Of all the years of political spin to justify construction of the Site C dam, last week’s media briefing about BC Hydro might get a special place in the hall of fame.

On Thursday, provincial media were invited to the underground theatre at the B.C. Legislature for a “technical briefing” on the first phase of a review of BC Hydro, a public utility so deeply indebted that it’s been flirting with bankruptcy.

For the next 30 minutes or so, media were treated to a shock and awe presentation with a barrage of slides, graphs, numbers and various claims about B.C.’s energy demand and the price of different renewables.

It all bolstered the NDP government’s messaging, rolled out the previous evening in an exclusive story placed in the Vancouver Sun, that contracts the previous Liberal government signed with independent power producers have led to staggering losses for BC Hydro and that the Liberals had manufactured a need for new power.

“The reason Site C is something we are going to need in the future is because it’s firm power,” B.C. Energy Minister Michelle Mungall nevertheless told the Sun in an interview that accompanied the story about the government’s report on independent power projects (IPPs), titled Zapped.

The IPP contracts, Mungall informed media after the technical briefing, were a “sweetheart deal for some” but not a good deal for British Columbians who had “overpaid billions of dollars for power.”

How ironic then, that the NDP government opted for a sweetheart deal for itself when it announced just over a year ago that construction of the Site C dam would continue.

It punted the question of how to pay for the project’s unsightly $10.7 billion tab to a future government, passing the buck to generations of future hydro customers while appeasing its construction trades union donors that had lobbied relentlessly for construction to proceed.

The result is that the NDP is now doing precisely what its report justifiably criticizes the Liberals for doing with IPPs — manufacturing a need for Site C’s power while saddling generations of British Columbians with a project which will produce energy that cannot be sold for even close to the price it will cost to produce it.

Construction on the Site C dam in the summer of 2018. Photo: Garth Lenz / The Narwhal

In January, the conservative C.D. Howe Institute issued a report outlining why Site C — along with the Keeyask dam in Manitoba — is “uneconomical” and should be terminated immediately.

“For projects like Site C and Keeyask, it is not too late to cancel,” said the report, Dammed If You Do: How Sunk Costs Are Dragging Canadian Electricity Ratepayers Underwater.

“The sooner provinces face reality and begin negotiating reasonable cancellation programs, the better off ratepayers will be.”

But now the NDP is recharging efforts to convince British Columbians that Site C’s power is needed and that the troubled project is a bargain, even though the dam’s cost has soared by more than $4 billion since it was announced in 2010 and, according to an independent review, could exceed $12.5 billion.

In 2017, the independent B.C. Utilities Commission concluded that a renewables portfolio, including wind and geothermal, could supply the equivalent power of Site C for $8.8 billion or less, calling BC Hydro’s energy forecasts “excessively optimistic.”

Those forecasts have been wrong for years, according to the Commercial Energy Consumers Association, which represents the province’s commercial sector and business interests. Power demand in the province has been stagnant since 2005, despite a growing population.

To fortify its case for the Site C dam, the NDP government mysteriously dropped the price of Site C power at the technical briefing, thus casting the project in a favourable light compared to other renewables, including independent power projects that could be a good deal for British Columbians.

Instead of costing $83 per megawatt hour, as BC Hydro stated when the Site C dam cost $2 billion less than it does now, Site C’s energy can now supposedly be produced for just $62 per megawatt hour, according to the technical briefing.

Wind power, on the other hand, costs between $70 to $105 per megawatt hour to produce in B.C., journalists were informed — which is odd indeed, because the Alberta government recently bought wind power for $37 per megawatt hour and wind power with storage is selling in the U.S. for US$21 per megawatt hour.

When asked about the discrepancy, the senior civil servants — who can’t be named, according to the rules of the technical briefing — said it was because B.C.’s mountainous terrain makes wind power much more expensive than in other jurisdictions.

Tell that to the Canadian Wind Energy Association, which pulled out of B.C. in 2016 as the Site C dam proceeded. Tell that to Northland Power, which recently constructed the North Sea’s largest offshore wind farm but, as Site C continued, withdrew from two proposed wind projects in B.C., one near Prince George and the other near Summerland, that had the combined capacity to produce half as much power as Site C.

And tell that to First Nations all over B.C. who are eager to join the global renewables revolution but who were shut out by the decision to proceed with the Site C dam — First Nations that had already invested in plans for clean energy projects were told last week that BC Hydro’s standing offer program was not just on hold but cancelled, because B.C. doesn’t need one more watt of power.

