Two top B.C. civil servants, including the senior bureaucrat who prepares Site C dam documents for cabinet, knew in May 2019 that the project faced serious geotechnical problems due to its “weak foundation,” according to documents obtained by The Narwhal.

Energy ministry assistant deputy minister Les MacLaren and deputy finance minister Lori Wanamaker also knew the following month that the over-budget project had almost exhausted its $858 million contingency fund, a likely sign of another cost overrun, according to the documents, which were released under B.C.’s freedom of information act.

Yet British Columbians — the owners of the publicly funded dam on the Peace River — didn’t learn about the project’s escalating troubles for more than a year, until Energy Minister Bruce Ralston held a brief press conference on July 31, the same day BC Hydro released overdue Site C dam reports. 

The belated BC Hydro reports said the Site C dam faces unknown cost overruns, schedule delays and such profound geotechnical troubles that its overall health is now classified as “red” — meaning it is in serious trouble. 

In late January, The Narwhal submitted a freedom of information request to BC Hydro, asking for all Site C project assurance board agendas, minutes, reports and recommendations.

Premier John Horgan created the project assurance board in December 2017 after his government approved the dam and added another $2 billion to the project budget. But the NDP government subsequently refused to release any of the board’s findings or a list of its members. 

Following an appeal to the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner after BC Hydro missed a legal deadline for responding, we received 2,247 pages of documents almost seven months after filing the request.

(The Narwhal is releasing the FOI response in its entirety to the public and it can be accessed at the following links: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5.)

The documents reveal new information about the dam’s geotechnical struggles and raise troubling questions about who in government knew about the project’s climbing costs and deepening geotechnical woes, when they knew it and why the information was not made public.

Key sections of the documents, including information pertaining to rising cost pressures and the severity of key project risks from January 2018 to January 2020, are redacted. 

Even so, the documents paint a picture of a project rife with growing geotechnical issues and risks as well as safety and quality concerns — and facing a rising risk of cost overruns and schedule delays — long before the COVID-19 pandemic shut down much of the province and temporarily scaled back the Site C dam workforce in mid-March. 

On Sept. 1, 2019, for instance, nearly one year before the public learned of significant problems and a soaring price tag for the Site C dam, BC Hydro submitted a weekly status report to the assurance board listing the overall health and cost of the dam’s main civil works as “red,” meaning the civil works — the dam structure, generating station and spillways — were in deep trouble.

 ‘A matter of grave public concern’ 

Harry Swain, who chaired the joint review panel that examined the Site C project for the federal and provincial governments, said it is “anomalous” that project assurance board reports have been kept secret by the B.C. government until now and key information is still being withheld. 

“This project is proceeding in doggone secrecy that just is not at all common in large public projects of any kind,” Swain, a former federal deputy minister, told The Narwhal. 

“This is a matter of grave public concern and we, as taxpayers or ratepayers, are going to wind up paying a heck of a lot of money for it,” said Swain, who was also Canada’s director general for electricity and the country’s first senior advisor for renewable energy.

“It looks like we’re going to lose $10.7 billion on this project. That would take care of the homelessness problem, unequitable incomes, First Nations health and several other things, all at once.” 

In July, when BC Hydro released the overdue reports, the public utility said it didn’t know when the Site C dam — slated for completion in 2024 — will be finished or how much it will cost beyond its current $10.7 billion budget. 

BC Hydro also said it hasn’t figured out how to resolve grave geotechnical issues, which require shoring up the unstable foundation of the earthen dam, powerhouse and spillways. 

Site C project assurance board documents reveal an important meeting took place at the end of May 2019, when the Site C dam technical advisory board — a panel of engineering and construction experts — convened in Fort St. John and Vancouver over a three-day period. 

A list of the meeting attendees is redacted, but the documents show a de-briefing was conducted with BC Hydro executives and project assurance board members on May 31, 2019. 

Premier John Horgan created the Site C project assurance board in December 2017. But the NDP government subsequently refused to release any of the board’s findings or a list of its members. In late January, The Narwhal submitted a freedom of information request to BC Hydro, asking for all Site C project assurance board agendas, minutes, reports and recommendations and received 2,247 pages of documents about seven months later. Photo: Jayce Hawkins / The Narwhal

Stability of the dam ‘a significant risk’ 

The main objective of the three-day meeting was to assess progress and performance on the Site C project, as well as to assess design-related risks. The primary area of focus was the main civil works — the dam structure, powerhouse and spillways — according to the documents. 

The technical advisory board found the stability of the dam is “a significant risk and the hazards associated with the weak foundation have been adequately recognized.” 

“We’re talking about a possible lack of stability under the dam itself,” U.S. energy economist Robert McCullough said in an interview.

“Literally, if we look at some of the academic articles that have been written about this, we could be talking about a dam that’s going to crack or slide in the case of an earthquake,” said McCullough, a former officer for a large hydroelectric facility in Portland, Oregon, who has studied the Site C project extensively. “Since there are earthquakes in this part of the world, this is a very important issue.” 

The Site C project is located in a geographical area filled with faults that can become critically stressed during fracking operations, which are poised to expand significantly in the region to supply gas for the LNG Canada export project. In 2017 and 2018, more than 10,000 earthquakes occurred in the wider area, including one that shook the Site C dam construction site in November 2018, forcing workers to evacuate. 

The advisory board also said the Site C dam’s design — changed to an unconventional L-shape, much to the concern of retired BC Hydro engineer Vern Ruskin — needed to be checked. 

It outlined seven steps for BC Hydro to follow, including calculating “the factor of safety” at the end of construction and again at the end of reservoir filling, and requested an update at its next meeting. 

“They’ve gotten pretty het up over this,” McCullough said. “This is a tone that says ‘you’ve got to do a ton of work right now, and we want to hear back that you’re doing it.’ Some of these things are pretty major.”

B.C. ministers likely aware of escalating problems

According to the documents, the Site C project assurance board has an “oversight function to help ensure that the project is completed on time and on budget, and that risks are appropriately identified, managed and reported on an ongoing basis.” 

Swain said the assurance board, despite its moniker, is not an oversight board. He described it as “pretty much an emanation of BC Hydro, with a few additions.”  

“That is a management board,” he said. “If you’re going to have some kind of oversight or project assurance you want some really independent people. You want to have a few experts — particularly geotechnical ones — who have a lot of experience around the world and have no interest in further employment by BC Hydro. They’re really independent in that sense.”

MacLaren, the long-time assistant deputy energy minister who prepares Site C documents for cabinet and reviews BC Hydro’s quarterly Site C progress reports to the B.C. Utilities Commission, is one of two government representatives on the board. 

The other representative is Wanamaker, who in 2017 challenged the commission’s final findings about the Site C project in a six-page letter to the commission that seemed to suggest the new NDP government was searching for a rationale to continue the project.  

The independent commission found the Site C dam’s final price tag could exceed $12 billion and the same amount of energy could be produced by a suite of renewables, including wind, for $8.8 billion or less. It also found that BC Hydro had a historical pattern of over-forecasting energy demand. 

According to documents on BC Hydro’s website, the project assurance board is at the centre of Site C dam communications among BC Hydro’s board of directors, the energy ministry, and treasury board and/or the finance ministry. 

Swain said it would be “strange” if MacLaren and Wanamaker had failed to inform their ministers — then Energy Minister Michelle Mungall and Finance Minister Carole James — about mounting problems with the Site C project during 2019.

“It strikes me as highly unlikely that the most senior officials in those departments and the ministers would be unaware of the developing difficulties,” Swain said. 

Harry Swain chaired the panel that reviewed the Site C dam on behalf of the provincial and federal governments. He says it’s “highly unlikely” that government the ministers would have been unaware of the escalating construction difficulties at the Site C dam. Photo: Jayce Hawkins / The Narwhal

An ‘egregious’ problem with oversight for Site C and Muskrat Falls dams

For David Vardy, the retired chair of Newfoundland’s public utilities board, the Site C project’s lack of transparency and escalating costs create a sense of déjà-vu.

The failure to disclose the Muskrat Falls dam’s rising costs to ratepayers was a front-and-centre issue in Newfoundland, where the over budget dam on Labrador’s Churchill River will require a bail-out from federal taxpayers to avoid a minimum 50 per cent increase in provincial hydro rates.  

An inquiry into the $12.7 billion Muskrat Falls project examined why the provincial government didn’t cancel the uneconomic project when there was still time. 

The inquiry’s scathing report, released in March, found executives at the Crown corporation responsible for building the dam “frequently took unprincipled steps” to secure approval of the project, while governments were “determined to proceed” through a lens of political bias.

Since the inquiry, the cost of the Muskrat Falls dam has climbed again, to $13.1 billion, and Vardy predicts another $1 billion will be added to the tab before the dam becomes operational at least three years behind schedule.  

“I think there’s an egregious problem with oversight on the two projects,” Vardy said in an interview. “If anything, it almost appears in some respects that Site C oversight is not as good as what we’ve had here.”

Vardy said it would have made “all the difference in the world” if ratepayers in both provinces had been apprised of rising costs earlier. “They [Crown corporations] are in the same camp of misrepresenting their costs to the public and misrepresenting to the public what’s going to happen at the end of the day. It’s bad public policy because you don’t have transparency.” 

The Site C project assurance board documents beg the question of who has been looking out for the public interest in B.C. since the board began meeting in January 2018, using weekly information from BC Hydro to review expenditures and progress on the dam. 

The Muskrat Falls Dam pictured here under construction in April 2018 was the subject of a public inquiry due to the project’s high costs. “If anything, it almost appears in some respects that Site C oversight is not as good as what we’ve had here,” said David Vardy, the former chair of Newfoundland’s public utilities board. Photo: Nalcor Energy

Project assurance board voted to increase SNC Lavalin’s contract 

The assurance board is chaired by John Nunn, the former chief project engineer for the Site C dam and a BC Hydro director since January 2020.

Nunn worked for the Vancouver-based engineering and consulting firm Klohn Crippen Berger, a major donor to the BC Liberal Party.  

Along with embattled engineering giant SNC Lavalin, also a major donor to the BC Liberal Party, Klohn Crippen began to receive direct award Site C contracts after former Premier Gordon Campbell announced in 2010 that the project would proceed to review. (Donations to political parties by corporations and unions were banned in B.C. after the NDP took power in 2017.)

Direct award contracts — which are prohibited by the federal government if they are larger than $25,000, unless they are needed for special justifications such as a national emergency — allow BC Hydro to decide which companies get contracts instead of going through a more transparent and competitive tender process. 

The documents show the BC Hydro board of directors approved the retention of the two firms to design core components of the Site C dam in November 2014, the month before the former BC Liberal government announced the project would proceed. 

Klohn Crippen was given a direct-award Site C contract for $104 million to design essential components of the dam, including the main civil works, generating station and spillways, according to the documents. 

SNC Lavalin received a direct award contract for $131 million, also to design core components of the dam. 

The core components of the dam are now in question due to the lack of solid ground on which to anchor the dam structure, powerhouse and spillways — an issue flagged years ago by both SNC Lavalin and Klohn Crippen as a potential project risk. 

In February 2019, with geotechnical issues an ongoing concern, the project assurance board authorized an “increase” to the Site C engineering design service agreements with Klohn Crippen and SNC Lavalin, the documents disclose.

The amount of the increase is redacted from the documents, which show Nunn abstained from the vote due to his prior working relationship with Klohn Crippen. 

On July 31, well over a year after the assurance board approved additional funds for SNC Lavalin and Klohn Crippen, BC Hydro reported to the B.C. Utilities Commission that “the foundation enhancement costs are expected to be much higher than initially expected.” 

The third-generation Boon family farm sits within the 128 kilometres of river valley that is set to be flooded for the Site C dam. Photo: Garth Lenz / The Narwhal

Assurance board hired ‘independent’ engineer from company represented on board

Also on the Site C project assurance board is Joe Ehasz, the California-based program manager for AECOM Energy & Construction, a company that had received $225,000 in Site C dam contracts by May 2017. 

