crimes. It’s doubtful a fine will suffice for the families of the 47 people who died there last summer.

Photo: Transportation Safety Board

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Of the 30 million Canadians and Americans depending on the Great Lakes for water very few would guess there is an oil pipeline sitting in their drinking water supply. It is anyone’s guess if this 61-year old Enbridge pipeline, known as Line 5, is pumping bitumen from the Alberta oilsands through the Great Lakes.

U.S. pipeline regulations do not require Enbridge to make public if Line 5 is transporting bitumen. Enbridge says the pipeline carries light crude oil mainly from the Bakken shale in North Dakota. The pipeline begins in Superior, Wis., and cuts through Straits of Mackinac, where Lake Huron and Lake Michigan meet, in the U.S. to get to its end destination of Sarnia, Ont.

“(U.S.) Pipelines in general are considered a national security risk,” says Beth Wallace, a regional coordinator with the National Wildlife Federation based in Ann Arbor, Mich.

“So PHMSA is not willing to provide records of Line 5 that provide detailed information about the location, integrity or product transported,” Wallace told DeSmog Canada. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHSMA) oversees pipelines for the U.S. Department of Transportation.

The National Wildlife Federation conducted an underwater dive last year to investigate and film the condition of Line 5. The federation discovered some of the pipeline’s steel supports meant to keep Line 5 secured to the bottum of the Straits had broken. Other sections of the pipeline were covered with debris.

Line 5 To Transport Bitumen Soon, If Not Already

The National Wildlife Federation believes if Line 5 is not transporting bitumen now, it will be in the near future.

“If Enbridge is granted authority to increase capacity on the Alberta Clipper pipeline, there will be an incredible increase in the amount of heavy bitumen pushed into Superior, Wisconsin, where Line 5 begins,” Wallace says.

Map of Enbridge pipelines including Line 5 and estimated response times to a rupture. The yellow ring indicates it would take Enbridge three hours to respond to a Line 5 spill in the Straits of Mackinac.

A U.S. decision on Enbridge’s Alberta Clipper is expected next year. Earlier this week, Enbridge announced its Line 3 pipeline will be replaced by a new pipeline with expanded capacity. Both pipelines ship oil and bitumen from Alberta to Superior, Wis.

Concerns of a Bitumen Spill in the Great Lakes

Residents of Michigan experienced the worst bitumen spill in U.S. history when Enbridge’s Line 6B pipeline ruptured, spilling more than three million liters of bitumen and oil into Michigan’s Kalamazoo River. Bitumen — the tar-like form of petroleum in oilsands — sinks in water, unlike conventional oil. Enbridge has dredged the Kalamazoo multiple times in an attempt to remove the bitumen from the river. The cleanup is still going on four years after the spill.

Underwater footage of Line 5.

The environmental damage a bitumen spill can cause plus Enbridge’s spill record — estimated at eight hundred pipeline spills between 1999 and 2010 — has Canadians worried about a Line 5 rupture as well. Georgian Bay, Ontario’s most vibrant bay, makes up the eastern part of Lake Huron.

“We are very concerned about Line 5,” says Therese Trainor of the Manitoulin Area Stewardship Area Council in Manitoulin Island, Ont.

“Georgian Bay is one of the most unique ecosystems in the world. We have flora and fauna here you cannot find anywhere else. We could lose this in an oil spill,” Trainor told DeSmog Canada.

There is no land between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan to stop the Straits of Mackinac’s swift water currents from spreading an oil spill into either lake. The National Wildlife Federation estimates in its Sunken Hazard report that if Line 5 has a large oil spill it could reach Georgian Bay.

Underwater dive of Line 5 conducted by the National Wildlife Federation.

Condtions in Straits of Mackinac Make it a Terrible Place For A Oil Spill

“This (Straits of Mackinac) is a terrible place for a rupture,” says pipeline safety expert Richard Kuprewicz.

Kuprewicz, a pipeline safety expert with 40 years of experience in the energy sector, says pipeline ruptures are difficult enough to cleanup, but conditions in the Straits of Mackinac would make things much worse. Line 5 at its deepest is 90 metres underwater and the straits freeze over in the winter. 

What emergency responders could do about a burst pipeline nearly 100 metres below in the either stormy or frozen straits is questionable.

"Pardon the expression, but cleaning up and containing a Line 5 rupture in the straits would be a crap shoot," says Wallace of the National Wildlife Federation.

There are no reports of Line 5 rupturing in the Straits of Mackinac. The 76-centimeter (30-inch) wide pipeline splits into two smaller 50-centimeter (20-inch) wide pipelines with thicker pipe walls (2.5 cm) in the straits. An external coal-tar coating minimizes corrosion on the pipeline. Coal-tar coating has had “mixed success” in the past protecting pipelines, according to Kuprewicz.

 “Just because a pipeline hasn’t leaked or ruptured in the past doesn’t mean it won’t in the future. The past does not predict the future,” Kuprewicz, president of research group Accufacts Inc.,  told DeSmog Canada.

Line 5 has ruptured on land, notably in 1999 at Crystal Falls, Mich., spilling 850,000 litres of oil and natural gas liquids.

Underwater photo of Line 5.

Michigan Needs To Protect the Great Lakes Commons

Liz Kirkwood, executive director of the Michigan-based Great Lakes advocacy group FLOW (For Love of Water), argues Enbridge should be required to secure permission from the state of Michigan under the Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act before the pipeline company can transport bitumen through the Straits of Mackinac.

“As a trustee of the Great Lakes, the state of Michigan is obligated to assess possible impairments to the public’s use of the Great Lakes and protect the lakes for the enjoyment of present and future generations,” Kirkwood says.

Michigan’s Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act requires companies to obtain state permits to build or modify structures in the Great Lakes. Line 5 was built in 1953. The Act came into effect in 1955.

Image credit: PHMSA, all underwater photos of Line 5 courtesy of the National Wildlife Federation. 

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