And then there’s solar energy. Solar just isn’t a good option for B.C., according to the senior bureaucrats at the technical briefing.

Yet the United Kingdom, not known for excessively sunny weather, has installed enough solar capacity to generate more than twice the amount of Site C’s energy.

A provincial government study found that northeast B.C., where the Site C dam will be built on the Peace River, is ideal for solar. Witness the town of Hudson’s Hope in the district that will be most severely affected by the Site C dam, which recently installed B.C.’s largest municipal solar array and will save an estimated $70,000 a year on its hydro bills as a result.

Curious, too, that BC Hydro recently changed the rules for people who install solar at their own expense.

Unlike other utilities, BC Hydro no longer wants to buy extra power from new solar installations — power the utility has purchased for about $100 per megawatt hour. Granted, those purchases alone don’t add up to anywhere near as much power as Site C would produce, but the price is a steal of a deal compared to Site C’s power, which experts like Eoin Finn, a former partner with the global accounting firm KPMG, peg at $120 or more per megawatt hour.

And let’s not forget that BC Hydro backed away from its energy conservation programs as Site C moved forward — programs that, according to BC Hydro’s former CEO and president, had saved about as much power as Site C will produce.

All the more puzzling, B.C. refuses to follow other jurisdictions and introduce time-of-use tariffs, which would further reduce energy demand.

As for Mungall’s claim that B.C. needs Site C because it is “firm” power, readily available any time, the vast majority of B.C.’s energy currently comes from non-run of river hydro.

That means we already have oodles of firm power, including from the W.A.C. Bennett dam, where water flows into the Peace River have been held back for several years for Site C construction — with the only harm done not to energy supply during cold snaps and heat waves but to Wood Buffalo National Park.

There’s also the “firm” Columbia River power, even more power than Site C would produce, that B.C. sells to the United States. The price the U.S. pays for that power? About $30 per megawatt hour.

But U.S. president Donald Trump thinks $30 per megawatt hour is far too high a cost, and his government has re-opened Columbia River Treaty negotiations in an effort to reduce it.

BC Hydro also has the option of using existing assets like the sixth generating unit at the Revelstoke Generating Station (Revelstoke 6) for additional firm power, if indeed it is ever needed.

Just over a year ago, B.C.’s NDP government said a taxpayer bailout of Site C’s $2 billion in sunk costs would result in “massive cuts to services” on which British Columbians depend (a claim that was immediately slammed by project financing experts and later revealed by The Narwhal to be something of a sham).

Yet on Thursday, the government announced a BC Hydro bailout of $1.1 billion with — wait for it  — no cuts to services.

An eight per cent rate hike over five years is now on offer from the NDP — provided the utilities commission accepts the government’s suggestion that eight per cent is sufficient to cover BC Hydro’s rising costs, let alone to start paying down Hydro’s remaining $4.4 billion debt.

Nor has the NDP ruled out another bailout for BC Hydro.

None of those initiatives, however, will pay for the Site C dam, the astronomical bill for which will only start to come due in approximately five years when the power comes on-line.

The C.D. Howe report takes aim at the NDP government’s assertion that it has no choice but to continue building the Site C dam due to the amount of money that had already been spent.

“Policymakers often justify proceeding with uneconomic projects due to the significant amount of money that has already been spent,” the report’s authors note, a phenomenon known as the “sunk cost fallacy.”

“However, the decision about whether to proceed with a project should be determined by the yet-to-be-spent costs, instead of costs already spent.”

The authors recommend that B.C. and Manitoba consider hiring skilled negotiators to “review all existing contracts and develop a pathway toward minimizing cancellation costs, identifying ways to recover value and exploring means of appropriately compensating key stakeholders such as First Nations.”

Even now, a combination of energy sources such as wind and natural gas, including projects with storage capacity “procured in smaller sizes closer to the period of demonstrated need, would be more cost-effective” than the Site C dam, the report concludes.

In Manitoba, an inquiry is now underway to determine why work continued on the hugely over-budget Keeyask dam even though its energy wasn’t needed. Ironically, that inquiry is being led by former B.C. premier Gordon Campbell, who was so determined to build the Site C dam that his government changed the law to remove the B.C. Utilities Commission from determining if the project was in the financial interests of British Columbians.

Likewise, in Newfoundland, a $37.5 million public inquiry is underway into the boondoggle Muskrat Falls dam on Labrador’s Churchill River. Residents of Newfoundland and Labrador can go online to determine how much their hydro bills will rise because of the ill-sighted dam, with an average $1,800 a year per household reported.