In August 2019, according to records obtained by The Narwhal through a separate freedom of information request, the company’s subsidiary AECOM Technical Services also received a $132,000 Site C dam contract to provide an “independent construction advisor” for the project.

Board members include three other BC Hydro directors, Concert Properties CEO David Podmore and Lorne Sivertson, an energy consultant and the author of a pro-Site C report for B.C. construction trade unions that was used to discredit the utility commission’s findings.

The documents show MacLaren and Wanamaker were privy to a January 2018 report from the project’s technical advisory board that described construction schedules as “aspirational” and identified geotechnical stability issues as a risk that could further impede progress building the dam.

In a report for the project assurance board one year later, covering the week ending Jan. 25, 2019, BC Hydro points to the most serious geotechnical issue plaguing the project today — the lack of solid ground on which to anchor the dam structure, powerhouse and spillways — as a topic of discussion in a conference call with the project’s technical advisory board.

Site C dam construction on the Peace River. Photo: Garth Lenz / The Narwhal

The design team presented information on the “small amount of movement on a bedding plane” and “the compression of the foundation from powerhouse buttress loading,” the report noted.

The site where the dam is being built contains “bedding planes” between layers of sedimentary shale that have poor shear strength, meaning they could suddenly shift under modest amounts of force. The site, in Swain’s words, is composed of “relatively youthful and unpetrified sediments, some of which appear in the form of weak shales, mudstones, siltstones and some of which appear in the form of clay.” 

“Those sedimentary muds and rocks and clays and whatnot are known to react quite alarmingly either in the presence of a lot of water or a lot of dryness,” Swain said. 

“They swell and shrink. They move around. It’s not the sort of geology that you’d really want to go out and put a multi-million tonne dam on, or even a roller compacted concrete powerhouse.” 

Swain said he was puzzled by BC Hydro’s re-design of the dam to an L-shape after the joint review panel assessed the project.

“I think we’re finally seeing some kind of response to the question of why the heck did they [decide to] build an L-shaped dam when nobody’s ever done that in the world before.” (BC Hydro has pointed to several examples of L-shaped dams around the world, but those dams are not earthfilled like the Site C dam.) 

“The suspicion is that the initial placement of the powerhouse was found to be over an especially weak spot,” Swain said. “By turning it 90 degrees, they thought they would avoid the problem. It appears that they may not have.”

Site C dam’s civil works in serious trouble almost one year before public disclosures  

On Sept. 12, 2019, nearly one year before the public learned of the project’s rising price tag, BC Hydro informed the assurance board that geotechnical risks were “likely,” potentially increasing costs and causing a schedule delay. BC Hydro also warned of the “likely” risk of additional engineering costs. 

The severity and probability of those costs were redacted from the documents, along with contingency cost pressure items. But by Sept. 1, 2019, according to the documents, the entire contingency fund had been spent, with five years of construction still ahead. 

BC Hydro also said there was a “likely” risk that Highway 29 budgets are “based on incomplete designs, with limited construction market data.” To accommodate the Site C dam’s reservoir, about 30 kilometres of the highway in six different sections, including four bridges, will have to be relocated.

Dam spillway costs would increase materially due to design changes and reservoir clearing costs would be higher than allocated for in the budget, the assurance board also learned. The severity, probability and cost of those risks were redacted from the documents.

Nine days later, a Sept. 21, 2019 report from Steve Summy, the AECOM “independent construction advisor” — a position created by the project assurance board — flagged safety, quality, schedule and cost issues on the project’s left bank. 

Key parts of Summy’s conclusions are redacted from the documents. However, Summy zeroed in on the “poor” quality of the finished surface in the river diversion tunnels, recommending a finishing crew begin work as soon as possible. He cautioned against “pressure to accept a substandard product to finish on time” and noted the application of shotcrete — sprayed concrete — in the tunnels was “inconsistent.” 

By Sept. 1, 2019, the Site C dam’s entire contingency fund had been spent, with five years of construction still ahead, according to documents obtained by The Narwhal. Photo: Jayce Hawkins

Six ‘significant’ technical risks identified 

The May 2019 report from the technical advisory board — shared with BC Hydro executives and the project assurance board members on May 31 of that year — identifies six “significant” technical risks. 

They include the “stability of the earthfill dam and tailrace wall,” described as a “significant risk due to the weak foundation” in a 15-page report that recommended seven steps to check the project’s design and calculate the factor of safety. 

A second risk is the right bank foundation, which forms the shorter arm of the radically re-designed L-shaped structure. Structures on the right, or south, bank of the Peace River include the power house, spillways and earthfill dam. 

The technical advisory board noted “the hazards associated with various ground defects affecting stability have been correctly identified” on the south bank “as have risk mitigation efforts based on seepage control and drainage.” 

But a greater effort was required, the board said. Those efforts should include making it a “high priority” to develop a hydrogeological model of the right bank to determine how the bank would respond to reservoir filling, the board said. 

The technical advisory board also flagged the earthfill dam foundation and grouting as a significant risk.  

The stability of slopes and foundation at the dam site could potentially be “decisively” affected by hydrogeological conditions and phenomena, the technical advisory board noted. 

“Simple flushing of a borehole has immediately raised the groundwater levels in an extensive section of the right abutment and has caused displacements on bedding planes. Rainfall has triggered similar effects.”

The Site C dam is being built in an area that contains “bedding planes” between layers of sedimentary shale that have poor shear strength, meaning they could suddenly shift under modest amounts of force. Photo: Jayce Hawkins

For the grout, “options for responses to approaching risks are more limited,” the board noted. “Especially in the right abutment, groundwater levels rising with the lake are capable of jacking open the existing stress relief features and, in this process, not only raising the hydraulic load on the curtain but also, in the worst case, damaging the curtain by hydrojacking.”

As a precaution, the board says grouting could be performed to obtain a “safe pre-stressing of the rock mass against the hazard of hydrojacking.” 

“Such measure has positive precedent but meets with difficulties imposed by the geological and geotechnical conditions prevailing at Site C…” the board noted.

A further risk is the thermal performance of roller compacted concrete and cracking. Cracks in the roller compacted concrete have “been recognized and studies are underway to evaluate their extent and significance,” the board noted.   

“If, ultimately, substantial grouting is necessary to repair such cracks, a complex and costly program could result,” the board said, adding it wished to be kept informed on progress “associated with managing this risk.”

Neither BC Hydro nor the B.C. government are responding to media questions during the provincial election campaign, unless inquiries pertain to health and safety or statutory requirements. 

Calls for independent safety review, cancellation

If completed, the Site C dam will flood 128 kilometres of the Peace River and its tributaries, putting Indigenous burial sites and traditional hunting and trapping grounds, some of Canada’s best farmland and habitat for more than 100 species at risk of extinction under up to 50 metres of water. 

Swain and others — including members of the Peace Valley Landowner Association and residents of the community of Old Fort, downstream from the Site C dam  — are calling for an independent safety review of the project. Swain said the safety review should follow investigations by independent geotechnical engineering experts. 

“I strongly believe that BC Hydro and the government should pause the construction, do that work and then take another decision,” Swain said. 

“That’s entirely aside from the economics of the case which have been abysmal for some time and are getting worse.” 

Forest in the Peace River valley in the Site C dam flood zone. Photo: Garth Lenz / The Narwhal

Two new expert reports, including one written by McCullough, conclude British Columbians will save money if the Site C dam is immediately cancelled by the new provincial government following the Oct. 24 election. 

McCullough’s report, commissioned by the Peace Valley Landowner Association, said the dam will conservatively cost an additional $2.1 billion and ratepayers will save an initial $116 million a year if the project is scrapped and the same amount of energy is procured from other sources. 

An “intelligence memo” from the C.D. Howe Institute, addressed to B.C.’s upcoming new government, says the case for the Site C dam is “getting weaker” and any meaningful cost increase makes cancellation the best choice.

The documents show the Site C project had spent $3.5 billion of its budget by March 31, 2019. The latest figures show $5 billion has been spent. But McCullough, Swain and Vardy all point out the only cost the government should consider is the one to come.

Ralston announced in July that the government has appointed Peter Milburn, a former deputy minister of finance and secretary to the Treasury Board, as a special Site C project advisor who will work with BC Hydro and the Site C project assurance board to examine the project and provide the government with independent advice.

But whether or not Milburn’s findings will be made public remains to be seen. 

McCullough said Milburn’s appointment underscores the problem of “who guards the guards.” 

“Normally, in a construction project, you want as clean a chain of command as possible,” he said. “In this case it would be the premier at the top, then the chairman of the board of BC Hydro and then the engineers at the bottom.” 

But in the case of the Site C dam, McCullough said there’s “a cloud of committees and cross-committees watching each other.” 

McCullough said the Site C dam’s geotechnical challenges call for “the simplest and most direct and most hands-on management, and what we have is a committee of committees.” 

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The B.C. government says an overdue report on the Site C dam will be available in the “near future,” fueling speculation that BC Hydro will use the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to announce a significant schedule delay and further cost overrun on a project that was in trouble long before the coronavirus struck. 

“You look at all of this and it just adds up to something that doesn’t smell right,” said Ken Boon, president of the Peace Valley Landowner Association, which represents dozens of property owners affected by the Site C dam project.

 At issue is a missing Site C quarterly report, which provides a public update on the project’s progress and risks for the three-month period ending on Dec. 31, 2019. 

Normally the document — which includes a yearly report from the Site C dam Technical Advisory Board, outlining its key findings — would have been submitted to the B.C. Utilities Commission in early April. 

But commission chair and CEO David Morton said he has still not received the report. 

“We have been in contact with [BC] Hydro about it and we have been told that the report has been delayed because of COVID,” Morton told The Narwhal. “We are anxious to get it.”

BC Hydro also has not submitted the quarterly Site C report for the period ending March 31, 2020, Morton confirmed. That report would normally be available in early July.

Delayed report to include budget, schedule update 

In an emailed response to questions, the B.C. Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources said the two quarterly reports have been delayed “due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the evolving impacts of the pandemic on the project.” 

The ministry said the reports will be released soon and will include an “update” on the Site C project schedule, budget and diversion of the Peace River.

Diverting the Peace River early this fall, as scheduled, is critical for building the dam structure and completing the project in 2024 without additional cost overruns.

BC Hydro has said missing the river diversion deadline would delay the project by about one year and significantly add to the dam’s cost, which has already ballooned from $6.6 billion, when the project was announced in 2010, to $10.7 billion. Ratepayers will only begin paying for the project once the dam generates power. 

The energy ministry did not respond to a question asking if the Site C project is still on schedule and within its revised budget, as previously asserted by the government. 

The quarterly reports give British Columbians a glimpse of the major financial risks associated with the largest publicly funded project in the province’s history. They provide details about the project’s expenditures, setbacks and prognosis for on-time completion that are not otherwise available due to the unusual secrecy surrounding the project. 

Boon said using the pandemic as an excuse for delaying release of the reports “doesn’t make any sense.”

“If they’re capable of carrying on building the project — they called the Site C project an essential service — they should also be able to carry on doing their quarterly reports,” he said in an interview.

Part of the third-generation Boon family farm will be flooded for the Site C dam and most of the rest will be lost to the relocation of a provincial highway for the dam. Photo: Don Hoffmann

Harry Swain, chair of the joint review panel that examined the Site C project for the federal and provincial governments, said it is “ridiculous” to blame the delay on the pandemic, noting that writing a quarterly report involves office work that can be done at home, which can be approved by the necessary executives, also working from home. 

“It is a specious argument,” said Swain, a former federal deputy minister and Canada’s first senior advisor for renewable energy.

 “A report like this can be compiled within a week or 10 days of the end of the relevant reporting period. It’s not very difficult to do.” 

The last Site C quarterly report, which covered the three-month period ending on Sept. 30, 2019, positioned the project for more cost overruns and schedule delays. That report was released on Jan. 15, two months before the pandemic was declared and much of B.C. shut down. 