Why did the Crown corporation Nalcor continue building the Muskrat Falls dam, and why did the provincial government let it? Where was the oversight and where were the missed opportunities to stop the project before it was too late? Who manufactured the need for Muskrat Falls energy, and why? What other energy options were available if the need arose? Who knew what, and when?

Those are just some of the questions the inquiry is probing — the same questions that no doubt will be asked one day at the inevitable, and much anticipated, Site C dam inquiry in B.C.

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B.C. Energy Minister Michelle Mungall said Thursday that “there’s a mess” at BC Hydro. Mungall made the comment after the B.C. Utilities Commission denied the government’s request for a hydro rate freeze — putting the kibosh on one of the NDP’s campaign promises.

Instead, the commission approved a scheduled three per cent hydro rate hike for April 1, saying that the increase is not sufficient to cover BC Hydro’s costs. What’s going on? And what does it mean for you and your future hydro bill?

DeSmog Canada caught up with Eoin Finn, a former partner at KPMG, one of the world’s largest accounting and consulting firms, to find out. Finn is also a director of the Pacific Electricity Ratepayers Association.

Are you surprised by yesterday’s decision to increase hydro rates, after the NDP promised to freeze them?

Not at all. The financial condition of BC Hydro is dire. The $140 million — that a three per cent rate increase would give them — is the first step in trying to put BC Hydro back together again. For the government to make that promise was extremely rash and I think that they at this stage realize how dire the situation is at BC Hydro.

The BCUC said that even the three per cent rate hike won’t cover its cost. What does that mean for BC Hydro customers?

It means they have to raise the rates. To put hydro back in shape in any decent fiscal condition is going to require that BC Hydro double its rates in the next 15 years.

Minister Mungall said “there’s a mess” at BC Hydro. What does she mean?

BC Hydro owes $20 billion.

And in addition to that they have used these terrible deferral accounts to defer roughly $6 billion more of debt. Instead they call it an asset. It’s the craziest accounting system I’ve ever seen. This complies with no known accounting system in the world and is definitely not generally accepted accounting principles.

The debt to equity ratio — which is a common measure of the financial health of an organization — is the worst in BC Hydro of any public or private utility in North America.

How did we end up in this situation?

We had a government for 16 years that preferred to shut its eyes and tell Hydro to give it a fixed amount of money every year, and then didn’t let them up their rates in order to be able to afford it. They didn’t want people to get excited about big rate increases. [Essentially they said] we’ll keep taking the dividend from BC Hydro — about $3 billion in all — to pay for government programs, but we won’t let Hydro charge the rates that would keep them whole in that arrangement.

And then the government fiddled further with BC Hydro and said: ‘You will buy more power from these independent power producers (IPPs) and give them a rate that will cover their expenses and capital costs.’

BC Hydro’s gone ahead and done that with over 100 IPPs. It’s currently buying power from them at an average $93 a megawatt hour and then selling it back to the average customer for $88 a megawatt hour. Now there’s no retailer I’ve ever seen that can put stuff on the shelves and sell it for less than it’s buying it for that can last for very long. Since Hydro has only one thing on its shelf — power — basically it’s a money-losing proposition.

“The debt to equity ratio — which is a common measure of the financial health of an organization — is the worst in BC Hydro of any public or private utility in North America.” https://t.co/YmH9DxWJrF

— DeSmog Canada (@DeSmogCanada) March 2, 2018

How would you compare the situation at BC Hydro to what’s going on with ICBC?

They’re similar messes, for much the same reasons. Basically the government has moderated the rates in both organizations — required to keep revenues and expenses somewhat in line — for its own purposes. It has raided the reserve funds of ICBC to the point where it can no longer be solvent, and compliant with the legal requirement to keep reserves sufficient to cover claims.

It’s much the same situation with BC Hydro. They’ve been told to keep rates down but as expenses go up the government has said: ‘That’s your problem. If we cap your rates, your business is to get expenses down so we come out even-steven.’ But clearly ICBC cannot do that. Nor can BC Hydro. The government has meddled and removed the regulator’s ability to regulate so that expenses and revenue stay in line.

How does the $10.7 billion Site C dam factor into the mix?

It adds a surplus of power for no known customer. So BC Hydro is going to add $11 billion more of debt without any customer for the power.