Some of the more serious issues the report detailed include “significant cost pressures and/or budget increases” incurred after the NDP government approved an additional $2 billion for the project in December 2017, and a September 2019 cost risk analysis showing that the revised Site C dam project budget was “under pressure” — five years before the dam’s projected completion date. 

“It said to me that they were setting up for some bad news to be coming in some future quarterly reports,” Boon said.

“Now we have these two quarterly reports that have been delayed for so long, and the word on the street is that there are problems with the project. To me, it all adds up to that they’re just trying to delay as long as possible revealing bad news and embarrassing this government.”

A view of the Site C dam construction site in July 2020. The dam will flood 128 kilometres of the Peace River and its tributaries, including First Nations burial grounds and sites of cultural and spiritual significance. Photo: Don Hoffmann

‘Left in the dark’

Swain decried the lack of transparency, pointing out that BC Hydro is accountable to the utilities commission and the government. 

“Neither have insisted on reporting, or at least the publishing of any reports. I would presume that the B.C. government or the B.C. Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources is fully informed of what’s going on, and has decided for whatever reason not to make it public.” 

BC Hydro announced in late May that the two river diversion tunnels have been completed. But Boon pointed out there are significant issues with one of the tunnels and other infrastructure necessary for river diversion, including coffer dams, is not in place. 

In its last Site C quarterly report, BC Hydro acknowledged, for the first time, that the fast-approaching and already revised timeline for completing the river diversion tunnels was “at risk,” noting issues with tunnel liner concrete that included falling pieces of concrete chunks as large as 18 metres by three metres.

Boon also said a five-kilometre conveyor belt to carry fill for the dam structure has been beset with operational problems. Part of the conveyor belt was also recently underwater following heavy rainfalls that caused multiple landslides in the Site C project area, which is notorious for its slope instability, sparking calls for an independent safety review of the dam.

The conveyor belt was supposed to be operational by the summer of 2019, noted Boon, who lives with his wife Arlene in their third generation family farmhouse, which was expropriated for the dam. 

“We’re a year past that now and that’s not happening. Those conveyor belts are not running. And they need those conveyor belts to move the material that’s going to build the dam. It would appear that they’re obviously behind schedule with that. What is the story with that? Once again, we’re left in the dark.” 

Boon said he had hoped the public would be kept better informed about the project following Premier John Horgan’s 2017 announcement that his government would establish a Site C project assurance board, to ensure the dam would be completed on time and without further cost overruns. 

“We were led to believe we’d have better accountability and transparency,” Boon said. “We’re not getting any of that from this government.” 

Minutes and reports from the assurance board have been kept secret by the NDP government, which will also not reveal the names of board members. 

“The individual members, minutes and reports of the project assurance board are not available publicly in order to ensure the protection of sensitive information that, if released, may harm financial, economic, business and other interests related to the project, and to protect personal privacy,” the energy ministry said in an email to The Narwhal. 

A Site C dam work crew in July 2020. The Peace River Valley is notorious for its unstable slopes and has a history of large landslides. Photo: Don Hoffmann

Private corporations not permitted to delay reporting

Morton of the B.C. Utilities Commission said the commission can ask for the Site C quarterly reports but does not have the power to order them. 

“We have limited jurisdiction here because we didn’t approve the project.” 

Normally, the watchdog commission would review BC Hydro’s proposed capital projects, such as the Site C dam, to determine if they are in the public interest.  

But the former Liberal government changed the law to exempt the commission from reviewing the decision to build the Site C dam, heralded by the government as a legacy project, while former B.C. Premier Christy Clark famously vowed to push construction “past the point of no return.” 

The utilities commission rejected the Site C project in the early 1980s following a two-year review. BC Hydro’s board of directors rejected the project when it was proposed again in the 1990s, saying the dam was too expensive and environmentally destructive and B.C. did not need the energy.

A UBC study subsequently found the project would have more significant adverse environmental effects than any project ever examined in the history of Canada’s environmental assessment act.

Swain said the utilities commission could “quite literally, write a letter demanding the reports.” 

“It could then, if they’re not delivered, issue a press release saying we’ve asked for these reports, they haven’t been delivered. The idea that they are not being open with the public on that is disturbing.” 

He said BC Hydro has established “a pattern of behaviour” to file reports very late, including its annual reports.

“If they were a private corporation, regulated by a securities commission, this would not be allowed.” 

BC Hydro’s most recent annual report, which provides information about the overall financial health of the publicly owned utility, has not been released. 

Boon said he and other Peace Valley landowners remain hopeful that continuing geotechnical issues and escalating costs will make the Site C project uneconomical. 

“If things go sideways enough on this project, I don’t think it’s too late to kill it,” he said. 

“With all the rain we’ve been having the trees are growing back about as fast as they can cut them down. Nature will restore this valley.”

“I don’t think it’s too late for this project to die of natural causes.”

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More than a year after a Peace Valley landslide forced the evacuation of Old Fort residents, with six homes still under an evacuation order or emergency alert, the regional district and B.C. government are wrangling over who is responsible for determining if the community of 200 is safe. 

“This uncertainty is affecting the whole community down there,” Brad Sperling, chair of the Peace River Regional District, told The Narwhal.

“But even more so, the three [property owners] that are on alert, they’re living day to day being ready to get out. It’s not right and it’s not fair.” 

The slide, in an area underlaid by numerous natural gas leases and near one entrance to the Site C dam worksite, was classified as a “dangerous occurrence” under B.C.’s health, safety and reclamation code.

That triggered a geotechnical assessment to identify “the root cause and contributing factors” of the slide, according to a briefing note for Peter Robb, mining and energy assistant deputy minister, that was included in the response to a Freedom of Information request made by The Narwhal.

A screenshot of a briefing note prepared for Peter Robb, assistant deputy minister of B.C.’s Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources. The briefing note was obtained by The Narwhal through a Freedom of Information request. The document also notes the region is home to “historically unstable slopes.”

But almost 14 months later — with the landslide moving metres a day for the first month and then settling, before advancing another few centimetres last spring — the geotechnical assessment is not yet complete, the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources said in an email to The Narwhal. 

“The Chief Inspector’s investigation into this matter is ongoing,” the ministry said, noting that “13 months is not an unusual amount of time to complete such a complex investigation.” 

“ … everything surrounding the slide is very hush-hush.”

The ministry did not respond to a question asking what information must still be gathered in order to conclude the investigation into the slide, which displaced eight million cubic metres of earth and blocked the only road to Old Fort for a month. 

Old Fort resident Kali Chmelyk said community members are getting contradictory messages about the landslide, noting “everything surrounding the slide is very hush-hush.”

For example, when residents ask about the temporary road into the community and when it will be paved, they’re told the slide is still dangerous and still moving and not to stop their cars on the road because it isn’t safe, Chmelyk said. 

“But then when you bring up ‘so it’s dangerous, what does that mean?’ Then you get the response of ‘oh no, everything’s fine, it’s not dangerous, it’s not moving anymore, there’s no danger to safety, blah, blah, blah.’ ”

“These are our homes and we want to know we’re safe where we are. I don’t want to be told in six months ‘it’s possible that this could happen again, so we’re just going to buy you out.’”

Google map showing the location of the Old Fort landslide in relation to the Peace River and the Site C dam. Photo: Cathrine Ruddell / Twitter

Site C project commissions landslide report 

The banks of the Peace River are notoriously unstable, sparking calls for an independent safety review of the $10.7 billion Site C dam, the largest publicly funded infrastructure project in B.C.’s history. 

Geotechnical problems have already slowed work on the project and have contributed to its escalating cost.

The Joint Review Panel that examined the Site C dam for the federal and provincial governments found that slope instability and landslides in the valley “would potentially adversely affect” the project and “could result in landslide-generated waves or overtopping of the dam that could result in direct damage to infrastructure.”

The FOI documents show that, immediately following the slide, BC Hydro requested a Site C project field reconnaissance report from BGC Engineering Inc.

Work being done to build a temporary access road to the community of Old Fort on October 20, 2018. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

According to emails, BGC engineer Andrew Mitchell asked the provincial government for LIDAR data for a two-kilometre square area around the landslide. Other FOI documents show BGC examined LIDAR data dating back to 2015, the year preliminary construction for the Site C dam began. 

“We’d be very interested in seeing the wider view of the recent topography,” Mitchell told the energy and mining ministry in an email.

LIDAR, which stands for Light Detection and Ranging, is a remote sensing method that uses lasers to record information about the earth’s surface. It is used for a wide range of land management and planning efforts, including for hazard assessment in the case of events such as tsunamis, lava flows and landslides.

Sperling said he wasn’t aware of the BGC report, which was sent to Pooley and others — including to staff in B.C.’s ministries of energy, transportation and forests, lands and natural resource operations — as well as to BC Hydro’s Site C team.

“They were doing LIDAR flyovers in that two-kilometre area but that was supposedly to figure out where the Old Fort slide was going,” Sperling said. “I had no idea that BC Hydro was involved in this.” 

B.C. investigation into Old Fort landslide caught up in conflict of interest, residents say

Site C project landslide report redacted from FOI response

The BGC report was redacted from the FOI documents, which The Narwhal received more than one year after filing its request. 

Almost 70 pages were removed from the FOI response on the grounds that contents would reveal policy advice or recommendations, or because disclosure would be harmful to law enforcement or personal privacy.

“Why are they redacting stuff?” Sperling asked. 

Site C dam construction in 2018 along the banks of the Peace River. The dam is located roughly one kilometre upstream from the location of the Old Fort landslide. Photo: Garth Lenz / The Narwhal

He said he would ask the regional district board to write a letter to the provincial government at its next meeting on Nov. 28 requesting more information.

“We write letters, our MP writes letters, so does our MLA,” Sperling said. “And it just seems the province uses the wording in the [emergency program management] legislation and puts it back on the district and leaves us to our own devices.”

Gravel mine above Old Fort ‘not the root cause’ of landslide

According to emails in the FOI documents, a gravel mine stockpiling materials on the slope above Old Fort was not the root cause of the landslide, which destroyed a house and cut off the community with a wall of earth, rocks and trees. 

Crews work to remove gravel loads from a pit above the Old Fort landslide, Oct. 6, 2018. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

A load of gravel is moved away from the hillside and closer to the 240 Road. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

“The size of the slide seems to indicate that there were underlying issues with the material down the entire slope,” said an email from mining inspector Adrian Pooley.

“The weight of the material is a contributing factor [to the] slide, but it is not the root cause,” Pooley, a professional engineer, wrote to senior inspector of mines Laurie Meade and others in the ministry. 

The email was written on Oct. 2, 2018, just two days after the slide began, on the day Pooley toured the disaster area on the outskirts of Fort St. John.

Pooley also noted that the permit given to Deasan Holdings, owners of the gravel mining operation, stated that stockpiled material must be designed by a professional engineer “and when asked they said they had not done this.” 

But “even if they had involved a geotechnical engineer it’s unlikely that they even would have identified the potential for a slide like this to happen,” Pooley wrote.

Sperling called the information about Deasan’s apparent non-compliance with its mining permit “surprising.” 

The district had asked the provincial government if Deasan was in compliance with its permit, issued the month before the landslide, but did not receive an answer, Sperling noted.

“That is the kind of information that we’ve been waiting for,” he said. “We need to know what’s going on.”

Sperling said regional directors knew the ministry was investigating the potential role the gravel mine may have played in triggering the landslide. But he said they were not aware of the broader investigation into the root cause and contributing factors to the slide.

“My response is surprise. I didn’t know that. They’re doing a study on the root cause of it?”

Government says further landslide movement ‘is possible’

For months, the regional district and the provincial government have exchanged sometimes testy letters over who holds responsibility for determining if the slopes around Old Fort are stable enough for the evacuation order and alerts to be lifted. In addition to six houses, the order and alert include portions of other properties and Crown land. 