Their alternatives are to sell it to a non-existent LNG industry at $54 a megawatt hour. Or they can sell it to Alberta at a wholesale price — again for way less than it cost to produce it. Or, sell it into the U.S. market at $25 to $30 per megawatt hour. All of which are money-losing propositions. And that’s for Site C power that’s going to cost $120 per megawatt hour [to produce]. Demand in B.C. has remained stagnant and flat for the last 15 years.

When do the bulk of Site C’s costs hit the books?

It doesn’t begin to leak into the operating costs until the switch is turned on in 2024. But it’s still accumulating debt. Hydro plugged in the debt at somewhere around three per cent for the next 70 years, the operating life of Site C. The problem is that debt interest costs are going up. Since Site C is 100 per cent debt-financed, it’s really sensitive to any increase in interest rates, which are currently destined to go up from historic lows.

What is that going to mean for Site C’s $10.7 billion price tag?

The capital cost is $10.7 billion. But over the next 70 years the interest cost on that is going to be huge. Although the capital cost left to go will be about nine and a half billion dollars — because they’ve already borrowed two billion — the interest costs alone on that borrowed capital will be over $20 billion on top of the $10.7 billion to build it.

You’ve got to pay back the capital costs over 70 years, you have to pay the interest on the money you borrowed over 70 years, and you have to pay the operating and maintenance costs of Site C. And then you’ve got to find a buyer.

What is the Pacific Electricity Ratepayers Association?

It’s a group of people who are very concerned about the future of BC Hydro. It was formed mid-last year as a society. It’s essentially a pressure group trying to force reality into the situation with BC Hydro. If we don’t improve it we will lose it. Its purpose is to critically examine the financial health of BC Hydro.

It also had a purpose in trying to stop the construction of the Site C dam. It still has that purpose; it is still worth stopping that project.

What needs to happen to fix the mess at BC Hydro?

The government needs to take their hands off the misuse of BC Hydro, and allow the regulator [BCUC] to do its job. Currently there are two restrictions on that. One is the famous direction 7, which the previous Liberal government issued, restricting the B.C. Utilities Commission’s powers to regulate BC Hydro.

And the second one is the Clean Energy Act, which ignores the fact that we have this ready-made power at much lower rates from the Columbia River Treaty. It forces B.C. to be self-sufficient in electrical energy no matter what the cost.

What is the first step that needs to be taken?

Repeal the changes that the Liberal government made to the Clean Energy Act that requires B.C. to be self-sufficient in electrical energy. That would allow all sorts of things.

I think they also have to take a long hard look at why we are buying power from IPPs at 93 bucks a megawatt hour and — because it’s surplus to our needs — selling it south of the border for $30 a megawatt hour. That’s not a sustainable situation. And the third thing is to repeal direction 7 of the previous Liberal government’s cabinet order, which places big restrictions on the power of the regulator.

Do you think they have the cojones to do all this?

No.

So where does that leave us?

The three per cent hydro rate increase is just the start. I figure that in the next 15 years they’re going to have to double the rates to keep the situation from getting to a bailout by the government, whereby the government takes BC Hydro’s debt and puts it on its books rather than BC Hydro’s books. And, if it does that, it really will be threatening its credit rating with Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s.

The BC NDP may not be in power for very long. BC Hydro is in dire danger of being sold piecemeal to the private sector. And then we will lose all control over our rates. We’ll be in an Ontario-like situation where they sold off Hydro One, and then look at their rates, they’re double what B.C.’s are. That’s what we’re facing.

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A full public inquiry, with powers to call witnesses and gather research, is needed to investigate natural gas fracking operations in B.C., says a coalition of 17 community, First Nations and environmental organizations.

The group, which includes the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, David Suzuki Foundation, Public Health Association of B.C. and West Coast Environmental Law, is appealing to the NDP government to call a public inquiry — instead of the scientific review promised during the election campaign — because of mounting evidence of problems caused by fracking.

“We believe that the NDP’s campaign promise to appoint a scientific panel to review fracking won’t be enough to fully address the true risks of deploying this brute force technology throughout northeast B.C.,” said Ben Parfitt, a resource policy analyst with the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, one of the organizations asking for an inquiry.

Fracking — or hydraulic fracturing — involves pumping large volumes of water into the ground at high pressure to break open rocks or fissures and extract oil or gas.

Problems include excessive water usage, induced earthquakes, poor consultation with First Nations and the proliferation of dozens of unlicensed, earthen dams, constructed by companies ignoring provincial water laws.

The BC Greens have called on the NDP to investigate the use of unapproved dams.

The use of fracking in B.C. comes with serious implications, Parfitt said.