“The vast majority of the evacuation order is actually on Crown land,” Sperling said. “That in itself frustrates us because now we are responsible for Crown land? If you read the emergency legislation we’re responsible for people and private land.”

In August, the regional district board asked Public Safety Minister Mike Farnworth for data and information to substantiate the minister’s claim that the area is unlikely to experience “a dramatic slippage of the remaining hillside that might further impact homes” in the Old Fort area.

A section of Old Fort Road, heavily damaged in the 2018 landslide. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

The district informed Farnworth it will have that information “verified by geotechnical and all applicable experts.” 

In response, deputy minister of Emergency Management BC Lori Halls wrote back that transportation ministry staff would reach out to ensure the regional district knows how to access data about earth movements.

“It is acknowledged that further slow movement of the terrain is possible, but as noted in the minister’s response, the assessment of the risk and application of evacuation orders or alerts is the purview of the PRRD [Peace River Regional District],” Halls said in a letter.

Sperling said the district has decided to commission its own geotechnical review of the current risk to properties in Old Fort, and the contract will be discussed at the regional board’s next meeting on Nov. 28. The district has requested funding from Emergency Management BC for the review, Sperling noted.

“We can’t wait,” he said. “It’s been 14 months. Those people want some clarity down there. And the board agreed to move forward even if we have to financially take it on ourselves.” 

Old Fort resident Gord Pardy speaks at a community meeting, Oct. 6, 2018. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

Old Fort residents at a community meeting. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

Chmelyk said Old Fort residents are perturbed by the lack of information. 

“It really seems that everybody is passing the buck and nobody wants to take responsibility and nobody wants to be held accountable for it — and that is super frustrating for all of us down here.”

Fish habitat work for Site C dam affected by slide

BC Hydro has said there is no indication the landslide was connected to nearby excavations and other major earthworks for the Site C dam.

However, the slide has affected at least one aspect of work on the hydro project, which is $2 billion over-budget and behind schedule for diverting the Peace River so the dam structure can be built.

Sperling said the landslide affected a Peace River island and blocked a back channel of the river near Old Fort where fish habitat enhancement for the Site C project was scheduled to take place.

“In order for them to go ahead with their original plans they would have to remove that part of the slide. Without proper assessment I would really object to that. I did have a meeting with them and said ‘I don’t want you guys touching that.’ ” 

The Old Fort landslide began on September 20, 2018. In this photo, a helicopter takes a LIDAR survey to measure the landslide’s movement and speed on Oct. 6, 2018. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

A Nov. 13 letter from BC Hydro to Sperling said “given the recent instability in the area” BC Hydro will not be initiating any work around Old Fort.

BC Hydro is “evaluating alternative locations to meet our commitments with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans,” said the letter from Shanna Mason, director of environment, regulation and community impacts and properties for the Site C project. 

“BC Hydro understands and respects the concerns of the PRRD and Old Fort residents regarding any works which could impact slope stability,” Mason wrote. 

DFO requires BC Hydro to implement “mitigation” measures as a condition of its environmental assessment certificate because the Site C dam will destroy fish habitat, including for at-risk bull trout, which will be anesthetized and transported past the dam in trucks so they can reach their spawning grounds.

BC Hydro does not intend to undertake works “in areas of stability concern and works within the Peace River mainstem near Old Fort are assessed by engineers to ensure there will be no interaction with the areas of instability,” Mason wrote.

She also said BC Hydro would brief the regional district and provide updates to Old Fort residents prior to completing any work on the north bank of the Peace River near Old Fort. 

Gravel pit operator given new exploration permit

According to Michelle Mungall, Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, the investigation into the gravel mining operation’s potential role in the landslide was nearing completion last June.

In a June 12, 2019 letter to Sperling, Mungall said the scope of the investigation includes “determining the extent, if any, that the mining activity contributed to the landslide, reviewing the permitting process, reviewing the compliance history of the site and evaluating if there may be other sites in the province that should be reviewed for similar conditions.” 

The FOI documents show that immediately following the slide, Victor Koyanagi, acting regional director for B.C.’s office of the chief inspector of mines, asked his staff for a list of “permitted aggregate pits located anywhere on the flank of the Peace River from Hudson’s Hope to the Alberta border.” 

The Old Fort landslide took place in a region with historically unstable slopes. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

That included all pits near the future Site C reservoir area, which will stretch 83 kilometres from Fort St. John to Hudson’s Hope, as well as an additional 45 kilometres, in total, along Peace River tributaries.

Aggregate, or gravel, is in high demand in northeast B.C. by the natural gas industry, which uses large amounts of gravel at fracking well pads. 

The ministry provided The Narwhal with a list of the 35 gravel pits along the Peace River. The Site C project was listed as the permitee for two of the pits, according to the list provided, which noted that one pit had closed. 

The ministry said none of the gravel pits, with the exception of the Deasan Holdings operation above Old Fort, are under a suspension of work order.

Shortly before Mungall wrote to Sperling, her ministry issued Deasan Holdings a permit to explore subsurface conditions under the slide area “and compare it with subsurface conditions where the ground did not slide in 2018.”

“Deasan hopes the comparison should show the depth of the failure zone during the October 2018 landslide,” said the permit, which also said the work may help to determine whether historical landslides have occurred in the past. 

The Narwhal’s FOI request, filed on October 12, 2018, asked the B.C. Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources for records and communications related to the Peace Valley landslide over the 12-day period since the landslide had begun. 

The ministry responded well past established deadlines for answering a FOI.

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West Moberly First Nations are not backing down from their long battle to stop the Site C dam following Tuesday’s announcement that they will engage in confidential discussions with BC Hydro and the provincial government, says Chief Roland Willson.

“Our position is that the dam should not go ahead,” Willson told The Narwhal. “We think there’s still an opportunity to kill the thing before they flood the [Peace River] valley.”

The B.C. government said in a press release that the discussions will “seek alternatives to litigation related to the Site C dam project.”

“We’re listening to what they have to say,” Willson said. “There may be an alternative [to Site C]. In the discussion we’re going to be talking about how they don’t have to destroy the valley. Our primary focus is going to be about trying to protect the valley.”

The West Moberly and Prophet River First Nations filed civil claims in January 2018 alleging the Site C dam and two previous dams on the Peace River unjustifiably infringe on their treaty rights.

The nations subsequently lost their application for an injunction to protect 13 areas of cultural importance for the Dunne-Za nations — including prime moose habitat, a rare old-growth white spruce and trembling aspen forest and two wetlands called Sucker Lake and Trappers Lake — from clear-cut logging for Site C.

But the judge ruled their treaty rights case must be heard by 2023, prior to Site C reservoir filling scheduled for 2024.

“Our position is that the dam should not go ahead. We think there’s still an opportunity to kill the thing before they flood the [Peace River] valley.” — Chief Roland Willson

West Moberly First Nations Chief Roland Willson.

Willson said the provincial government is under “enormous pressure from all over the place” to cancel Site C, which would flood 128 kilometres of the Peace River and its tributaries in the heart of Treaty 8 traditional territory, poisoning bull trout and other fish with methylmercury.

He pointed to a United Nations request that Canada suspend Site C dam construction until the project obtains the “free, prior and informed consent” of Indigenous peoples. Canada has until April 8 to report back to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination outlining the steps it has taken to halt construction of the $10.7 billion dam.

Willson also highlighted a January study from the C.D. Howe Institute that concludes BC Hydro customers will be better off if the Site C dam is cancelled immediately, as well as the provincial government’s report on the first phase of a comprehensive review of BC Hydro, released in mid-February, which found B.C. has too much energy.

“There’s an abundance of power and we don’t need Site C,” said Willson, who has called the Site C dam “cultural genocide.”

“It was a political decision when [former premier Gordon] Campbell made it [in 2010]. It was a political decision when [former premier] Christy Clark approved it and it was a political decision when [premier] John Horgan decided to continue it.”

United Nations instructs Canada to suspend Site C dam construction over Indigenous rights violations

But the B.C. government told The Narwhal it is not reconsidering the Site C dam. “This does not impact planned construction timelines,” the Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation said in an e-mailed statement.

“If successful, we are hopeful that an agreement could settle the ongoing litigation regarding Site C, [and] also help us to create a more positive relationship with Prophet River and West Moberly moving forward,” the statement said.

Willson said legal cases against Site C have cost the two nations more than $1 million, and the treaty rights case will cost “millions” more.

The nations raise money for Site C legal bills $100 at a time through their yellow stakes initiative.

Yellow stakes were used by BC Hydro contractors to mark the centre line for a provincial highway that must be relocated out of the Site C flood zone. The highway, whose relocation will cost at least $530 million, is slated to run past Indigenous burial sites and a special cultural area for First Nations, who have been gathering for millennia at the spot at the confluence of Cache Creek and the Peace River.

A rare, ancient tufa seep within the Site C dam flood zone. Photo: Garth Lenz

The Narwhal previously filed a Freedom of Information request asking BC Hydro for the total amount it had spent on legal fees related to the Site C dam. BC Hydro responded that the total amount was subject to attorney client privilege, and did not release the information.

BC Hydro financial reports show that the public utility paid $4.3 million over a recent one-year period (April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018) to the Vancouver law firm Fasken (formerly known as Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP), which represents BC Hydro in the treaty rights case against Site C.

The firm, which has a long history of representing governments and resource companies in legal cases against First Nations, also represented BC Hydro during the joint federal-provincial environmental assessment hearings on Site C and on what it refers to as other “Aboriginal matters” related to Site C.

Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP received an additional $29 million from BC Hydro from 2011 to 2017, according to BC Hydro financial reports.

Three years into an estimated nine years of construction, most clear-cut logging for the Site C dam has taken place around the eastern flank of the Peace River Valley near Fort St. John, where the dam structure will be built. The rest of the valley is still relatively intact.

“Some of the old growth forest we’re trying to protect has been cut,” Willson said. “A tree will grow back. There’s nothing that can’t be undone.”

Low elevation forest in the Site C flood zone. Photo: Garth Lenz

Tim Thielmann, legal counsel for West Moberly First Nations and Prophet River First Nation, said he could not discuss the content or timing of the discussions.

“West Moberly and Prophet River continue to be opposed to the project,” Thielmann told The Narwhal.

“They continue to fight to prevent their treaty rights from being infringed by the cumulative effects of the three dams on the Peace River, and they are fully prepared to go to trial and obtain a judgement in advance of any Site C flooding if that is what they need to do.”

Sarah Plank, communications director for the Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation, said the ministry can’t comment on the format and structure of the discussions.

“The discussions are in the early stages and they’re confidential,” Plank told The Narwhal.

The government said the parties “will continue trial preparations as discussions proceed on alternatives to litigation.” The parties appeared in court in late February and proposed a case plan for a 120-day trial commencing in 2022.

“We’re willing to listen to what they have to say, but we’re still filing our papers,” Willson said. “If we don’t like what we hear at the negotiating table we’ll walk away.”

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The landslide began on the last day of September, a day no resident of the small Peace River community of Old Fort will forget.

A slide on a steep slope near the town quickly buckled and destroyed portions of the only road leading into and out of the community. Before long, the road was buried under a mass of earth, rock and trees, and the seemingly unstoppable wall of slumped and moving earth forced the evacuation of the community’s 200 residents.

Ever since then, residents have had lots of questions of B.C.’s Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources. Questions about whether the slide may have been triggered by a gravel mining operation at the top of the slope.

They continue to wait for answers from a ministry that also has ultimate authority for major hydroelectric dams, oil and gas industry operations and mines, all of which have the potential to trigger landslides, especially if they occur along the river that borders their community.

During the community’s evacuation, information was released about a historic “failure” at the very same location, directly downslope from a gravel mine. Locals now wonder aloud why the operation was permitted given foreknowledge of slope instability.

“Is this a natural occurrence or is there a man-made reason behind this?” asks Old Fort resident Kali Chmelyk.

“I want to know that those hills are not going to come crashing into our community.”

Work is done on a temporary access road, October 20, 2018. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

‘We cannot release any information’

The steep slopes siding the Peace River are notoriously unstable.

Over the years dramatic landslides have blocked the river, wiped out bridges, and sent plumes of sediment coursing down tributaries and into the main stem of the river for months on end.

Which now begs the question why B.C.’s ministry of energy would knowingly allow a new gravel mine to operate on the very same parcel of land where a previous mining venture had caused slope failures.

Sometime after the September slide occurred and a local state of emergency was declared, the ministry of energy launched an investigation into events at the slide site.

But the ministry is refusing to release any documents or correspondence with the mining company about known “slope stability” concerns — because, they say, an investigation is currently underway.

As Old Fort’s 54 homes were being evacuated in early October, images of the slide began appearing, showing huge stockpiles of mined gravel very close to where the slide began.

Google map showing the location of the Old Fort landslide in relation to the gravel pits and the Site C dam. Photo: Cathrine Ruddell / Twitter

In response to a request for any documents relating to unstable slopes at or near the mine site, the ministry’s communications director, David Haslam, responded by e-mail in early November, furnishing only copies of the original “Notice of Work” filed in May by mining company, Deasan Holdings Ltd., and the “Sand and Gravel Permit” issued to the company by the ministry on August 7.

All other documents, including correspondence between the ministry and the company regarding unstable slopes were withheld.

Pasted to the bottom of Haslam’s e-mail was an undated note from Al Hoffman, chief inspector of mines, indicating that he had ordered an investigation into the Old Fort slide under Section 7 of the Mines Act.

“We cannot release any information that might prejudice an active investigation,” Hoffman said, adding: “All other documentation is now part of the ongoing investigation and may not be released publicly at this time.”

Section 7 of the Act grants powers to the chief mines inspector to order an investigation into any “accident” that may have caused “personal injury, loss of life or property or environmental damage.”

Slopes historically unstable

The community of Old Fort lies close to the river only a short distance downstream from the Site C dam construction site where “tension cracks” appeared on the unstable north riverbank in February and again in May, 2017. Those cracks forced a BC Hydro contractor to remove massive quantities of earth to reduce the risk of a slope failure in the vicinity of the project, the costs of which have ballooned from $6.6 billion to an estimated $10.7 billion.

At a lengthy public meeting organized by the Peace River Regional District the day after the evacuation, a ministry spokesperson fielded numerous questions from residents about the gravel mine, including one from evacuee Gordon Pardy.

“If a little bit of common sense could take place here you might ask the question: Why would a very large heavy pile of crushed material be stockpiled right on the edge of an unstable — a historically unstable — valley?”

“Those are the things that we will be looking into with our investigation,” replied Adrian Pooley, who works in mines operations at the ministry’s offices in Prince George and who joined the meeting remotely by speakerphone.

During the meeting, Pooley revealed that there had been a previous “failure” at the mine site sometime in the 1980s or 1990s when another company had operated there.

A portion of a slope on the northeast side of the property collapsed after gravel was excavated from below. “There were some studies that went into that and some conditions around no further removal of material up in that portion [of the property],” Pooley said.

The Old Fort slide occurred at the south end of the property, away from where gravel was being actively removed but near where large piles of gravel had been stored, Pooley said. On the day that the slide occurred, the ministry of energy and mines received reports that the outer edge of the gravel quarry or excavation area had dropped eight to 10 metres.

Both the area of the property that was actively mined and the land where the company was temporarily storing gravel before delivering it to customers, are under the ministry of energy and mine’s jurisdiction.

Pooley went on to say that the mining company “did not do a study on the weight of the stockpiles” and added more generally that no geotechnical studies had been done “on the slope on the south end of the property.”

A section of Old Fort Road, heavily damaged in the landslide. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

Officials warned of ‘slope stability issues’

Pooley’s comments generated numerous questions and responses from Old Fort residents attending the meeting, including from one who felt that it was a “conflict of interest” for the ministry that issued the mining permit to conduct an investigation into what may have gone wrong at the mine site; another who questioned who would be held liable should the mine be linked in some way to the slide; and another who maintained that local residents had witnessed a smaller slide at the mine site months before the bigger slide but that nothing had been done.

As previously reported by The Narwhal, information filed with the Peace River Regional District by the former mine owner shows that a little more than three years before Deasan Holdings commenced gravel extraction this summer, an official warned of challenges at the site.

That warning came from Kris Bailey, the ministry’s inspector of mines permitting in Prince George.

“Please be advised that based on the past geotechnical and slope stability issues present both at the site and surrounding areas a mine plan will be required to be developed by a qualified geotechnical and or mining engineer. It is strongly advised that any potential future mining proponents contact this office prior to mine planning,” Bailey wrote then mine owner Jack Blair, on July 17, 2015.

Bailey, who still works for the ministry but in a different capacity, said during a phone conversation following the slide that he could not provide copies of the mine plan or any related documents because the matter had been pushed “up the food chain” in the ministry. He referred questions to Diane Howe, deputy chief inspector of mines permitting.

Howe did not return phone calls.

‘Extreme caution…should be observed’

Arthur Hadland, a longtime resident in the Peace Region and a former director of the Peace River Regional District, says nobody should be surprised by the slide.

“The banks of the Peace River have been identified as extremely unstable ever since man started messing around with it,” Hadland said, adding that that reality is well understood in the ministry.

Hadland noted that in 1991, then energy and mines minister, Jack Weisgerber, had received a report from Norm Catto, with the Geological Survey Branch. Catto’s report noted that some of the most accessible gravel deposits in the Peace River region were along the river itself, an area that was known for being extremely unstable.

“Slope failure is ubiquitous along all of the major streams in the region,” Catto wrote in his report, adding later: “Extreme caution should therefore be observed in any effort to exploit or utilize river valley slopes.”

Given the known risks, Hadland said it is imperative that any investigation into the Old Fort slide has as its priority “the safety of downstream people.”

That investigation should be broad, he said, and include all land-use activities that could conceivably destabilize slopes including gravel mining operations, oil and gas industry gas wells and disposal wells, the Site C dam, and two large Fort St. John sewage lagoons nearby to Old Fort.

Documents give insight into pre-existing concerns

Despite the ministry’s decision to withhold key documents, enough information exists in the mining permit issued to Deasan Holdings to indicate that the office had concerns about the region’s unstable slopes.

The permit was signed by Victor Koyannagi, a professional engineer and senior inspector of mines, and is dated August 7 of this year. The seven-page document is peppered with references to geotechnical concerns, including “slope stability,” “erosion,” and “unstable slopes.”

At one point, the permit notes:

“…a qualified professional engineer shall determine the potential inundation zone (Zone) for all unstable slopes including the eastern pit slope that has already slumped. This zone shall be clearly illustrated on a map and shall be provided to the Regional Inspector of Mines prior to initiating mining activities. The Zone shall be clearly defined and marked on the ground ensuring equipment and workers are prohibited from entering the Zone.”

The document also clearly instructs Deasan to hire a “qualified professional engineer” to design any “temporary and permanent stockpiles” of gravel. And that “daily visual inspections” of such stockpiles are required “to ensure stability and erosion control is maintained.”

At least two documents that may have been withheld from the public by the ministry are referred to or alluded to in the permit.

The first is a “slope design” document prepared for Deasan Holdings by Tryon Land Surveying Ltd., a company that has operated in northeast B.C. since 1961. On its website, Tryon says that it specializes “in the design and execution of civil and land development engineering as well as structural engineering,” including mining projects.

The permit also notes that Deasan was required to file a “geotechnical incident report” in the event of any “dangerous occurrence” at the mine site.

One such occurrence appears to have happened during the summer.

Bob Banack, a resident who lives just west of the gravel mine site said that sometime in late July or early August he witnessed a slide at the site. The slide was triggered as a road was being built down toward where the gravel piles were eventually placed, Banack said.

“When they did build that road…it rained. And that whole hill, basically, it slid all the way down,” Banack said. “There were a couple of guys at the bottom and a couple of guys at the top and the guys at the bottom were standing with their hands out.”

Banack said he phoned the City of Fort St. John to alert officials to what he saw, but was told that the property was not under municipal jurisdiction. Banack added that he “assumed” the gravel pit operator had reported the incident.

Following the public meeting where Pooley fielded questions, Banack said he received a call from Pooley asking him to explain what he had witnessed at the site.

Residents, still on evacuation alert, say scope of investigation unclear

Peace River Regional District board chair Brad Sperling said most residents in Old Fort are now back in their homes.

One property and house was damaged by the slide and is now uninhabitable, another half dozen homeowners closest to the leading edge of the slide have been told to remain on evacuation alert because their properties could still be threatened, Sperling said.

A new road to Old Fort was constructed on top of the landslide. The speed limit posted along the new roadway is 30 kilometres per hour. Photo: Matt Preprost / Alaska Highway News

As of now, Sperling says the Peace River Regional District has received no formal notice from the provincial government about which ministries may ultimately investigate the slide and its causes.

While he said he knew that the ministry of energy and mines was investigating the events at the mine site itself, he felt that such an investigation needed to be expanded.

“We want the answer from the province, not a single ministry,” Sperling said.

Public Health and Safety Minister, Mike Farnworth, flew over the slide on October 10.

During the course of his visit, the slide advanced 20 metres, about five times more than it had on average since the slide had begun 11 days earlier when the district declared a local state of emergency.

“Once this whole issue has been resolved, once the slide is stabilized, once people know what the long-term situation is going to be, of course there’s going to be an investigation into how this happened, why it happened, and are there measures that need to be taken to mitigate or ensure it doesn’t happen again,” Farnworth told the Alaska Highway News, which has reported extensively on the slide since it began.

One month after Farnworth’s visit, however, the scope of any promised investigation remains unclear. His ministry even declined to answer questions about whether it would participate in such an investigation, referring all questions to the ministry of energy and mines.

After e-mailing questions to Farnworth’s ministry about what provincial ministries would take part in any investigation, Jordan Turner, a communications manager covering Emergency Preparedness, part of Farnworth’s ministry, phoned to say that answers would come from someone else.

“That response will come from energy and mines,” Turner said.

The ministry of energy and mines subsequently confirmed that it is currently the only provincial ministry actively investigating the slide.

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Calls for an independent safety review of the Site C dam project are mounting following a large landslide near the project’s worksite that has blocked the only road to a small community and led to the evacuation of residents by boat.

Retired BC Hydro engineer Vern Ruskin said this week’s mushrooming slide is a reminder that the project is located in an area prone to landslides and that a major landslide close to the Site C dam structure could compromise it.

“If the landslide is a long way off and all they get is a wave then the dam can withstand it,” Ruskin told The Narwhal. “If the landslide is close enough it could damage the dam structure and it may fail.”

Ruskin, who directed the team that designed the five dams originally planned for the Peace River, including Site C, said he has repeatedly asked the B.C. government and BC Hydro to conduct an independent safety review of the project due to its location in a valley with a history of large landslides and because of a change to the design of the dam structure.

When former B.C. premier Gordon Campbell announced his government would proceed with the Site C project in 2010, the dam structure was depicted as a very slight arc. But in 2014 an L-shaped structure — which Ruskin says to the best of his knowledge has never been used anywhere in the world for an earthen dam — was revealed when former premier Christy Clark announced final approval of the project.

The new structure is described by one engineering firm that helped design it as “unique” and an “innovative solution” to stabilize the original river valley wall.

Ruskin said that is all the more reason for an independent safety review of the $10.7 billion dam, the largest publicly funded infrastructure project in B.C.’s history.

“Someone outside of BC Hydro has to do the review,” said Ruskin, who taught engineering economics at UBC for 14 years. “It seems to me that if you are going to do something completely different you should test it.”

Dam safety under fire around world

Announced in 2010 as a $6.6 billion project and given final government approval in 2014 as an $8.8 billion project, the Site C dam’s price tag climbed by an additional $2 billion late last year.