“We have significant earthquake activity that is being generated in the northeast of the province, with the largest earthquakes associated with fracking operations occurring in B.C., and we also have strong indications that the amount of water that is being used, and subsequently contaminated, is at a level that is not seen anywhere else on the continent,” Parfitt said in an interview.

At a Progress Energy site near Fort St. John, where, in 2015, the B.C. Oil and Gas Commission confirmed a record-setting 4.6 magnitude earthquake was caused by fracking, the company was using eight times more water than used at operations anywhere in the U.S., Parfitt said.

Coalition Calls for Public Inquiry Into B.C. #Fracking https://t.co/wxylk6DXL9 #bcpoli

— DeSmog Canada (@DeSmogCanada) November 6, 2017

“The water volumes are very, very significant and there is a correlation between the tremendous amount of water being used and the earthquakes that are cropping up,” he said.

BC Hydro has expressed concern about fracking in areas near major dams and a public inquiry could look at whether there should be exclusion zones, he said.

One reason for the excessive use of water in areas such as Montney Basin is to coax valuable gas liquids to the surface. The presence of the gas liquids is one reason fracking operations are increasing even though natural gas prices remain low.

Gas liquids include light oil, condensate, butane and propane. Condensate from the Montney Basin is used to dilute bitumen from the Alberta oilsands.

Air as well as water is affected by fracking and there is compelling evidence from the David Suzuki Foundation that more methane is venting into the atmosphere from oil and gas operations than previously reported.

“That is going to have a serious impact on our greenhouse gas emissions in the province,” Parfitt said.

Peer-reviewed research from the Suzuki Foundation found that methane pollution, largely from fracking operations, is 2.5 times more than reported by the industry and the provincial government.

Ian Bruce, Suzuki Foundation science and policy director, said the province must make controlling methane pollution a priority and then ensure the industry helps come up with solutions.

“Right now, we know that British Columbians are not getting accurate and transparent information about the real environmental damages from oil and gas activities,” Bruce said.

For First Nations, a major concern is unlicensed dams built on First Nations land without consultation.

Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs president, said the dam-building free-for-all and effects of excessive water use by the industry is deeply troubling.

“There are still no substantive or meaningful opportunities to fully participate in decisions around how water resources are managed in our respective territories,” he said in a news release.

“We need a credible, strong, independent inquiry to get to the bottom of this,” Phillip said.

Among questions that need scrutiny are the public health effects, said Larry Barzelai of the B.C. Chapter of the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment.

Recent U.S. studies have shown increases in premature births, asthma and congenital heart disease in people living close to fracking operations, Barzelai said.

“Can we be assured that the same complications will not occur in B.C.? We think that a properly funded public inquiry, with a comprehensive and strong mandate, is needed to answer critical questions such as these,” he said.

Public inquiries in B.C., such as probes into forest industry practices, have produced useful recommendations, but the gas industry has never been subjected to such scrutiny, Parfitt noted.

Among questions the group wants addressed are:

• The extent of consultation with First Nations and whether it meets standards set by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
• Public health and safety risks.
• Risks to the environment and water resources.
• Risks to critical infrastructure, such as dams.
• Increases in greenhouse gas emissions.
• Whether there is adequate monitoring and transparency by the B.C. Oil and Gas Commission.

During this year’s election campaign the NDP acknowledged there are questions about fracking and the party’s election platform said: “With the potential of significant expansion of gas production in the years ahead, we will appoint a scientific panel to review the practice to ensure that gas is produced safely and that our environment is protected.”

The review will include an assessment of the impacts on water and “given recent minor earthquakes in the area,” what role gas production has in seismic activity, it said.

So far, the government has not moved on the scientific review and the mandate letter, given by Premier John Horgan to Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources Minister Michelle Mungall, makes no specific mention of the review, although it could be encompassed in more general endorsements of sustainability and respect for First Nations.

Neither Mungall nor Green Party spokespeople were available to comment by deadline for this story. However, later Monday the Ministry of Energy and Mines sent along a statement from Mungall:

“The provincial government is attentive to the concerns expressed about hydraulic fracturing in British Columbia, and we respect the diversity of opinions shared with us by third parties and stakeholders.

“We will act on our commitment and appoint a scientific panel to review hydraulic fracturing in British Columbia. This will include looking at impacts on water and the relationship to seismic activity. Further details will be announced in the near future.”

In 2016, after a scientific study was published drawing a direct line between fracking and earthquakes in the Western Canada sedimentary basin, on the Alberta/B.C. border, Green Party leader Andrew Weaver called for a “moratorium on horizontal hydraulic fracturing until there is a better understanding of its risks.”