Dam safety practice around the world “has been shaken” by the recent collapse of tailings pond dams at B.C.’s Mount Polley mine and in Brazil, the Site C project’s technical advisory board noted in its February meeting minutes. The board, charged with providing technical reviews and engineering advice, also noted the 2017 failure of California’s Oroville dam spillways following heavy rains, which led to the evacuation of more than 180,000 people downstream.

“Considerable re-evaluation of site documentation to better inform future dam safety assessment is currently underway in the industry,” the board noted in its minutes. The board also said it was “of the view” that the Site C project should “engage in these evaluations to be able to assert that it is adopting Best Available Practices.”

The minutes were disclosed in affidavits filed for a First Nations court case seeking an injunction to stop work on the Site C project until a treaty rights legal case is resolved.

The Narwhal had previously requested technical advisory board meeting minutes through a Freedom of Information request, but the response was so heavily redacted it was impossible to determine if the board had any dam safety concerns.

In a statement e-mailed to The Narwhal, the B.C. energy ministry said BC Hydro has conducted extensive engineering studies into the geology of the Site C project area — including the dam site — for decades.

“The issue of historical slides in the area is well documented and its being addressed by BC Hydro with the excavations and stabilization measures that have been taking place at site since construction started in 2015,” said the statement.

The Peace valley landslide, which began overnight on Saturday, has left engineers scrambling to survey the unstable slope close to one entrance to the dam worksite, which is not affected.

Landslide near dam site forces evacuation orders

The landslide, which continues to gather momentum, has displaced five million cubic metres of earth — almost half the amount BC Hydro has excavated from the river’s north bank over the past three years to prepare for building the Site C project’s river diversion tunnels and the dam structure.

On Tuesday the Peace River Regional District — which has issued evacuation orders for three properties — evacuated people by boat who opted to leave their homes in Old Fort, a community of about 50 residences that has been isolated by the slide.

BC Hydro spokesperson Mora Scott said in an e-mail to The Narwhal that “there is no evidence to suggest that the slide that took place over the weekend is related to Site C or any of the work taking place on the project.”

The slide occurred immediately below a former gravel pit operation, where piles of stockpiled construction materials were clearly visible.

According to Peace River Regional District documents, when the gravel pit operation closed down in 2015, the B.C. ministry of energy and mines advised the owner that any future mining activities at the site would require a mine plan developed by a qualified professional, due to “past geotechnical and slope stability issues.”

“We all know the slopes are very unstable in the valley,” said Ken Boon, president of the Peace Valley Landowner Association, representing 70 landowners who will be impacted by the Site C dam. “An independent review of the Site C safety issues would be prudent.”

Arthur Hadland, the former Peace River Regional District director for the area that includes Old Fort, has repeatedly asked successive provincial governments to establish an independent panel of academic and non-academic geological experts to investigate the safety of residents of Old Fort, Taylor and Alberta, downstream from the Site C dam.

Hadland said in an interview that his concerns were heightened following BC Hydro’s confirmation in August that the Site C dam will be anchored to shale bedrock instead of to firmer bedrock such as granite.

“Shale is old mud,” said Hadland. “It’s 80,000 year-old mud. When it’s exposed to air and a little bit of moisture it turns back to mud.”

In August, BC Hydro spokesperson Dave Conway told local media that the Crown corporation has not been searching for stronger bedrock at the dam site, where it has removed 11 million cubic metres of earth in an effort to resolve geotechnical issues that have added to the project’s escalating cost.

“We know what rock is here,” Conway said.

“The dam is going to rest on shales, and the powerhouse and spillway structures are going to be anchored into shale materials as well.”

Ruskin said it’s not uncommon to build dams on shale, even though it is weaker than other types of bedrock. But what concerns him is the combination of shale and the new L-shaped design structure that includes construction of a roller compacted concrete buttress that will serve as the foundation for the generating station and spillways.

“That has never been done before,” he said. “They are pioneering.”

“There’s nothing wrong with a new idea,” Ruskin said, as long as the new design passes a safety review by a committee independent of BC Hydro and its contractors. Such a committee should include representation from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which operates and maintains 700 dams, because it has extensive experience building on shale, he said.

Slope instability identified as issue during environmental review

The Joint Review Panel that examined the Site C project for the federal and provincial governments noted that slope instability and landslides in the valley “would potentially adversely affect” the project and “could result in landslide-generated waves or overtopping of the dam that could result in direct damage to infrastructure.”

In its most recent quarterly Site C report, made public in late September, BC Hydro referred to a June rockslide near construction of one of two river diversion tunnels as a “minor geotechnical event,” noting that remediation work is underway to minimize schedule impacts.

BC Hydro also stated in the same report that “changes to geotechnical ground conditions remain a risk to the project schedule and cost.”

The energy ministry said BC Hydro has identified 16 other earthen dams around the world that rest on a similar shale foundation. There are 57,000 large dams in the world, according to the U.S. non-profit group International Rivers.

The valley where the Site C reservoir would sit has experienced huge landslides in the past.

In 1973, a landslide in the future Site C reservoir area hurled 14.7 million cubic metres of debris a distance of almost one kilometre, damming the Peace River for 12 hours and generating a wave so high it snapped trees more than 20 metres above the river.

Sixteen years later, a slide at the nearby Halfway River, which would be flooded by Site C, sent 3.6 million cubic metres of debris into the Peace, blocking it for six hours and sending the river north.

And in 2016, a series of landslides at Lynx Creek, a Peace River tributary that would also be inundated by Site C, sent a plume of toxic metals, including arsenic, barium, cadmium, lithium and lead, into the Peace River.

According to BC Hydro technical reports, engineers expect as many as 4,000 landslides will be triggered by the Site C reservoir, which will be up to 50 metres deep, several kilometres wide and stretch for a total 128 kilometres along the Peace River and its tributaries — about the same distance as driving from Vancouver to Whistler.

Many of the landslides will be small, but some will be so large they are expected to generate waves reaching so far above the reservoir they may damage a planned new bridge across the Halfway River, according to BC Hydro reports.

BC Hydro says the Site C project is designed “to the highest recommendations” of the Canadian Dam Association, to withstand major events such as earthquakes and floods, and that the project design is in keeping with international best practice.

* The article has been updated from an earlier version that stated the landslide began following intense rain. In fact, there was no rain the night of the landslide.

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B.C. Premier Christy Clark made headlines last month when she claimed that even a few months delay in evicting two Peace Valley families from their homes could add $600 million to the Site C dam project tab.

When Premier designate John Horgan asked BC Hydro to hold off forcing families from their homes this coming week as scheduled, Clark wrote to Horgan that “…with a project of this size and scale, keeping to a tight schedule is critical to delivering a completed project on time and on budget.”

But now BC Hydro’s latest Site C report reveals that — well before May’s provincial election and Clark’s headline-grabbing claims — the hydro project was already late meeting three out of eight “key milestones” for 2017 and was at risk of being late for three more.

It begs the question: was Clark trying to deflect blame for Site C construction delays and potential cost overruns onto the soon-to-be NDP government?

Tucked away on page 30 of BC Hydro’s most recent quarterly Site C report to the B.C. Utilities Commission is a chart of “key milestones.” It provides a glimpse at some of the behind-the-scenes challenges of keeping the $8.8 billion project on schedule and on budget.

Report Cites Reasons for Site C’s Late and “At Risk” Milestones

The report lists some of the reasons for Site C’s late and “at risk” milestones. Among them are a pesky 400-metre long tension crack on an unstable Peace River embankment and delays — prior to March 31 — in awarding contracts. 

One key milestone, a new civil contract award for the dam’s generating station and spillways, was five months behind schedule by March 31. A milestone to complete a road on the north bank, where the tension crack appeared in February, was 13 months behind by the end of March.

And a contract to relocate a section of provincial highway away from the Site C flood zone — the reason Clark gave for the pressing need to evict farmers Ken and Arlene Boon from their home as scheduled on July 15 — was one month behind and deemed to be “at risk” before the election campaign kicked off in April.

The report notes that the delay, even as of March 31, “may impact the overall work schedule” for highway relocation at Cache Creek, where the Boons live.

Site C Dam Late for Key Milestones Under BC Liberals, Report Reveals https://t.co/e6dpYO9KlM #bcpoli #SiteC pic.twitter.com/3Wf53gQUKl

— DeSmog Canada (@DeSmogCanada) July 14, 2017

It also states that “plans are in place to address potential delays” in constructing Peace River diversion tunnels — the river must be diverted to allow construction of the dam structure — as a result of the tension crack. 

Yet Clark made no mention of these potential delays when she told Horgan that allowing the farmers to stay in their homes for a few more months could prevent river diversion from occurring as planned in September 2019. 

In Clark’s words, “Preliminary work undertaken on this issue by BC Hydro indicates that should river diversion not be completed as scheduled, a year-long delay would occur…” That one-year delay, Clark wrote, was expected to cost BC Hydro customers $600 million.

Evictions for Highway Construction Hang in Balance

The Boon’s third-generation farmhouse, in an area of the valley known as Bear Flat, was expropriated by the B.C. government last December for a new Site C highway route that local First Nations say will desecrate an aboriginal burial site that may contain the bodies of people who succumbed to the 1919 flu pandemic while at a traditional winter encampment at Bear Flat.

The First Nations, along with the Peace Valley Landowners Association, representing 70 people whose properties would be impacted by Site C, have requested an alternate shortlisted route for the highway. They have also repeatedly requested details about the comparative costs of the shortlisted routes, which have not been released by the Transportation Ministry or BC Hydro.

The Boons were given permission to remain in their home until May 30, after the provincial election. That deadline was subsequently moved to June 30 and then to July 15 and now to July 23, leaving the Boons and their neighbours on tenterhooks as they wait to hear if they can stay in their farmhouses, which are now legally owned by BC Hydro.

Site C’s main civil works contractor — a partnership that includes the Alberta corporation Petrowest, Korea’s Samsung C&T and a Canadian subsidiary of the Spanish conglomerate Acciona — has “experienced delays on several of their critical path activities, requiring a re-sequencing of planned work,” according to the report.

BC Hydro declined to answer questions about the report, which states that Site C remains on budget and on track to be completed in November 2024 despite the late and at risk milestones.

“Any cost impacts to BC Hydro associated with rescheduling activities can be managed from existing allocated contingency budgets,” says the report.

The report also notes that the Site C project had spent $482 million more by March 31 than was anticipated for that date when the project gained final B.C. government approval in late 2014.

But adjustments made to Site C’s most recent service plan — a three-year spending plan — show that the project actually spent $93 million less than anticipated by that date.

The savings, according to BC Hydro, are related to a “shift in expenditures” into other reporting periods. Details were provided confidentially to the BCUC but have been withheld from the public.

“Many questions remain surrounding the cost of Site C,” Green Party leader Andrew Weaver told DeSmog Canada.

“It is egregious that the most expensive taxpayer-funded project in B.C.'s history has not undergone review by BCUC to determine whether this project is in the interests of British Columbians,” Weaver said in an e-mailed statement.

The NDP and Greens have said they will send Site C for BCUC review as soon as the new government is in place next week.

Muskrat Falls, Keeyask Dam Costs Escalate

Adjustments to Site C’s spending timeframe come as the people in charge of building the other two large dams currently under construction in Canada — the Keeyask Dam on Manitoba’s Nelson River and the Muskrat Falls dam on Labrador’s Churchill River — disclose that both projects are significantly over budget.

The bill for the Muskrat Falls dam — called a “boondoggle” by the CEO in charge of building it — jumped by another $1 billion last month and is now pegged at $12.7 billion. The dam will produce roughly three-quarters of Site C’s energy.

The price tag for the Keeyask dam — which will produce 695 megawatts of power compared to Site C’s projected 1,100 megawatts — jumped by $2 billion this year, to $8.7 million. 

Muskrat Falls is expected to tack an extra $150 onto the monthly hydro bill of every household in Newfoundland and Labrador. Rate increases for Manitobans as a result of the Keeyask dam’s escalating price tag have not yet been determined, although news reports say they will be in the double digits.

Former BC Hydro CEO Marc Eliesen has called Site C a “big white elephant” that will lead to significant hydro rate increases.

BC Hydro’s report also notes that three Site C “material risks” have increased this year — construction execution, geotechnical risks and environmental non-compliance.

“Unknown or changes to geotechnical ground conditions is a risk impacting the schedule and cost,” states the report. 

The “First Nations” material risk to Site C decreased this year, as a result of Site C impact agreements with the Doig River First Nations and the Halfway River First Nation, according to the report.

The risk of interest rate variability also decreased, and the $1.4 billion in interest that will be accrued during Site C’s construction period remains unchanged.

The report notes that “identified risks are being managed and treatments are in place or planned.”

Photo: Garth Lenz, Site C dam construction, fall 2016.

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Sandbags, bales of weed-free straw, crushed gravel and silt fencing are among the extra supplies BC Hydro has stockpiled at the Site C dam construction site to avoid federal fines.

In early January the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency issued BC Hydro with a Notice of Intent to Issue an Order after inspectors found that “no erosion and sediment contingency supplies” were to be found at three sites.

The agency also noted BC Hydro could face fines of up to $400,000 for not meeting the conditions set out in its environmental certificate.

It’s not the first time BC Hydro has been found in contravention of the law. In May, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency found BC Hydro had failed to measure air pollution and threatened BC Hydro with a $400,000 fine.

BC Hydro, in a Jan. 5 letter to the Environmental Assessment Agency, said all measures had been taken to restore the Site C project to a “state of conformity,” and, after studying photographs supplied by BC Hydro, the agency agreed that there was no need to issue the order, which could have resulted in hefty fines.

“The contingency supplies, including hay bales and sandbags, must be on hand to mitigate potential environmental effects, such as those to fish and fish habitat, as a result of construction activities,” said CEAA communications spokeswoman Lucille Jamault in an e-mailed answer to questions from DeSmog Canada.

B.C.’s Environmental Assessment Office (EAO) previously issued three warnings to BC Hydro over pollution, erosion and sediment concerns during construction of the controversial $9 billion dam.

The EAO, after an August inspection, found that “excessive sedimentation is still occurring and the risk of erosion has not been effectively mitigated over much of the project.”

Problems included a landslide that occurred as a result of an overloaded sediment fence, which deposited sediment directly into the Moberly River, a temporary road constructed through a sediment fence that was supposed to protect a wetland even though “less environmentally detrimental options exist,” and plugged culverts.

.@BCHydro Let Off Hook for $400,000 #SiteC Dam Fine… Again https://t.co/E2ANbCGauq @LavoieJudith #bcpoli #cdnpoli #bcelxn17

— DeSmog Canada (@DeSmogCanada) February 16, 2017

On Oct. 18 BC Hydro responded with a two-month plan to address sediment and erosion control and, although no further enforcement action was taken, the problem areas are being monitored.

The B.C. agency also issued two orders on Dec. 22, both of which require action from BC Hydro and its’ contractors.

The first found that BC Hydro was not complying with conditions to conduct amphibian surveys and to protect amphibians on roads adjacent to wetlands and requires a detailed plan to be in place by Feb. 15.

The second order found BC Hydro was not complying with well monitoring requirements and, by January 16, the agency wants a list of all wells within one kilometre of the reservoir and details of the monitoring program.

BC Hydro did not return phone calls from DeSmog Canada, but a story posted on the BC Hydro site on Jan. 7 said that the construction, rather than being “rife with environmental violations,” stands as “a study in environmental best practice for major utility projects.”

Approval of the project, which will flood 83 kilometres of the main Peace River Valley and 35 kilometres of the tributary valleys, came with 150 legally binding federal and provincial conditions and that means the work by contractors is continually being inspected, says the article.

“We took immediate steps to respond in the face of some severe rain events that caused flash flooding and made erosion and sediment control even more challenging. In fact, the precipitation over the May to August 2016 period would be likely to occur only once or twice per century,” it says.

A new erosion and silt control program is in place, with 30 kilometres of silt fencing, nine sediment ponds and 240,000 square metres of the area hydroseeded. Fifteen employees on site are responsible for the erosion and sediment control program.

However, Ken Boon, Peace Valley Landowner Association president, said questions remain about the effects of the construction on the water quality in the Peace River and its tributaries.

“There are ongoing concerns with silt from the project. There are many concerns that have not been addressed with machines working directly in the river and creating silt,” he said.

The in-stream silt monitor appears to be 10 kilometres downstream from where the work is being done, Boon said.

“You have to wonder if that’s why everything seems to stay in allowable limits.”

However, it is difficult for opponents to monitor the work as a public viewing site that was scheduled to be in use last fall will now not be completed until later this year, Boon said.

“I think there were stability problems,” he said.

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Two enforcement orders released by the B.C. Environmental Assessment Office detail BC Hydro’s failure to comply with environmental protection rules during construction of the Site C dam.

The orders, issued to BC Hydro in late December and first reported by the Globe and Mail on Sunday, detail on-site inspections that found BC Hydro out of compliance with permit conditions related to the protection of drinking water and amphibian species.

One non-compliance order found BC Hydro failed to comply with two conditions outlined in Site C construction permits for the protection of amphibian species.

Condition 19 requires BC Hydro to “avoid and reduce injury and mortality to amphibians on roads adjacent to wetlands and other areas where amphibians are known to migrate across roads.”

A related condition, number 16, requires BC Hydro to conduct amphibian surveys at Portage Mountain to “identify specific mitigation structures and placement prior to road construction.”

However in late August, Alex McLean, a compliance inspector with the B.C. Environmental Assessment Office found BC Hydro had constructed an access road at Portage Mountain without conducting amphibian surveys or installing amphibian mitigation structures.

As DeSmog Canada previously reported, BC Hydro requested last-minute permission from the B.C. Ministry of Forests, Lakes and Natural Resource Operations to perform “emergency amphibian salvage” on the banks of the Peace River in May. The ministry granted BC Hydro permission in a manner some legal experts say was illegal.

The new non-compliance order could signal ongoing amphibian management troubles.

McLean ordered BC Hydro to bring in a qualified professional to oversee an amphibian survey and mitigation plan.

In an e-mailed statement BC Hydro spokesperson David Conway told DeSmog Canada BC Hydro will have a plan by that professional in place by February 15.

Conway said environmental approval of the Site C project “came with more than 150 legally binding federal and provincial conditions.”

“We take these conditions very seriously.”

According to another condition outlined in Site C’s environmental permit, BC Hydro is required to conduct regular monitoring of water wells located within one kilometre of the proposed Site C reservoir.

As outlined in the certificate, BC Hydro is responsible for ensuring wells near Site C, which will flood 83 kilometres of the Peace Valley, “continue to function as reliable and safe sources of water for human consumption by monitoring potentially affected wells, with the approval of potentially affected well owners, for significant long-term well-quality issues.”

Yet an inspection from the Environmental Assessment Office found BC Hydro has taken insufficient steps to fulfill this condition.

“No well monitoring as required by Condition 56 was conducted between the commencement of construction in July of 2015 and October 2016,” the enforcement order reads.

Inspectors find @BCHydro Violating Rules During #SiteC Construction https://t.co/FsFXPRqgta @carollinnitt #bcpoli #cdnpoli

— DeSmog Canada (@DeSmogCanada) January 5, 2017

In a statement e-mailed to DeSmog Canada, BC Hydro spokesperson David Conway said BC Hydro began placing ads in local papers in 2015 asking local well owners to participate in a water quality testing program but no responses were received.

“So BC Hydro decided to conduct groundwater sampling that would be representative of the water quality of surrounding wells,” Conway said.

BC Hydro conducted sampling in June, September and December of 2015 but heard from the B.C. Environmental Assessment Office that the sampling was not in compliance with condition 56, Conway said.

“That’s why we completed a geographic information system (GIS) review of the provincial database of registered well owners in April,” he said, adding that after contacting registered well owners by mail and phone and using ads in local papers, BC Hydro had a complete list of owners agreeing to participate.

“We collected the first round of samples in October,” Conway said. “We’ve provided evidence to the EAO that well monitoring began in October.”

Image: Site C construction. Photo: Garth Lenz/DeSmog Canada

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Gravel-bed rivers and their floodplains are the lifeblood of ecosystems and need to be allowed to run and flood unimpeded if species are to be protected and communities are to cope with climate change, a ground-breaking scientific study has found.

The broad valleys formed by rivers flowing from glaciated mountains, such as those found throughout B.C. and Alberta, are some of the most ecologically important habitats in North America, according to the team of scientists who have done the first extensive study of the full range of species that rely on gravel-bed rivers, ranging from microbes to bears. The paper was published online Friday in Science Advances.

In the region that stretches from Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming to the northern Yukon, gravel-bed river flood plains support more than half the plant life. About 70 per cent of the area’s bird species use the floodplain, while deer, elk, caribou, wolves and grizzly bears use the plains for food, habitat and as important migration corridors.

While everyone knows that fish rely on rivers, the scientists found that species such as cottonwood trees need the river flood to reproduce and the ever-changing landscape of changing channels and shifting gravel and rocks supports a complex food web.

Gravel-bed rivers are much more than water flowing through the channel, said lead author Ric Hauer, director of the University of Montana’s Center for Integrated research on the Environment.

“The river flows over and through the entire floodplain system, from valley wall to valley wall, and supports an extraordinary diversity of life. The river is so much bigger than it appears to be at first glance,” he said.

But the floodplains are endangered worldwide as the flat, productive valleys are attractive for agriculture, roads or houses and it is time to look at gravel bed rivers with new eyes, said Harvey Locke, co-founder of the Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative and one of the study’s authors.

“A wild and free river drives the life support system across the whole landscape and we need to keep them happy,” Locke said in an interview with DeSmog Canada.

“We need to let them be rivers and run free and do our development respecting that need instead of trying to control them.”

That means not building dams or levees that prevent essential flooding, Locke said.

“Flooding is critical to the health of the riparian system and, by extension, organisms across the whole landscape and, when you put in a dam for climate change mitigation you are killing that process. It’s a catastrophe not only for the immediate ecological effects, but it also puts a huge barrier to connectivity so species cannot go up the river to adapt to climate change,” Locke said.

Hydro dams are often touted as green energy, but, in reality they are a huge problem, not a solution to climate change, he said.

Locke emphasized that the scientific study does not look at the controversy behind individual projects such as the planned Site C dam in northeastern B.C., but said he personally regards Site C as a prime example of the problem.

Existing dams on the Peace River have already had a devastating effect downstream, he said.

“And the horror of wrecking more of that beautiful river valley around Fort St. John is an example of not thinking clearly. It’s very bad for the resilience of the landscape,” he said.

Gravel-bed rivers are found mainly in the western U.S. and Canada — and include major rivers such as the Columbia, Fraser, Flathead, Mackenzie and Yukon — and every part of B.C is affected by them, said Locke, who is hoping the scientific paper will attract the attention of groups such as planners and politicians who make development decisions.

“The really big point is that gravel-bed river systems are the heart of the whole landscape and you don’t want to clog the arteries attached to the heart, which is what a dam does,” he said.

Even in protected areas such as Yellowstone and Banff national parks, humans have altered the floodplains, the scientists found.

Hauer said the increasing pressures of climate change mean that species need access to intact gravel-bed ecosystems in order to survive.

“These systems must be protected and those that are already degraded must be restored,” he said.

Biologist and grizzly bear expert Michael Proctor, of Birchdale Ecological, one of the report’s authors, said the research highlighted how river systems are a focus of regional connectivity, not only for grizzly bears, but for all species.

“This paper helped me realize the amazing significance of gravel bed river systems, not just river valleys, as an ecological focus and arena of so much biodiversity and ecological processes,” Proctor said.