In a September interview with DeSmog Canada, Weaver said the problem was not so much the existence of fracking, but the free-for-all approach.

“The right approach would be to pause and reflect on the cumulative impacts of our wild-west approach to resource extraction here in B.C.” Weaver said.

The Green platform called for creation of a natural resources board, which could take a detailed look at the cumulative effects.

Image: Premier John Horgan tours the AltaGas Ridley Island propane export facility. Photo: Province of B.C. via Flickr

The Narwhal’s reporters are telling environment stories you won’t read about anywhere else. Stay in the loop by signing up for our free weekly dose of independent journalism.

The Tulsequah Chief mine, a zinc and copper mine close to the Alaska border, has been leaking acid mine drainage into the Tulsequah River since it was first shut down in 1957 and attempts to re-open the mine have failed, along with a multitude of promises to clean up the site.

Two companies have gone bankrupt during their ownership of the Tulsequah Chief, with the current owner, Chieftain Metals, declaring bankruptcy last September and there are now reports that Black Loon Metals has backed away from a potential deal to take over the site.

Black Loon chairman, Gordon Bogden, would not say whether the company remains interested in buying the Tulsequah Chief.

“As a private company we do not comment on our investment opportunities,” Bogden said in an email.

The NDP have indicated cleanup of the Tulsequah will be a priority for the new government. In early July, Jen Holmwood, caucus spokeswoman for the NDP, said cleanup of mine “is a serious issue we’ll be looking into and have to say more on in the weeks ahead.”

Green Party leader Andrew Weaver has previously stated the abandoned mine gives B.C. “an environmental black eye.”

Mine Closure, Water Treatment, Priority for Alaskans Living Downstream

Chieftain still holds a permit to build the initial phase of the mine, but receiver Grant Thornton LLP wants to sell assets and the water treatment plant — which operated only briefly because of operating costs — to help repay creditors.

Decades of pollution, running into the Tulsequah River, have infuriated Southeast Alaskans as the Tulsequah is a tributary to the salmon-rich Taku River and there are fears that the acidic drainage could affect salmon runs.

In 2015 then mines minister Bill Bennett appeared shocked by the mess when he visited the site and promised that the mine would be cleaned up, but he later backtracked, claiming the runoff poses no environmental threat.

But a study by SLR Consulting (Canada) Ltd. — which was commissioned after a risk assessment by Chieftain Metals was found to be flawed — documents details of damage to fish habitat from the acid mine drainage.

The report, released last month, looks at four zones within the river and tests showed hazards are highest in the zone closest to the discharge.

“This is likely because multiple undiluted and untreated sources of historic mine waste are discharging into the Tulsequah mainstem and side channels from surface water and groundwater inputs,” says the report.

“Metal concentrations pose unacceptable risks to fish, fish eggs and pelagic invertebrates.”

The waste includes cadmium, copper, zinc, aluminum, iron, lead, cobalt and sulphate, says the study, which recommends reducing the overland flow and doing follow-up assessments.

In some zones the contamination could be worse than documented as the study may not have captured the “worst case scenario,” according to the SLR assessment.

The new study should put an end to claims that the mine runoff is not harming fish and water quality, said Chris Zimmer, Rivers Without Borders Alaska campaign director.

“After two bankruptcies and failed attempts to sell the mine out of receivership, it is clear that the Tulsequah Chief is not a viable mine, financially, environmentally or politically,” he said.

“The only way to stop the illegal and clearly harmful acid mine drainage from the abandoned mine into the salmon-rich Taku watershed is for B.C. to honour its promises and take responsibility for mine cleanup and closure.”

New BC Gov Inherits Toxic Legacy as #Tulsequah Buyer Backs Away from Abandoned, Leaky #Mine https://t.co/BsPYWQfMxK #bcpoli @BCNDPCaucus

— DeSmog Canada (@DeSmogCanada) August 4, 2017

Trying to reopen the mine is a recipe for another bankruptcy, more pollution and exposing the Taku watershed to mining and road building, said Zimmer, who is urging the new NDP government to take a more responsible approach to the cleanup than the former BC Liberal government.

“We urge the new Minister of Energy and Mines, Michelle Mungall, to honour the promise made by her predecessor and accept responsibility for cleaning up the mess at Tulsequah Chief,” Zimmer said.

Mungall could not be contacted in time for publication.

Image: Tulsequah Mine in 2010 by Chris Miller

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