“It’s like the narrow pinch point in an hour-glass of influence. Everything is influenced by that pinch point.”

Human settlement and activities in those river valleys and floodplains reduces their biodiversity and significance, Proctor said.

“We need to leave and even restore some portions of these river systems to more of a natural condition,” he said.

Photo: Flathead River by Harvey Locke

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Toxic heavy metals, including arsenic, barium, cadmium, lithium and lead, are flowing unchecked into the Peace River following a series of unusual landslides that may be linked to B.C’s natural gas industry fracking operations.

The landslides began nearly two years ago and show no sign of stopping. So far, they have killed all fish along several kilometres of Brenot and Lynx creeks just downstream from the community of Hudson’s Hope.

As plumes of muddy water laced with contaminants pulse into the Peace River, scientists and local residents are struggling to understand what caused the landslides and why they have not ceased.

Hudson’s Hope mayor Gwen Johansson is also worried about a broader question raised by the ongoing pollution. The toxic metals are entering the Peace River in a zone slated to be flooded by the Site C dam. That zone could experience nearly 4,000 landslides should the dam be built and the impounded waters begin to rise in the landslide-prone area.

The landslide estimate is contained in a voluminous consultant’s report to BC Hydro, which under the direction of Premier Christy Clark is rapidly advancing work at Site C in an effort to push the project past “the point of no return.”

“If this much damage can result from tiny Brenot Creek, what happens to the reservoir if we get thousands more landslides?” Johansson asks.

No definitive cause has yet been identified to explain what caused the Brenot Creek landslides. But one possibility is that they were triggered or exacerbated by natural gas industry fracking operations, in which immense amounts of water are pressure-pumped deep underground with enough force to cause earthquakes. Fracking is known to cause unanticipated cracks or fractures in underground rock formations, allowing contaminated water, natural gas, oil and other constituents to move vast distances undetected.

Such brute-force operations happened frequently in the years immediately before the first slides were noted at Brenot creek in August 2014.

Between July 2010 and March 2013, a dozen earthquakes ranging between 1.6 and 3.4 in magnitude occurred in the Farrell Creek fracking zone, about eight kilometres away from Lynx and Brenot creeks. (A small number of other fracking operations also occurred closer to the creeks, but do not show up in the seismographic record.)

Requests to B.C.’s Oil and Gas Commission or OGC, and information gleaned from non-redacted parts of Freedom of Information requests to BC Hydro, indicate that by March of 2013 both the provincial energy industry regulator and the Crown-owned hydro provider were increasingly concerned about “events” at Farrell Creek.

“Right now our focus is on getting the improved seismographic network up and running. We will continue to monitor and study all cases of induced seismicity [earthquakes] in NEBC [Northeast British Columbia],” Dan Walker, the OGC’s then senior petroleum engineer wrote in an email to Andrew Watson, BC Hydro’s engineering division manager, on March 7 of that year. The email was written two days after the last of the 12 earthquakes occurred at Farrell Creek.

By the time of that earthquake, Talisman Energy, the biggest natural gas company then operating at Farrell Creek, knew that wastewater was disappearing below one of four massive “retention ponds” that it had built to store millions of litres of highly contaminated water from its fracking operations.

A detailed investigation subsequently paid for by Talisman and conducted by Matrix Solutions, an environmental engineering firm, notes that Talisman’s “leakage management system” detected that contaminated water was escaping from between two liners that were supposed to trap and prevent Pond A’s toxic brew from polluting the ground and water around it.

Pond A had likely leaked for five months beginning in January 2013. In June of that year, Talisman drained Pond A and confirmed that the leaks had, indeed, occurred.

The wastewater ponds and gas reserves in the region are now owned by Progress Energy, owned in turn by Petronas, the Malaysian state-owned petro giant that the provincial government is eager to see build a liquefied natural gas terminal at Lelu Island near Prince Rupert. The Oil and Gas Commission, which regulates B.C.’s oil and gas industry, subsequently ordered Talisman to drain the remaining three ponds. At that point, it was discovered that Pond D was leaking toxic wastewater too.

Among the toxic substances found in water samples collected from groundwater sources underneath Talisman’s faulty storage pits were arsenic, barium, cadmium, lithium and lead, the same hazardous compounds that are found in the billions of fine sediments that continue to turn the waters of Brenot and Lynx creeks a muddy brown and enter the fish-bearing Peace River.

The Matrix Solutions report released in May 2015 noted that the release of toxic metals into the environment was predictable. By digging the huge pits and exposing massive amounts of unearthed material to the air, “surface and groundwater acidification” were potential risks, Matrix said.

“The primary concern for receiving environments related to acidic groundwater is the potential for release of trace metals,” the report warned.

Whether or not the fracking-induced earthquakes or the failures at Talisman’s waste ponds played any role in events at Brenot and Lynx creeks is unknown. To date, no studies have been done in the region to determine how and where water moves below ground. In its report of more than 2,200 pages, Matrix noted a troubling lack of such information. “Flow direction is not documented,” the Matrix report said. However, the report went on to say that groundwater generally moves from “topographic highs toward topographic lows.” In other words, it moves downhill.

Below the Farrell Creek fracking zone, the waters of Lynx and Brenot creeks continue to be so full of contaminants that a person’s finger placed just a millimeter below the surface disappears from view. The pollution caused one local farmer to quip at the time that his “cows are not supposed to chew the water.”

Martin Geertsema, a geomorphologist with the provincial Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations in Prince George, says he has never seen anything quite like what has occurred at the slide site since August 2014.

“We’ve got a camera pointed at the landslide. I’d like to install a few more to try to figure out what the heck is going on. It’s very unusual. There’s nothing quite like this,” Geertsema said in an interview.

“At other slide sites the water flows finished in a few days. The difference here is it just keeps going. Water is coming out of the base and because the water is eroding soil from the base it leads to cliff collapse. And the cliff is composed primarily of sand and some clay. And when it collapses, the debris just flows.”

Geertsema notes that the region is known for naturally occurring landslides, many of which show signs of “considerable antiquity.” However, today’s slides are occurring in a region with some of the most extensive and intensive industrial land-uses anywhere in B.C., including two major hydroelectric dams and reservoirs and water-intensive natural gas fracking operations that the OGC has concluded triggered clusters of earthquakes in various locales in northeast B.C.

When the slides at Brenot Creek first began, the District of Hudson’s Hope advised local residents not to drink the water. The advisory was followed by a similar one issued by the provincial government. The town’s council later paid a hydrogeologist and consulting water expert, Gilles Wendling, to collect and test water samples at the slide site to determine how toxic the water was.

Mayor Johansson remains disturbed by the event’s duration, its origins and most of all its timing. At the time that the first landslide was discovered, the region had endured weeks of extremely hot and dry weather. A water-triggered landslide in August was, Johansson felt, highly unusual.

In January 2015, Johansson wrote an article in a newsletter published by the District. During a recent interview she said her views remain unchanged.

“I have contacted MoE [B.C.’s Ministry of Environment] to ask what further steps they are planning and to find out when the advisory might be lifted. The MoE representative said they have no plans to do anything further, other than file a report. He said he expected that eventually the creek would cleanse itself.”

“That seems pretty inadequate. Test results show levels of exotic metals such as lithium, barium, cadmium, and others to be significantly above guidelines. They are not normally found in shallow ground or surface water. They have not shown up at those levels in any previous testing in the area, and I am not aware of similar readings being found anywhere in the northeast of the province. Some of the metals are toxic. They pose a risk to human and animal health.”

The OGC, which visited the site shortly after the slides began, concluded that the contaminants in the water were commonly found in the soils in and around the creek and that a natural spring was the source of the groundwater.

“The 2014 landslide appears to be entirely natural, and is one of a number of similar landslides that have occurred along Brenot and Lynx creeks over the last few hundred years, resulting from natural geomorphic processes,” Allan Chapman, the OGC’s hydrologist reported in November, 2014.

Chapman added that the “landslide deposited a moderate volume of fine-grained silt into Brenot Creek and Lynx Creek. I would anticipate that these deposits along the stream channels will continue to release the elevated metals into the stream water, affecting the stream water quality, for an extended period of time.”

Wendling, however, has questions. For one, the slide was not a singular event. Slides continue to occur there regularly. In an interview from his Nanaimo office, Wendling said the only way to understand whether the presence of toxic metals in the water is natural or not would be to dig deep into the ground around where the slides have occurred and to see whether the metals are found there. If they are not, and are being carried into the creek by groundwater, then where is the groundwater flowing from and why does it continue flowing in such intensity so long after the first slides?

Such test wells might shed light on whether or not major changes to the landscape such as the nearby giant Williston reservoir and/or natural gas drilling and fracking operations played a role in altering the direction in which groundwater flowed, Wendling said.

Wendling, an independent professional hydrologist, works closely with First Nation governments in the northeast who are concerned about the gas industry’s impacts on water resources. He said the high volume of groundwater entering Brenot and Lynx creeks, the contaminated soils being carried in that water, and when the slides began are all of concern. Typically, he said, such events occur in the spring months following periods of intense rain and snowmelt. But this one appears to have occurred in the middle of a drought, he said.

Shortly after the slides began, Wending says he walked the area and was struck by the dramatically different water levels upstream and downstream of where Brenot creek enters Lynx creek. Upstream, Lynx creek was virtually dry. Downstream, the creek had 50 times the normal water discharge.

“Why do two similar steams have such a difference in flows?” Wendling asked, adding that it was “important to investigate” all possible explanations for “the discharge of larger flows of shallow groundwater in proximity to Brenot creek.”

However, no one is expecting any such investigations any time soon. Neither BC Hydro, the Oil and Gas Commission, provincial ministries such as Environment, or the natural gas industry have groundwater flow monitoring wells in place: a fact that Geertsema laments.

“I think it would be very useful to characterize groundwater flows,” Geertsema said. “It would help me and it would help the mayor whose backyard is where the problem is.”

It would also be extremely useful in light of another uncomfortable truth about earthquakes and their potential to alter groundwater flows and trigger landslides.

Hydroelectric reservoirs themselves can and do induce earthquakes. After the massive Three Gorges Dam was built in China, for example, more than 3,400 earthquakes were recorded between when the dam’s reservoir began to fill in June 2003 and the end of 2009. The frequency of earthquakes in the region during those seven years was 30 times greater than before the dam’s reservoir began to fill.

A network of groundwater testing wells would go some way to helping people in the region understand what might occur as the Site C dam goes from concept to potential reality over the coming years.

The reservoir that would be created by the dam would flood nearly 110 kilometres of the Peace River valley and side valleys.

Should the Site C dam be completed, steadily rising waters impounded by the dam are expected to cover ground vegetation that will react with the water to contaminate it with methylmercury, a substance that continues to poison fish in the massive Williston reservoir nearly 50 years after the first dam on the Peace River, the W.A.C. Bennett Dam, was completed in 1968. First Nations people and anglers are warned not to eat fish from the artificial lake, whose shores continue to erode and slide into the reservoir, causing further contamination.

Johansson’s worry is that any one of a number of other landslides like those at Brenot creek could occur in future years, leading to a steady increase in the amount and variety of other waterborne toxins that could one day accumulate in the Site C reservoir. Toxic water impounded by the future dam would have to be released to power the dam’s hydroelectric turbines, meaning that such water would then flow downstream toward the wildlife rich Peace-Athabasca Delta, one of the world’s largest freshwater deltas and a critically important staging area for migrating birds.

Meanwhile, as Site C construction activities accelerate, members of UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee are about to conduct a study into the impacts that the dam could have on Wood Buffalo National Park, a World Heritage Site. The investigation was prompted by a petition from Alberta First Nations concerned about the potential downstream impacts of the $9 billion hydroelectric project. The committee has asked the federal government to ensure that no irreversible work on Site C takes place until it has completed its mission and report.

This article originally appeared on Policy Note.

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